Emotions, Metaphors and Reality by Furmuzachi, Gabriel
EMOTfONS, METAPHORS AND REAfiITY 
A Thesis 
presented to tha 
D e p a r t m e n t  of Philosophy 
wehead U n i v e r s i t y ,  Thirnnar w, Ontario 
In partial fuifillment 
of the requireaients for the 
dogtee o f  M a s t e r  o f  Ar ts  
National Library 1+1 ,.,da Bibliothèque nationale du Canada 
Acquisitions and Acquisitions et 
Bibtographic Services services bibliographiques 
395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A O N 4  OtrawaON K 1 A W  
Canada Canada 
The author has granted a non- 
exclusive licence allowing the 
National Lîbrary of Canada to 
reproduce, loan, distribute or sell 
copies of this thesis in microform, 
paper or electronic formats. 
The author retains ownership of the 
copyright in this thesis. Neither the 
thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author's 
permission. 
L'auteur a accordé une licence non 
exclusive permettant à la 
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de 
reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou 
vendre des copies de cette thèse sous 
la forme de microfiche/nlm, de 
reproduction sur papier ou sur format 
électronique. 
L'auteur conserve la propriété du 
droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. 
Ni la thése ni des extraits substântiels 
de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés 
ou autrement reproduits sans son 
autorisation. 
LAKEHEAD U T 1  VERS ITY 
OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH 
T i t l e  o f  thesis:  Emotions, Metaphors and Reality 
Name of student: Gabr ie l  Furmuzachi 
Degree Awarded: Master of Arts 
The undersigned Supervising Commit tee certify 
that this thesis has been prepared u n d e r  their direction 
and that the candidate has complied 
with the Masterr s r e g u l a t i o n s  
Advisor: Richard A. Berg 
Cortunittee Member: Todd Duf re s n e  
Cornmittee Member: J . D .  Rabb 
In  t h e i r  work The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Wilosophy and 
Culture in English Canada 1850-1 950, Leslie Armour and Elizabeth 
Trott consider that tne Canadian way of doing philosophy uses 
reason in an accommodationist manner- 1 propose i n  t h i s  thesis t h a t  
William Lyall' s Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature 
represents a splendid example of the accomodationist use of 
reason . 
The Maritimes p h i l o s o p h e r  advances t h e  idea that ernotions 
have a cognitive value, a claim which 1 support by t ry ing  to put 
Lyallfs ideas in a modern framework offered by French philosopher 
Jean  Paul Sartre. Latent in Lyallrs work can a lso  be found a theory 
of metaphor which 1 t r y  to revive with the help of French 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur. 
Thus, fo l lowing  Lyall, emotions and reason are always in a 
balance and they work together in order to give us a m o r e  
consistent and fuller grasp of  r e a l i t y .  
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T h e  two extremes i n  philosophizing - the highly 
ideal and the  l o w  s e n s a t i o n a l  - are equa l ly  a t  
f a u l t .  They both equally subject the mind to a 
kind of necessity of a c t i o n ,  or o f  being acted 
upon, i n s t e a d  o f  viewing it as Being, having 
l a w s  by which it is regulated, indeed, b u t  
still possessed of a free activity, a personal 
ex i s tence ,  and an action with in  itself.  
William L y a l l  
(1811 - 1890)  
This chap t e r  aims t o  give a p i c t u r e  of William Lyallfs 
phi losophica l  i deas .  His work In te l lec t ,  the Wnotions and the Moral 
N a t u r e  (1855) can be considered an e x a m p l e  o f  the accommodationist 
theory of reason, as it is developed i n  Leslie Armour and Elizabeth 
T r o t t ' s  s t udy  of  Canadian philosophy ana cu l tu r e ,  The Faces of 
Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and C u l t u r e  in English Canada (1850 - 
1950) published in 1981 (hencefor th  abbreviated as Faces of Reason). 
B r i e f l y  pu t ,  Armour and Tro t t  consider that t h e  accommodationist use 
o f  reason is (o r ,  a t  least, used  t o  be i n  the  period of t h e  analyzed 
i n  t h e i r  work) typical o f  English Canadian philosophers and it 
implies that reason is used as a means t o  accommodate ph i lo soph ica l  
p o s i t i o n s  opposed t o  one8 s own i n  order t o  learn from t h e m .  However, 
their analysis of L y a l l F s  work does no t  conclude on a very happy 
note .  T h e  Maritimes professor  does n o t  seem t o  have brought an 
o r i g i n a l  con t r i bu t ion  t o  philosophy. Moreover, he se-, Armour and 
T r o t t  consider, t o  be a r ep re sen t a t i ve  o f  Canadian philosophy on ly  i n  
name. M y  claim i n  t h i s  chapter  is that con t ra ry  t o  t h e  above 
considerations,  Lyall should be taken into account i n  an at tempt  t o  
configure a p ic ture  of philosophy as done i n  Canada. L y a l l r s  
p a r t i c u l a r  understanding of t h e  mot ions  (of t h e  way they connect us  
with phenornenal world) and of their  r e l a t ionsh ip  with i n t e l l e c t  i n  
the  imaginative s t a t e  of mind is an original contr ibut ion which, 
however. is overlooked because it is not f u l l y  in te rpre ted .  
L y a l l f s  philosophical  ideas  c m  be character ized as having an 
i d e a l i s t  s t reak ,  even though, as we will see,  he r e j e c t s  t h e  s o r t  of 
idealism t h a t  Berkeley, f o r  example, o r  Hegel, prac t ice .  Moreover, 
t h e r e  can be spotted i n  h i s  work a tendency toward mind/body dualism 
which develops out of h i s  s truggle t o  meet t h e  shortcomings of 
ideal ism and materialism. Following my explanation of L y a l l r s  thought 
it will be easy t o  see that, if the sort of  idealism descr ibed by 
Armour and Tro t t  is indeed s p e c i f i c  t o  Canadian philosophers, then 
L y a l l r s  ideas  f i t  t h e i r  desc r ip t ion  very wel l ,  
L y a l l r s  ideas a r e  not e a s i l y  access ib le  because of t h e  
pecu l i a r  way i n  which he narrows d o m  what he thinks is w o r t h y  f r o m  
t h e  works o f  other philosophers regarding the issues t h a t  he 
analyzes. His understandng of t h e  e s s e n t i a l  q u a l i t i e s  of mat te r ,  
where he "converses" with John Locke and Thomas Brown o r  t h e  r o l e  
played by emotions r e l a t i v e  t o  morality, where he draws on David 
Humers and Immanuel Kant's ideas  i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  pecu l i a r i ty .  
Another issue t h a t  unàe r l i e s  Lyallrs work is cons t i tu t ed  by 
his proneness t o  using metaphorical language which is s u r e l y  t o  be 
expected considering t h a t  he wr i tes  under t h e  influence o f  the 
Romantic movement. However, t h i s  explanation i s  t o o  s i m p l i s t i c  and 
leaves undeveloped an important s ide of h i s  work. T h e  use of 
rnetaphorical language m a r k s  the  existence of a preoccupation with the 
productive capaci ty  of language. Imagination is  a key term here: the  
imaginative s t a t e  is the  place where motions and the i n t e l l e c t  ( i n  
i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  create metaphors) meet, where they are under each 
other r s  influence. T h i s  represents an important issue, because 
although Lyal l  considered the  i n t e l l e c t  t o  be divorced from 
phenomenal reality and gave emotions f u l l  c redi t  f o r  making u s  a part 
of t he  world (an idea which will be analyzed i n  the  second chapter), 
fo r  connecting us with Nature, t h e  i n t e l l e c t  too should have been 
awarded t h i s  honour ( t h i s  w i l l  cons t i tu te  my preoccupation i n  the 
t h i r d  chapter) . 
Therefore, i n  t h i s  chapter, a f t e r  giving a general perspective 
on Lyallr  s In te l lec t ,  the Emotions and the Moral Nature 1 w i l l  
analyze the  p a r t  t h a t  deals w i t h  h i s  theory of emotions and 1 w i l l  
look closer  a t  how emotions are connected with t h e  i n t e l l e c t  i n  the 
imaginative s t a t e .  I w i l l  try t o  emphasize some of the  relevant 
aspects which w i l l  become t h e  f o c i  of further  and more deta i led  
considerations which w i l l  e s t ab l i sh  more clearly Lyallfs s ta tus  as a 
Canadian philosopher- 
AW OVeRVIEW OF WILLIAM LPALLf S PHILOSOPmr 
Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott give an interpretation of 
philosopby as it was done in Canada by stressing a special use of 
reason which can be seen at work in the musings of most English 
Canadian philosophers. In the Faces of Reason, they state: 
The single point which we would make here if we 
could make &ly one point in this book would be 
this: Dominantly in English Canadian philosophy, 
reason is used as a device to explore 
alternatives, to suggest ways of- combining 
apparently contradictory ideas, to discover nex 
ways of passing from one idea to another. Only 
rarely it is used as an intellectual substitute 
for force - as a device to defeat one's opponent, 
to show h i s  ideas to be without foundation, or to 
discredit his claims to philosophical thought. 
There is, in short, a kind of philosophical 
federalism at work, a natural inclination to find 
out why oners neighbor thinks differently rather 
than  to find out how to show him up as an idiot. 
(1981, 4) 
Thus, for Armour and Tsott, many of the early Canadian philosophers 
used reas on t h i s  particular accommodationist way . They shared 
willingness to attempt to understand and accommoaate philosophical 
positions opposed to their own" ( J - D .  Rabb 1986, 93) . In other words, 
the opinion of the Other counts. Dominantly, in Canada, following 
Annous and Trott' s findings, the Other as such counts, whether it 
represents other human beings or Nature. It should not be dismissed 
j u s t  because it a s s e r t s  something d i f f e r e n t  t o  what i s  expected o r  it 
a s s e r t  i tself  - i n  as m u c h  as Nature is concerned - i n  r a t h e r  
unexpected ways. From t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  given by Armour and T r o t t ,  one 
c m  i n f e r  that reason is not a r i g i d  t o o l  d iv id ing  and s t r u c t u r i n g  
ideas  whife be ing  guided by ve ry  s t r i c t  rules. Reason is t h e  c a t a l y s t  
fo r  mediating apparent  conf ron t ing  pos i t i ons  and not  t h e  t r i b u n a l  
where c o n f l i c t i n g  ideas  meet. In  t h e i r  book, Armour and T r o t t  look 
f o r  "a p a r t i c u l a r  way i n  which reason develops a s  it comes t o  be 
s u b s t i t u t &  for i n s i g h t  and i n t u i t i o n  i n  order  t h a t  c e r t a i n  kinds of 
c o n f l i c t s  might be overcome i n  a reasonable way" (1981, 18)  . 
Reason, when used by Canadian philosophers,  is thus seen as 
developing and as assuming d i f f e r e n t  "faces", according t o  the 
i n e v i t a b l e  changes t h a t  occur  i n  e i t h e r  sc ience  o r  publ ic  awareness, 
o r  i n  i ts  dia logue with f a i t h  o r  when d i f f e r e n t  t r a d i t i o n s  axe 
challenged. For example, John Watson saw reason as an ally i n  h i s  
concern t o  "develop and defend a  kind of na t iona l i sm which would be 
compatible with EL world order", t o  a t t enua te  individual ism "while 
maintaining a  s t rong  sense  of human r i g h t s  and l i b e r t i e s "  (Ibid., 
5 1 2 ) .  George John B l e w e t t  uses reason i n  order  " to  find a picture of 
the world i n  w h i c h  t h e  world i s  no t  a mere p lay th ing  o f  Godrs and not 
a mere machine. H e  wants t o  find a view of the world wi thin  which.. 
animal l i f e  comes t o  have a p o i n t  beyond i t s  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  f o r  human 
food, c lo th ing ,  and amusement" ( Ib id . ,  5 1 4 )  . Rupert Lodge is 
searching f o r  " the  l i m i t s  of reason i n  order  t o  es tab l i s f i  a t r u c e  
between the combatant p a r t i e s  so  t h a t  he can c r e a t e ,  i n  an 
educat ional  s e t t i n g ,  a common he r i t age  while preserving a c u l t u r a l  
p l u r a l i t y "  (Ibid. ,  513). These examples, among many o thers ,  e n t i t l e  
Armour and T r o t t  t o  corne t o  the conclusion t h a t  i n  Canada, there is a 
sort of philosophical federalism at work. Arrnour writes in "The Faces 
of Reason and Its C r i t i c s " ,  an article in the journal Dialogue, that: 
[I J n the period which Prof. Trott and 1 chose, we 
find the kind of philosophical federalism which 
one might expect under the circumstances. We 
found James Beaven, perhaps something of a bigot 
before he left Englana, trying to find a rational 
framework within which rival kinds of Christians 
could make common cause- We found philosophers of 
the Scottish common sense tradition, like William 
Lyall, becoming much more eclectic as their lives 
wore on in Canada, (1986, 76) 
There is, therefore, something distinctive about Canadian philosophy 
and there is sornething which gives shape t o  philosophical ideas 
promoted by Canadian philosophers, However, it is not my purpose here 
to argue whether the thesis sustaining Faces of Reason is legitimate 
or not. Rather, what 1 am interested in is to see how William Lyall's 
work f i t s  into the framework thus  provided. In other words, given 
this matrix, 1 want to see how Lyall's ideas develop within it and 
also how t h e y  are appreciated by Arniour and Trott. 
L y a l l  the Philonupher, Lyall the R o m a a t i c  
What should be done now is to take a look at Lyall's 
philosophical background and, by surveying In t e l l ec t ,  the Emotions 
and the Mural Nature, to sketch his philosophical stand point. 
First, let us briefly consider the context in which the book 
was written. William Lyall taught philosophy at the Free Church 
College i n  Halifax, which was l a te r  t o  become Dalhousie Univers i ty .  
Fmour and T r o t t  t e l l  us t h a t  Lyall:  
had been educated first  at  the Universi ty of  
Glasgow and then a t  Ediriburgh, where he 
encountered t h e  thought of Thomas Brown w h i c h  was 
t o  l e ave  a l a s t i n g  mark on his philosophy- For a 
t h e  he çerved as a clergyman and took part  of 
the  Free Chuxch i n  t h e  G r e a t  Disruption of 1843- 
H e  had a church i n  Linlithgow when, i n  1848,  he 
c a m e  t o  Ontario as a t u t o r  a t  Knox College- Two 
years later, Paxton Young replaced him a t  Knox 
when he decided t o  accept  a chair a t  t he  new Free  
Church College i n  Halifax.  T h e  Free Church 
Col lege of Halifax had a staff of  two: L y a l l ,  who 
se rved  o f f i c i a l l y  as Professor  of Mental and 
Moral Philosophy and C l a s s i c a l  L i t e r a tu re ,  and 
Andrew King, who w a s  Professor of Theology- I n  
f a c t ,  Lyall t aught  - a l1  t h e  arts sub jec t s -  (1981, 
62 1 
Lya l l  was educated i n  Scotland where he encountered t h e  philosophy of  
c o m m o n  sense. In  Canada, a f t e r  two years  as a t u t o r  at Knox College, 
he moved t o  Halifax where he taught n o t  only  philosophy of mind and 
ethics but  a l 1  a r t s - r e l a t e d  sub j ec t s  as  well. Lyall  was, as it was 
w r i t t e n  i n  the Dalhousie Gazet te  ( 2 0  D e c e m b e r  1893,  1361, "the whole 
Faculty of Arts". 
The In te l lec t ,  the Emotions and the M o r a l  Nature is  L y a l l ' s  
major work. It touches upon many phi losophica l  f o c i  a s  it opens with 
an ana lys i s  of  the i n t e l l e c t  followed by an inquiry  i n t o  the w o r l d  of  
emotions, both  of  them constituting a picture of t h e  human be ing  i n  
i t s  uniqueness. T h e  third p a r t  i s  made up of r e f l ec t i ons  on moral 
na ture ,  where t h e  conclusions reached i n  t h e  f i r s t  two parts are 
jo ined  toge ther  i n  an at tempt t o  explain how h u m a n  beings c o e x i s t ,  
how they  corne t o g e t h e r  i n  a community. However, according t o  F. 
H i l t on  Page, i n  William L y a l l  in H i s  S e t t i n g s  (1980) : 
Lyal18 s book i s  very much a per iod piece. 1 do 
not  say t h i s  t o  belittle it as 1 am myself r a t h e r  
p a r t i a l  t o  period-pieces, e spec ia l ly  t hose  of 
Lyall '  s own period-anyone reading Lyal l '  s book 
now has t o  be aware of the  conventions and 
attitudes of  the t h e ;  otherwise his a t t e n t i o n  
w i l l  be d i s t r a c t e d  from t h e  rnatter t o  t h e  manner 
of writing-..There was a time when almost every 
Sco t t i sh  professor of philosophy publ ished h i s  
l e c t u r e s -  Volumes of l e c t u r e s  were almost as 
popular as volumes o f  sermons. To understand 
Lyal l  it is necessary t o  understand the 
p e c u l i a r i t i e s  of t h e  S c o t t i s h  philosophy lecture 
of t h i s  period,  on which his own l e c t u r e s  wero, 
i f  uri_consciously, s t y l i s t i c a l l y  modeled.. [For 
Lyal l , ]~ .e loquent  passages; t a s t e ,  culture, moral 
and s p i r i t u a l  e leva t ion  ... [were important] . (1980, 
59-61) 
T h o u g h  1 would not  Say t h a t  Lya l l ' s  book merely r ep resen t s  a 
co l l ec t ion  of h i s  p u b l i c  l ec tu re s ,  t h i s  explains,  t o  a c e r t a i n  
ex ten t ,  w h y  Lyall used it as a textbook f o r  the  c l a s s e s  he taught;  
f o r  a good number of years, s o  did teachers  i n  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  col leges  
(Dalhousie Gazette, 30 January, 18 90) . The "eloquent passages", t h e  
metaphorical language intertwined w i t h  phi losophical  explanat ions  a s  
wel l  a s  t h e  abruptness of t h e  presen ta t ion  and t h e  mul t i tude  of  ideas  
t h a t  unexpectedly spring up here  and there leaving enough space f o r  
d e t a i l s  i n  t h e  classroom can thus  be understood. B u t  t h i s ,  I th ink,  
is not  the  only explanation f o r  Lyal18s s t y l e .  
Reading Lyall is  of ten s i m i l a r  t o  reading from t h e  works o f  a 
Romantic poet ,  In  h i s  work, quotat ions  from poe ts  r i v a l  w i t h  
quotations f r o m  philosophers, That which cannot b e  explained by 
reason alone, by t h e  i n t e l l e c t ,  i s  o f t e n  cha rac t e r i zed  by Lyal l  as 
something t h a t  "def ies  def in i t ion"  o r  is "unexplainable" and thus  is 
engulfed i n  an aura  o f  rnystery. 
When t a l k i n g  about the mind, f o r  example, i n  an attempt t o  
revise h i s  ideas and h i s  f indings  w i t h  regard t o  t h i s  issue i n  order 
r e  j ect the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  mesely organic product  , 
Lyal l  writes i n  the  tone  of  i d e a l i s t  philosophy: t h e  f irst  idea one 
has is about onese l f  and it is  followed by t h e  one about t h e  o t h e r  
than self, o r  "ex t e rna l i t y "  which implies the exis tence  of  "matter  
wrapping up t h e  mind". It fol lows t h e  idea o f  substance, t hen  those  
o f  space and t h e  and power which becorne " the  sub jec t s  of science",  
Science i tself something which develops , s omething which advances 
and mind's role 'is no t  [ t o  bel i t s e l f  a mere law, but  is conversant  
about t h e  l a w "  ; it 'is i n t e l l i g e n t  of it"; un£ o ld  i t s  
process o r  laws - is cognizant  of itself". 
But then,  soon a f t e r  talking about the mind employing concepts 
dear  t h e  philosophy 
brings into d i scuss ion  
t h e  
one 
t ime , Lyal l  changes perspec t ive  and 
t h e  f a c u l t i e s  mind, imagination 
says t h a t :  
i f  we go i n t o  t h e  region of imagination,  i f  we 
mark the  subtle process  of t h a t  f a c u l t y ,  i f  we 
observe i t s  potent sway - h o w  it e t h e r e a l i z e s  o r  
s p i r i t u a l i z e s  mat te r  itself, c l o t h e s  it i n  i ts  
own beauty,  invests it i n  i ts  own f a i r  hues, 
s c a t t e r s  around i ts  thousand s p e l l s ,  gives 
animation and meaning t o  every o b j e c t  by which w e  
a r e  surrounded, and t o  every sound t h a t  comes t o  
us, t o  the l i g h t e s t  whisper o f  t h e  breeze, and t o  
the s t i l l es t  r u s t l i n g  of t h e  summer o r  t h e  autumn 
fo l i age ;  which hears  a voice i n  t h e  gurgling 
brook, that comes £rom depths y e t  unfathomed by 
t h e  mind i t se l f ,  and l i s t e n s  i n  converse with the 
ocean as it m~rmurs unceasingly, and with 
Wordsworth, hea r s  t h e  sound of another  ocean 
' r o l l i n g  evermore', when 'our s o u l s  have s i g h t  of 
t h a t  Unmortal sea which brought us  h i t h e r r :  who  
w i l l  Say t h a t  a l 1  t h i s  i s  t h e  result of mere 
organiza t ion?  Who would be a materialist who has 
ever  f e l t  t h e  v i s i t a t i o n s  of t h a t  spirit which 
cornes t o  us when nature i s  s t i l l ,  which woos u s  
i n  t h e  moods and aspects of c r e a t i o n ,  who has 
felt - 'A presence t h a t  d i s t u r b s  him with t h e  
joy of e l e v a t e d  thoughtsc ,  who has c u l t i v a t e d  and 
cher i shed  t h a t  presence, and is indeed hardly  
ever unat tended by it, so t h a t  it meets him i n  
and 
every pathway where t h e  inf luences  of na ture  a r e  
around h k ?  (1855, 93-94) 
Mind, therefore, according to Lyall ,  i s  not a product, is not "an 
organic  result";  it is d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  m a t t e r .  The phi losophical  
inquiry,  guided by reason, as well as t h e  emotions one experiences 
under imaginationrs s p e l l  bring us t o  t h e  same conclusion which is 
t h a t  mat te r  is not  a l 1  t h e r e  i s  and t h a t  t h e  mind is no t  merely a 
product of it. T h i s  is, though, j u s t  an example among o thers .  
As  Lyal l  sees  it then, metaphors and concepts work together  f o r  
t h e  b e n e f i t  of a b e t t e r  explanation. A comect ion between philosophy 
and poet ry  i s  something w h i c h  o f t en  develops i n  the  Romantic period. 
G i l l e s  Deleuze, i n  one of his  l e c t u r e s  about Kant (1978), advances 
t h e  r a d i c a l  idea that w e  never find those  who understand philosophers 
among philosophers. In Kant's case, h i s  b e s t  d i sc ip l e  w a s  none other  
thdn Hdlderlin. T h e  f o r  Kant, t o  g ive  an exarnple, ceaçes t o  have a 
psychological  o r  cosmological connotation. It becomes a pure f o m ;  it 
is n o t  something t h a t  unfolds c i r c u l a r l y  but ra ther  something t h a t  
stretches itself,  l i n e a r l y .  This kind of t h e  is t h e  pure  and a p t y  
form i n  which, Deleuze claims, HOlderlinrs Oedipus wanders. ~ h e r e  is 
then an intimate comect ion  between t h e  findings of phiiosophy and 
poetic effusiveness ,  
B u t  how is t h i s  r e l a t e d  t o  Lyal l?  1s Lyal l ' s  aff luence of 
p o e t i c  language inter twined with phi losophical  arguments a mere proof 
of h i s  wr i t ing  f o r  the sake of  an audience, f o r  t h e  sake o f  eloquent, 
though scholar ly  presentations? 1s it proof of h i s  being an incurable 
Romantic? O r  does it imply something more than t h a t ?  Can it be t h a t  
h i s  e f f o r t s  were d i r e c t e d  toward an attempt t o  unpack Romantic themes 
and common places i n  a phi losophical  mi l ieu  thus feeding t h e  
philosophical  r e f l ec t ion  i t s e l f  with meanings revealed by poe t i c  
creation? I t h i n k  t h i s  qyes t ion deserves an af f i rmat ive  a n s w e r .  
In  sum, with Lyall ,  philosophical  reason and p o e t i c  imagination 
m e e t ;  w i t h  Lyall, reason and mot ion  jo in  hands and c r e a t e  a balance. 
T h i s  way, reason is not  used as t h e  one and only t r u e  philosophical  
tool ,  which is an idea t h a t  underlines the t h e s i s  sus t a in ing  Armour 
and Tro t t ' s  Faces of Reason, that is ,  reason is used by  English 
Canadian philosophers i n  an accommodationist marner. 
Lyall s B&&hoâ 
L e t  us now take a c loser  look at t h e  content of the Intellect, 
the Emotions and the M o r a l  Nature i n  order  t o  i l l u s t r a t e  what 1 
called a t  t h e  beginning of t h i s  chapter Lÿallfs pecu l i a r  way of 
re ta in ing  w h a t  is  usefu l  £rom the works of other philosophers. 
L y a l l f s  ideas w e r e  developed i n  c lose  connection t o  t h e  Scot t i sh  
philosophy of comon sense.  He studied thoroughly Locke, R e i d ,  
C a r l y l e  and, espec ia l ly ,  Thomas Brown, as well as Descartes, Kant and 
Fichte. B i s  way of dea l ing  w i t h  th ings can be reduced t o  so r t ing  and 
c la r i fy ing  intuitions, "which a r e  bas ic  c e r t a i n t i e s  w h i c h  are given 
t o  us" (Armour/Trott 1981, 66), i n  order t o  i n t e g r a t e  them i n t o  a 
coherent pattern. Once a t  t h i s  point ,  he r e - e x a m i n e s  t h e  
philosophical  s i t u a t i o n  t o  see w h a t  o ther ,  new i n t u i t i o n s  corne t o  
light. Lyal l  "tends t o  s t a t e  a thesis, and then qua l i fy  it, qual i fy  
it some more, and then qual i fy  it stj-11 fur ther .  After several pages 
of such qua l i f i ca t ions  w e  discover t h a t  he does not  hold the o r ig ina l  
t hes i s  a t  al l"  (J.D .Rabb, 1990 )  . For exânipfe, t h i s  i s  L y a l l  t a l k i n g  
about t h e  essential q u a l i t i e s  of matter: he starts by saying that  "we 
have thus, then,  a r r ived  a t  the  e s s e n t i a l  p roper t i e s  of matter.  These 
a r e  extension, d i v i s i b i l i t y ,  s o l i d i t y  o r  f l u i d i t y ,  hardness o r  
softness,  and figure" (Lyal l  1855, 47). Then, l i k e  Locke, he c l e a r l y  
dis t inguishes  between these  e s sen t i a l ,  o r  primary qua l i t i e s  and t h e  
secondary q u a l i t i e s  such as color ,  sound, fragrance, heat or  co ld ,  
sweetness o r  bittemess which "do not  e n t e r  i n t o  our idea of matter"- 
There is  nothing su rp r i s ing  up t o  here. Other philosophers worked 
with this d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  t h e  European phi losophical  t r a d i t i o n -  When 
one would expect t h a t  he is happy with t h e  framework, he a c t u a l l y  
goes fu r the r ,  turning t o  the thought of h i s  former teacher, t h e  
Scot t ish common sense phiLosopher Thomas Brown. With Brown's he lp ,  he 
manages t o  change the  "bundle" of p roper t i e s  with which he s t a r t e d :  
"According t o  D r .  Brown, himself, extension and res i s tance  are t h e  
only two q u a l i t i e s  which can invariably be predica ted  about matter; 
fo r  f igu re  and magnitude a r e  modifications of extension, - as  
s o l i d i t y  and f l u i d i t y ,  hardness and so f tness ,  are of resistance" 
(Ibid.,  4 8  ) . Thesefore, from t h e  o r i g i n a l  Es t  o r  primary q u a l i t i e s  - 
extension, a i v i s i b i l i t y ,  s o l i d i t y  o r  f l u i d i t y ,  hardness o r  so f tness  , 
and figure, we a re  now d o m  t o  j u s t  two - extension and re s i s t ance .  
A t  h a s t  t h i s  new q u a l i f i c a t i o n  should s a t i s f y  Lyal l .  After a l l ,  how 
much f u r t h e r  can he go? B u t  he does not  s t o p  even here. " D r .  B r o w n  
has reduced the  primary q u a l i t i e s  t o  t h e s e  two. They may be reduced 
s t i l l  fu r the r ,  v i z . ,  t o  res i s tance ,  f o r  extension i s  rather  a 
property of space than t h a t  of matter" (Ibid., 48). 
As can be seen, Lyal l  continuously q u a l i f i e s  h i ç  f indings and 
t h i s  implies t h a t  a great deal of a t t e n t i o n  i s  required i n  order t o  
ge t  t he  correct p o s i t i o n  that he mainta ins .  This is Lyall's marner of 
p re sen t a t i on  throughout the Intellect,  the Emo t ions and the Moral 
N a t u r e  - 
L y a ï l  s Understanding of the Intellect 
Now l e t  u s  see what Lyall t h i n k s  about how knowledge is  
gained, what t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  and that of sensa t ion  in 
t h i s  e n t e r p r i s e .  Reading t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  of t h e  In te l lec t ,  the 
Emotions and the Moral N a t u r e ,  one can be su rp r i s ed  by t h e  struggle 
Lyall goes through i n  the a t tempt  t o  explain how sensa t i on  becomes 
knowledge, how r e a l i t y  becomes idea. Al1 this leads one f u r t h e r  t o  
think that he  will n o t  g ive  up e a s i l y  when it cornes t o  the actual 
ex i s t ence  of t h e  physical world- H e  cannot concede t o  materialisrn, 
because, on his view, mate r ia l i sm is "the propes spawn of too great 
an engrossrnent i n  m e r e  mat ter ,  whether F t  be in t h e  t o o  exclus ive  
devot ion t o  t h e  bus iness  and pursuit of l i f e ,  o r  too e n t i r e  an 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  physical and mechanical sciences" (Ibid., 891, 
O n  the  other hand, he does n o t  subscr ibe  completely t o  
idealist views e i t h e r ,  because h e  continuously speaks about the world 
ou t s ide  and t h e  ex i s t ence  of both sensa t i on  and intellect- 'It is  a 
marvelous connexion which exists between t h e  world without and the 
world wi thin"  (Ibid, , 1 0 2 )  . The mind cannot work without the d a t a  
which s e n s a t i o n  provides it. There are places i n  the f i r s t  t h i r d  of 
h i s  book w h e r e  he cari be pe rce ived  as nothing b u t  a mind/body 
dualist and n o t  an i d e a l i s t  a t  all. "Mind and matter are the two 
substances about which al1 philosophy i s  conversant. These two 
substances may be s a i d  t o  d iv ide  t h e  universe" ( Ibid. ,  13) .  Moreover, 
he repeatedly d a i m s  t h a t :  
Minci cannot be an organic r e s u l t .  True, sensation 
i s  p a r t l y  m a t e r i a l  and the d i f f i c u l t y  of deciding 
where t h e  m a t e r i a l  part of t he  process  o r  
phenomenon s tops ,  and the mental part begins, may 
be urged i n  favor of  materialism; but sensation 
is not a l 1  t h e  phenornena of mind, and while w e  
confess a d i f f i c u l t y ,  w e  s t i l l  m a r k  the t o t a l  
di f ference between a mater ia l  and a mental 
product . ( Ibid., 92 ) 
Hence, Lyal l  disapproves of  both t h e  extreme materialism of "extreme 
sensa t iona l i s t s" ,  as  he calls than, and the transcendetalism of t h e  
"extreme i d e a l i s t s f t .  Rather, he f inds  a middle path between the t w o  
more s a t i s f y i n g .  I n  order  t o  prove h i s  point ,  he dis t inguishes  
between intellection, which is "the action of t h e  mind as min&' and 
sensation which is  "pa r t ly  corposeal  and p a r t l y  a mental funct ion o r  
s t a t e "  ( Ib id . ,  1 0 2 )  , Thus, i n  the presence of  certain sensat ions ,  t h e  
mind produces ideas like t hose  of matter, substance,  space and t i m e ,  
e tc .  Through them w e  gain knowledge of the  e x t e r n a l  world. These 
ideas rest upon ex i s t ing  t h i n g s  i n  the phenomenal world; there i s  
more to the world than pure  ideas  as there  is more t o  it than pure 
sensations. The i n t e l l e c t  provides us w i t h  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge which 
develops on the presupposit ion t h a t  there  is a mater ia l  world- 
However, for Lyal l ,  the i n t e l l e c t  i s  not t h e  only source of 
knowledge. Let us r e c a l l  Lya l l ' s  manner o f  presentat ion:  he s ta tes  a 
t h e s i s  and then  q u a l i f i e s  it i n  order t o  find out  what new i n t u i t i o n s  
corne t o  l i g h t ,  The same approach i s  used when talking about the 
i n t e l l e c t :  he assumes and acknowledges the  implicat ions  of h i s  
statements and that the i n t e l l e c t  not t he  only 
important element when it cornes t o  explaining t h e  w a y  w e  gain 
knowledge, There i s  something else t h a t  a l s o  cont r ibutes  t o  our  
understanding of t h e  world. T h e  i n t e l l e c t  opera tes  " f r o m  a distance",  
it i s  "wholly divorced from t h e  physical  worldf'. 
Lyall appears t o  be an i d e a l i s t  but not  of t h e  German kind nor 
of t h e  kind professed by Berkeley s ince as w e  said e a r l i e r ,  ne was 
very much against both of them. Lyall's ideal ism f i ts  within the 
framework of a d i s t i n c t i v e  Canadian idealism which has as i t s  most 
important p a r t i c u l a r i t y  t h e  search f o r  a balance, for an equi l ibr ium 
which w i l l  not be exclusive bu t  r a t h e r  accommodationist; i n  t h i s  
case, a bâlance between reason and mot ion .  what 1 am ta lking about 
here  i s  t h a t  Lyal l  f inds  necessary che use  of another sort of reason  
a p a r t  from pure reason namely, p r a c t i c a l  reason. 
For Lyall,  p r a c t i c a l  reason is what completes our in t e rac t ion  
with t h e  world. It refers t o  our moral nature  and t o  our emotions. 
UnlFke the  i n t e l l e c t ,  the knowledge gained through the use of 
p r a c t i c a l  reason is  indubi tab le  and reveals t o  us our t rue  nature as  
moral agents and our ob l iga t ions  t o  others ,  Lyal l  writes:  
There is  a practical power i n  t h e  sentiment. It 
has an a u t h o r i t a t i v e  voice within us  which makes 
us  f e e l  our r e l a t i o n  t o  being, and such relations 
as w e  dare not  d is regard .  It is here  that 
consciousness c a m o t  be mistaken. There can be no 
discussion about the  t ru thfu lness  o f  its 
int imat ions,  T h e  f e e l i n g  within now i s  such that 
no dubiety rests upon it; it i s  p r a c t i c a l ,  
overwheiming. Thexe is reality here i f  nowhere 
e l se .  W e  have got  out  of t h e  world of shadows 
into t h e  world of r e a l i t i e s  - o f  m e r e  
consciousness into au thor i t a t ive  consciousness 
which speaks aloud, which enforces itself,  which 
does not  admit f o r  a moment of  questioning, which 
w i l l  not  allow debate o r  parleying, which unites 
us  i n  r e l a t i o n s  not  to be broken with our fellow- 
beings, w h i l e  it makes us r e a l i z e  t o  ourselves 
our own subs tant ive  exis tence and importance. 
( Ibid. ,  469)  
The claim t h a t  practical reason i s  indubi table  cannot be e a s i l y  
expla ined  without first unders tanding how emotions work and how t hey  
work i n  connection t o  moral  n a t u r e -  Lyal l  recognizes t h e  importance 
of the i n t e l l e c t  i n  t h e  process  of acquir ing knowledge bu t  he still 
thinks t h a t ,  by i t s e l f ,  t h e  intellect i s  use less ,  I t  p re sen t s  us w i t h  
a p i c t u r e  of r e a l i t y  which is n o t  d i f f e r en t  from the one P l a t o  o f f e r s  
i n  the Cave m y t h ,  i n  t h e  Republic. Lyal l  pictures phenomenal r e a l i t y  
as having t h e  same c o n s t i t u t i o n  as t h e  shadows on t h e  walls of 
Plators Cave. However, u n l i k e  P la to ,  he considers these shadows t o  be 
t h e  f a b r i c  from which the i n t e l l e c t  t a i l o r s  the  phenomenal r e a l i t y ,  a 
reality, though, which c a m o t  be reached, which e x i s t s  'out there",  
which can only be analyzed and d i s s e c t e d  as  a  corpse i n  a  l abo ra to ry .  
Lyall writes t h a t :  
[ t l h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p a r t  of our na ture  i s  a 
surpass ing mystery - those processes by which 
t h e  mind becomes al1 l i g h t ,  opens t o  idea of 
i t s e l f  and the o u t e r  world of t h e  universe ,  p u t s  
upon a l 1  t h a t  i s  e x t e r n a l  o r  in te rna1  its forms, 
while these forms have the i r  counterpar t  without, 
o r  i n  t h e  inner self,  cons t ruc t s  sc ience,  and 
makes i ts own processes  t h e  subject of i t s  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n  - bu t  marvelous as this is, t h e r e  
a r e  myster ies  o f  o u r  nature fa- g r e a t e r  than  
t h e s e  and the i n t e l l e c t u a l  part m a y  be s a i d  t o  be 
t h e  least wonderful o f  our  compound be ing . ( Ib id . ,  
27 9 )  
The i n t e l l e c t ,  t he re fo re ,  i s  a n  impor tant  cons t i t uen t  of our  nature, 
b u t  it is no t  t h e  most important  one. The i n t e l l e c t  a lone i s  n o t  a b l e  
t o  g i v e  us a proper account  o f  r e a l i t y .  It needs t h e  i npu t  of  
ernotions 
Thus, w e  have seen t h a t  L y a l l  does not want to concede t o  
e i t h e r  idealism o r  mater ia l i sm.  Instead, he wants t o  b r ing  t h e m  t o  
and 
given their due. 
t h a t  that emotions should be 
Emotio~, M x a ï i t y  and m g  
After wr i t ing  almost t h r e e  hundred pages on t h e  i n t e l l e c t  
and i t s  functions, Lyall  goes further and analyzes the emotions. 
The i n t e l l e c t  l o s e s  i ts  glamour and this i s  because the emotions 
corne onto t h e  scene. Without t h e m ,  human beings would not  be 
capable of a c t i o n  and action is that which make us  what w e  r e a l l y  
are. Actions are t h e  way w e  a s se r t  ourselves i n  t h e  world and 
become p a r t  of it. What L y a l l  seems t o  think is t h a t  the  i n t e l l e c t  
has t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  r e f l e c t  upon any possible s i t u a t i o n  bu t  
without ac t ion  it would not be different from what w e  would cal1 
today a powerful computer. Without a c t i o n ,  hwnan beings would l i v e  
as i f  surrounded b y  a glass bubble. But ac t ions  themselves 
or ig ina te  i n  the w i l l  and emotion i s  t h a t  which "provides us - w i t h  
t h e  i n i t i a l  impetuous t o  action" (Armour/Trott 1981, 761 . 
L y a l l  claims t h a t  "emotion is  a higher s t a t e  than pure 
i n t e l l e c t "  (Lyal l  1855, 2 8 4 ) .  T h i s  is a ser ious  aff i rmat ion and it 
has implications i n  his theory of moral nature ,  Prima facie, i t  
looks as if he i s  going i n  the same di rec t ion  as  H u m e  on t h i s  
point .  "Hume and those who follow him t r e a t  emotians as 
e s sen t i a l ly  feelings ( ' a f fec ts f  o r  ' impressionsr) with thoughts 
inc identa l ly  attached" (Neu 1977, 1) , For L y a l l ,  " [ the]  moral 
element cornes from t h e  region of duty, and may mingle w i t h  our 
emotions, b u t  t h e  emotions themselves are d i s t i ngu i shab le  from 
t h a t  element, and are capable of s epa ra t e  considerat ionr '  (Ibid., 
2851 . By s ay ing  that emotions are capable o f  s epa ra t e  
cons idera t ion  L y a l l  seems t o  reach conclus ions  very close t o  t h o s e  
of Hume- H e  says  t h a t  t h e  mind can recognize witi-rout a shade of 
doubt a d i s t i n c t i o n  between r i gh tnes s  and wrongness. It does that 
with the same ease  as it does when it has t o  d i s t i ngu i sh  between, 
Say, two c a t e g o r i e s ,  o r  two numbers. B u t  t h i n g s  get complicated 
when the ques t i on  why? a r i s e s -  "Can w e  exp l a in  why it i s  r i g h t ,  o r  
why it is wrong - give any reasons f o r  p r o n ~ ~ c i n g  it so? Now, it 
would seem that no account o r  explanat ion of t h i s  can be given,  
but that w e  perce ive  a t  once t h e  q u a l i t y  o f  r i g h t n e s s  o r  wrongness 
apa r t  f rom any such explanation" (Ibid, , 4 87 ) . 
Does L y a l l ' s  account o f  mora l i ty  no t  sound l i k e  Hume's? =ter 
all, Hume is g iv ing  s i g n i f i c a n t  c r e d i t  t o  emotions too. I n  h i s  
Treatise of Human Nature (1967)  he argues t h a t  the r o l e  o f  r eason  
i n  m o r a l  d e c i s i o n s  is very l i m i t e d  and t h a t  moral approval i s  only 
a f ee l i ng  i n  the m i n d  of the person t h a t  makes a moral judgment. 
"Actions, he says ,  may be laudable o r  blmable, but  they cannot  be 
reasonable o r  unreasonable" (Hume 1967,  4 5 8 )  . There a re  s e v e r a l  
arguments w h i c h  Hume br ings  f o r t h  t o  sustain his pos i t ion .  The 
f i rs t  one is t h a t  reason involves only judgments about rea l i ty ,  
but  when one examines t h e  content  of a moral ac t ion ,  one does n o t  
have t o  deal with a f a c t .  The only t h i n g  t h a t  is t h e r e  i s  j u s t  a 
feel ing.  Moreover, moral pronouncements are c l o s e r  t o  our w a y  o f  
exper iencing a e s t h e t i c  pronouncements, which a r e  a l s o  f ee l i ngs ,  
and they are nowhere close t o  r a t i o n a l  judgments. One could t b i n k  
that moral pronouncements develop i n  a similar manner t o  logical .  
and mathematical reasoning, B u t  Hume argues t h a t  while i n  t h e  
d i s c i p l i n e s  of log ic  and mathematics w e  begin w i t h  known f a c t s  and 
discover  a new, unknown f a c t ,  i n  the d i s c i p l i n e  of e th ic s ,  a l 1  the 
re levant  f a c t s  must be known from the beginning. 
Besides, accoraing t o  Hume,  moral ac t ions  a r e  done with t h e  
so le  purpose of happiness and, insofar  a s  happiness is t he  goal,  
reason has t o  s tep  aside. "Morality, therefore ,  is more properly 
f e l t  than  judged of; though t h i s  f ee l ing  o r  sentiment i s  commonly so  
s o f t  and gen t l e  t h a t  w e  a r e  a p t  t o  confound it with an idea, 
according t o  our common custom of taking a l 1  th ings  f o r  the same, 
which have any near resemblance t o  each other" (Ibid. ,  470). The 
foregoing is a summary of what Hume has t o  Say on t h i s  subject, But 
it does n o t  exact ly  fit Lyal l f  s f ramework, Towards t h e  end of t h e  
second chapter of h i s  work, where he is t a l k i n g  about emotions, L y a l l  
notes t h a t :  
Man is not only  a mere being, he is a moral 
being; has n o t  only a place i n  c rea t ion ,  b u t  hâs 
a pa r t  t o  p e r f o m  i n  creation: he not  only l ives ,  
and thinks,  and feels - he w i l l s  - and not only 
wi l l s ,  but  w i l l s  according t o  a law of r i g h t  and 
wrong. And this l a w  i s  not a r b i t r a r y ,  it i s  
e te rna l ;  it i s  not imposed, it i s  a p a r t  of his 
very nature. It belongs t o  every moral being, 
enters  i n t o  t h e  essence of a moral cons t i tu t ion .  
It is the  l a w  of duty, the law of r i g h t  and 
wrong, a law o f  eternal and ahstract 
propriety.  ( L y a l l  1855, 468)  
T h i s  t h e ,  it seems that Lyal l  moves a long way a p a r t  from Hume. But, 
l e t  us no t  forge t  L y a l l r s  manner of presentat ion:  he s t a t e s  a 
pos i t ion  even though, i n  t h i s  case, he does not  Say c lea r ly  that t h i s  
particular pos i t ion  is Hume's, and then, he qualifies it. B u t  he does 
not s t o p  the re :  he q u a l i f i e s  it again. 
W i t h  t h i s  new qua l i f i ca t ion ,  Lyall is "talkingO' w i t h  Kant and 
his ideas  about moral duty which a r i s e s  out  o f  t h e  reverence for law. 
H e  goes f u r t h e r  i n  analyzing the meaning of t h e  w o r d  "reverence" and 
how it is comected with t h e  concept of "duty" and t h a t  of "law". For 
Kant, an ac t ion  perfonued out  of duty 'has to be done i r r e s p e c t i v e  of 
al1 a p p e t i t e  whatsoeverO'. Vir tue i s  deprived of any t r a c e  of f e e l i n g  
and it is entirely subjec ted  t o  the l a w .  But, according t o  Lyall: 
what 1 apprehend t o  be my l a w ,  1 recognize t o  be 
so  with reverence, which word denotes merely t h e  
consciousness of the  immediate, unconditional, 
and unreserved subordination of my w i l l  t o  t h e  
l a w .  T h e  inmediate determination of t h e  will by 
t h e  law, and the consciousness of itf is ca l l ed  
reverence, and is regarded not as t h e  cause but 
as the  effect of t h e  law upon t h e  person- (Ibid,, 
509) 
Thus, f o r  Lyall, the will is determined and subordinated t o  t h e  law. 
T h e  same position is supported b y  Kant and, after what happened w i t h  
Lyal l r  s appropria t ion of Humef s posi t ion,  f irst  explaining it and 
then qual i fying it, one might th ink  t h a t  this Kantian q u a l i f i c a t i o n  
u i l l  s a t i s f y  him. But t h i s  does not  seem t o  be t h e  case either! Kant 
too is wrong. Why? According t o  Armour and Trott: 
Lyall admires t he  f ormal aspect  of Kantr s moral 
theory. But t h i s  formal element i s  no t ,  i n  his 
view, s u f f i c i e n t  t o  account for moral i ty .  For w e  
need t o  be impelled toward s p e c i f i c  acts and 
outcomes. One can be determined t o  a c t  coherently 
only i f  one i s  determined t o  act a t  a l l .  And one 
must enjoy, amongst possible  a c t i o n s  t h e  choice 
already guaranteed by t h e  open-textured ambiguity 
of the  s t i rn~lus-response s i t u a t i o n  created by  the 
nature of our emotions, Thus, a rule l i k e  Kant's 
categorical imperative - 'act only on a maxim 
through which you can a t  the same time w i l l  that 
ié should become a universal  l a w 8  - is not 
s u f f i c i e n t ,  The gap, i n  pa r t ,  i s  f i l l e d  by the 
original moral mot ion  which appears to us as a 
moral i n t u i t i o n .  (1981, 77, xny i t a l i c s )  
L y a l l  accuses Kant of not admit t ing love t o  be a p a r t  of reverence.  
H i s  almost i n s t i n c t i v e  react ion is t o  think t h a t  i n  al1 reverence 
there must be a c e r t a i n  degree of love,  otherwise the  reverence would 
be "mere fear".  For Lyall, 
it would seem t o  be necessary,  i n  order  t o  moral 
approbation being real, that t he re  should be love 
a s  w e l l  a s  reverence f o r  t h e  Law: it would be 
otherwise a d i s t a n t  reverence, not  approval: 
t h e r e  would be assent t o  t h e  r igh tness  of the  
law, not  approbation. Distant reverence is a t  
most a cold fee l ing ,  and it i s  not properly 
approbation till t h e s e  is love. (Lyali 1855, 
510)  
Love is what Kant lacks i n  h i s  account o f  morali ty.  Lyall emphasizes 
g r e a t l y  the  concept of love. Love i s  t h e  most e s s e n t i a l  m o t i o n ,  love 
i s  t h a t  w h i c h  connects u s  t o  t h e  o ther ,  love is t h a t  which d iscovers  
a being f o r  us .  Love, next t o  sympathy, benevolence and g r a t i t u d e ,  is 
one of t h e  emotions which "tenninate on being". Love has as i t s  
ob jec t  Being but  Lyall  does not spend t h e  explaining what he m e a n s  
by using t h e  word "Being". I t  would seem that f o r  L y a l l  Being 
expresses that which has a real exis tence.  The  world, f o r  t h e  
Maritimes philosopher, i s  not a co l l ec t ion  of sensations.  II meets 
our  gaze organized i n t o  things w h i c h  stand apa r t ,  detached from t h e i r  
s u r r ~ u n d i n g s ~  Hence, there  can be t a l k  about love not only  with 
regard t o  fe l low humans but a l s o  love  fo r  Nature and everything t h a t  
pe r t a ins  t o  Nature. T h e  only d i f f e rence ,  Lyall thinks,  is t h a t  t h e  
ernotion o f  love increases propor t iona l ly  with t h e  pu r i ty  o f  i t s  
ob jec t .  Love of God is the absolu te  on the  scale of which Lyall i s  
thinking. "Moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l  q u a l i t i e s  give an inmense i n c r e a s e  
t o  emotions", he writes ( Ib id . ,  4 1 0 )  , Moreover, he claims t h a t  : 
w e  know that inanimate objects even may awaken 
our  love, a kind of attachment, and t h i s  rnay be 
dis t inguished from t h e  delight or pleasure  which 
they give us; t h e  one is del ight  i n  the ob jec t ,  
the o ther  is  d e l i g h t  produced by the  obj ect. T h e  
former, then, is  j u s t  love; and t o  Say t h a t  love 
is  de l ight  i n  an objec t ,  o r  i n  t h e  contemplation 
of t h a t  object ,  is t o  describe t h e  emotion by 
i t s e l f .  (Ibid., 392) 
Such are, on L y a l l f s  account, t h e  implications that emotions have on 
morality. Now, w e  have seen that emotions (and more p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  
emotion of love)  complete our  "interaction" with what we ca l1  " the  
real"  while t h e  i n t e l l e c t  could not  go f u r t h e r  than s c i e n t i f i c  
unders tanding . 
Lyal l  sensed t h a t  there is something l e f t  out of  the s c i e n t i f i c  
account of  r e a l i t y  arrd only t h e  emotions could connect us with it- 
Pure reason has t o  work toge the r  with p r a c t i c a l  reason i n  order  t o  
give us the complete p i c t u r e  of r e a l i t y .  Why? Because p r a c t i c a l  
reason, u n l i k e  pure reason r e f e r s  t o  the  very being of what exists i n  
Nature, of  another human o r  of God. As J . D .  Rabb explains i n  his 
Si lver  Jubilee lecture: 
The emotion of  love  is a source of knowledge. 
Nature herself  \is animated, i n t e l l i g e n t ,  f u l l  of 
sentimentf. This is t h e  ideal is t ic  i n s i g h t  
concealed from us by our narsow r e l i a n c e  on the  
i n t e l l e c t  as our  source of knowledge. Yet f o r  
Lyal l  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  s t i l l  important. It too i s  
a source of knowledge. H e  devotes t h e  first third 
of the book t o  it and t o  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of 
t h e  mater ia l  world it reveals. Unlike t h e  
Romantic poets o r  o ther  e th ica l  i d e a l i s t s ,  
Lyal l ' s  idealism ne i the r  ignores nor dirninishes 
a s  unimportant t h e  f indings of science.  (1990) 
Yet, the i n t e l l e c t ,  being 'divorced" from t h e  phenomenal world, being 
unrelated t o  t h e  objects  o f  t h e  physical world, cannot bui ld  a bridge 
between us and t h e  other-than-us. T h i s  i s  t h e  task of emotion, 
Emotion is "the atmosphere of mind; it is  i ts  v i t a l  breath" (Lyal l  
1855, 284)- In  L y a l l r s  p i c t u r e  of t h e  human e n d ,  t h e  emotions, 
" i n i t i a l l y ,  a r e  d i r e c t e d  t o  ob jec t s  i n  the world and, by reason of 
t h e i r  connection t o  the secondary objec ts  which a re  S ta t e s  of mind, 
they provide t h e  background f o r  t h e  i n t e l l e c t "  (Armour/Trott 1981, 
7 6 ) .  T h i s  is why emotions a r e  a source of knowledge and t h i s  is why 
w e  are able  t o  see nature  as "animateà" and "ful l  of sentiment". 
Lyall  aff i rms t h a t  Nature, i n  a sense, resonates t o  our emotions and 
our emotions are i n  tune with Nature. In  as much as we are s e n t i e n t  
beings w e  resonate with Nature. T h e  i n t e l l e c t  does not have any means 
t o  reach the phenomenal r e a l i t y  with al1 its complexity. But' 
for tunate ly ,  we connect w i t h  Nature through our emotions and thus  w e  
are a b l e  t o  provide t h e  i n t e l l e c t  something with which t o  work, w e  
are a b l e  t o  gain knowledge of r e a l i t y  and understand it. 
In  s u ,  w e  have seen t h a t  Lyal l  r e j e c t s  t h e  k i n d  of ideal ism 
which stems £rom Berkeley's theory of ideas where t h e  only t h i n g  t h a t  
e x i s t s  and t h a t  w e  a r e  c e r t a i n  of is t h e  mind, B u t  t h i s  does n o t  
r e f l e c t  well on Lyal l .  H e  could have c r i t i c i z e d  him by following 
e i t h e r  Hume and consequently, f a l l i n g  i n t o  skepticism, o r  Kant which 
he does not  because he r e j e c t s  p a r t  of Kant's ideas a l so .  Row t hen  
can Lyal l ' s  p o s i t i o n  be explained? The thing which might expla in  it 
i s  that Lyall  became aware of t h e  importance o f  Nature. H i s  stay i n  
Canada must have influenced him. H e  wants t o  Say t ha t ,  doubt less ,  
Berkeley was wrong. Nature e x i s t s !  Physical objec ts  exist! This is 
what Lyal l  does: he finds out  t h a t  the power of the  i n t e l l e c t  i s  
limited bu t  he does not  desert the post. I n  order  t o  have t h a t  piece 
of knowledge t h e  mind needs but cannot get through the i n t e l l e c t ,  
Lyal l  requests  help from the  emotions- mot ions  can give us knowledge 
about the world. Love i s  the emotion which unvei ls  Being, Certainly, 
t h i s  emphasis on love and emotion would sound very strange for 
Berkeley and it would be strange f o r  Kant a s  w e l l .  Hume would not  
have expected this turning po in t .  B u t  it seem natural to Lyall. 
Therefore, i f  there is anything t h a t  i s  worthwhile i n  Lyall 's work it 
is h i s  emphasis on t he  cogni t ive  value of motions which is  an 
overlooked aspect  of his philosophy because it w a s  not f u l l y  
in t e rp re ted .  
W i l l i a m  Lyall 's  phi losophical  work then i s  not j u s t  a 
"patchwork q u i l t "  of foreign ideas ,  as Armour and Tro t t  c l a h  (Ibid*,  
79)  . It i s  original, moreover, o r i g i n a l  i n  a Canadian way. J. D. R a b b  
recognizes t h a t  " H i s  work i s  a splendid example of what m o u r  and 
Trot t  have c a l l e d  the accomodat ionis t  use of reason, of 
phi losophical  federalism" ( 1 9 9 0 ) .  By  c lass i fy ing  Lyall  as an e c l e c t i c  
and by n o t  investigating thoroughly h i s  a t t i t u d e  t o  emotion, Armour 
and T r o t t  f e l t  e n t i t l e d  t o  accord him only a minor r o l e  i n  t h e  
general  p i c t u r e  of philosophy done i n  Canada. It is  not my in t en t ion  
t o  say that Lyall put a d i s t i n c t i v e  mark  on t h e  philosophical 
pantheon of  ideas. But he d id ,  most cer ta inly,  realize t h a t  i n  order  
t o  do philosophy a t  l e a s t  i n  t h a t  p a r t  of the  world, one must have 
open n o t  only a r a t iona l  eye, but  an emotional eye as  well. 
The only thing lacking i n  L y a l l ,  i n  t h e  formulation and 
aff i rmat ion of h i s  ideas, is confidence. The s i l e n t  echo of a non- 
existent t r a d i t i o n  springs through t h e  chasms of t h e  chapters of  h i s  
work. H e  was an exi le .  He was supposed t o  f e e l  at home, but he did 
not and he could not since h i s  philosophical home was overseas i n  
Scotland. Instead,  he was i n  Canada t ry ing  t o  b u i l d  his own s h e l t e r .  
H e  knew how t o  do it but he had to do it making use of w h a t  he w a s  
offered  there. And t h a t ,  as J.D. Rabb recognizes i n  his Jubilee 
l ec tu re ,  w a s  Nature: 
I n  s o  far  as L y a l l r s  i d e a l i s m  is concerned what 
i s  important ,  indeed c ruc i a l ,  i s  h i s  c l a i m ,  not  
merely that w e  can sympathize with nature ,  but 
r a t h e r  t h a t  t h e  emotion of sympathy can a c t u a l l y  
animate na tu re -  Here he begins t o  sound more l i k e  
a romantic poet  than a r a t i o n a l i s t  philosopher:  
'There i ç  something i n  t h e  voice  of a brook w h i c h  
s t irs the innermost m o t i o n s  of t h e  s o u l ,  p lac id ,  
s teady,  deep; in the s ign  of t h e  wind; i n  t h e  
dash of the ocean; i n  t h e  sunshine and gloom; i n  
c a b  and tempest : our mind f e e l s  i n  all, has an 
emotion corresponding t o  each. Such is t h e  l a w ,  
such is t h e  power of sympathy. What power does it 
e x e r t  i n  u n i t i n g  society! What a bond of 
c o m e c t i o n  ! What an amalgamating principle ! And 
through it nature i t s e l f  is  animated, 
i n t e l l i g e n t ,  full of sentiment, and t h e  i n s p i r e r  
of t h e  f i n e s t ,  and t h e  most d e l i g h t f u l ,  sometimes 
the most exalted emotionsr ( L y a l l  1885, 461-462). 
(1990) 
Not surpr i s ing ly ,  L y a l l r s  development of ideas  t akes  place abrupt ly .  
T h e r e  is not a smooth flow of phi losophical  thought-  He t r i e s  t o  set 
new views, b u t  h e  does t h a t  i n  as an ye t  un-explored t e r r i t o r y -  The 
school he cornes £rom, t h e  school of Sco t t i sh  philosophy, enjoys the 
r ichness  of a t r a d i t i o n  which did not e x i s t  i n  Canada, but whose 
exis tence was f e l t  necessary. A t r a d i t i o n  cannot corne i n t o  being by 
using borrowed elements but only by using i t s  own resources.  A 
t r a d i t i o n  i s  necessary because without it nothing can be labeled as 
new. Novel ideas cannot be recognized a s  new i f  t h e r e  are no o t h e r  
terms t o  which they can be compared. 
For  Lyal l ,  t o  u se  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  ph i losophica l  language and 
concepts o f  Western philosophy seems a seduc t ive  temptation.  B u t  they 
do no t  work any longer s ince  the a t t i t u d e  toward the  given of 
ana lys i s  has changed. This change explains  t h e  aura of ec l ec t i c i sm 
surrounding Lyallrs work. A certain philosophical t r a d i t i o n  can only 
be reached when it gets t o  the p o i n t  o f  finding a part icular  n e w  f o r m  
of cornmication. It finds i t s  own i den t i t y  when it develops a more 
free a d  efficient means of relating t o  t h e  other t r a d i t i o n s .  It is 
only then that thought can fo l low its essential and natura l  
ques t ions .  
Now, after providing sri- o u t l i n e  of L y a l l r s  work, the next 
th ing  1 w i l l  do is  examine more c l o s e l y  h i s  ideas  about the cognitive 
value of emotions and about t h e i r  connection with t h e  i n t e l l e c t  in 
t h e  imaginative s t a t e .  Thus, understanding L y a l l r s  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  of 
emotions, as well  as understanding how emotions work, how they b u i l d  
t h e  br idge between r e a l i t y  and t h e  emotional being, w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  
rny focus throughout t he  concluding sec t ion  of t h i s  chapter .  The fact 
t h a t  Lyal l  uses metaphors throughout h i s  exposit ion w i l l  be 
emphasized i n  what follows because it is my content ion t h a t  L y a l l f s  
understanding o f  emotions and metaphors as being connected and how 
they merge toge ther  i n  t h e  imaginative s t a t e  of mind are of c e n t r a l  
importance i n  comprehending h i s  philosophy. 
For L y a l l ,  t h e  intellect is  "but a p a r t  of his [man's] 
compound being, and not  [even] t h e  most important part". Lyall  talks 
about t h e  mind a s  having two dimensions. He d r a w s  on t h e  Cartesian 
conception t h a t  t h e  mind's essence i s  thinking but  he brings i n t o  
discussion t h e  Lockean view t h a t  th ink ing  is  the  "action of t h e  soul" 
and not i t s  proper essence. This compels him t o  adopt a m o r e  balanced 
pos i t ion  with  regard t o  t h i s  issue. "Thinking and feeling, however, 
a r e  t h e  two States of mind i n  which, i f  it exists i n  a s t a t e  o f  
consciousness a t  a l l ,  it must e x i s t "  (Lyall 1855, 289) . They are  
d i s t i n c t  and they do not i n t e r a c t  i n  the sense that one of them 
cannot be t h e  rnaster of the o ther .  One's thought can provoke one t o  
have an emotion and, as w e l l ,  an emotion is "the great prompter and 
enkindler of thought" ( Ibid . ,  290) .  This means t h a t  both t h ink ing  and 
having emotions share  t h e  same honours, i n  as much as one is n o t  t h e  
master of the o t h e r -  Thoughts and m o t i o n s  a r e  bound together .  The 
mind, a s  long  as it is  self-conscious, is a l s o  m o t i o n a l .  'Some one 
emotion o r  o t h e r ,  it may be sa id ,  i s  occupying o r  f i l l i n g  the mind 
every moment of its conscious exis tence"  ( I b i d -  , 290)  , It seems t h a t  
Lyall i s  s i t u a t e d ,  once again, on c o n c i l i a t o r y  ground. H e  does not  
side with P l a t o  and thus consider t h e  i n t e l l e c t  and the  emotion as 
opposite with one, t h e  i n t e l l e c t ,  being t h e  master  o f  the  o t h e r ;  o r  
with Hume w h e r e  the emotion becomes t h e  master  and reason i ts  s lave .  
B u t  t h i s  should no t  be a su rp r i s e ,  s i n c e  we have seen t h a t  h i s  work 
is a "splendid example of t h e  accommodationist use of reason". 
Lyallfs d e f i n i t i o n  of emotion is drawn from analogy. An 
emotion i s  a movement of t he  e n d ,  consequent upon some moving cause. 
Regarding the emotion as a movement of the mind is an a r t i f i c e  based 
on the analogy of t h e  mind w i t h  the  body: " there  is some analogy 
between motion of t h e  body, o r  o f  any mate r i a l  substance, and this 
phenomenon of the  mind, as t h e r e  i s  an analogy between an act of the  
body and t h e  a c t s  of t h e  w i l l  o r  t h e  i n t e l l e c t "  ( I b i d ,  , 286) . Thus, 
i n  def ining emotion as a movement of the mind, Lya l l  makes use of t h e  
metaphor, b r inging  toge ther  two remote tems ("emotion" and 
"movement") t o  t r y  t o  ç ive  a d e s c r i p t i o n  of "emotion". But he is 
quick t o  d r a w  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  emotion cannot be an "act" 
of mind because t h e  only "act ive  power" (again, another metaphor) of 
t h e  mind i s  t h e  w i l l .  T h i s  "movement" of t h e  mind, Lyall recognizes,  
is something d i f f e r e n t  than an act of t h e  mind: 
By an act of will, or an impulse from some 
foreign body, our limbs, or our whole bodies, are 
put in motion; =d in the sarne way, by an act of 
will, or the impulse of other bodies, bodies 
other and foreign to ourselves are put in motion, 
There is impulse and motion, Now, in the 
phenornena of emotion, there is something like 
impulse, and the emotion of the mind is the 
consequence, An emotion is thus, more properly, 
any feeling of the mind suddenly inspired or 
produced; it is the feeling either in its first 
and sudden excitement, or the same feeling 
considered in relation to that first or sudden 
impulse or excitement. We cal1 it a feeling, or, 
perhaps, an affection of the mind when it is not 
considered with relation to this impulse or 
excitement, but regarded in its continuous 
existence or exercise. Thus, love or admiration 
when awakened by any object, is an emotion; when 
continuous, it is an affection. (Ibid,, 286) 
Here Lyall àraws a distinction between feeling (or affection) and 
emotion. The difference between the two is rooted in the difference 
between abruptness and continuous flow. When the state of an 
emotional person is precipitously altered by the object of emotion we 
are dealing with an emotion. When the altered state persists, then we 
are dealing with feelings. Moreover, an affect has a connotation of 
passivity. One is affected or being acted upon rather than acting. 
The common use of language corroborated with Lyallfs proneness to 
continuously qualify his findings, compels him to disregard this 
distinction. He asserts that, when using the term "emotion" we also 
extend it to feelings because originally it regards the sudden rise 
of emotion.But this, by no means, should narrow the usage of the 
word. Thus, the emotions "take over" feelings and Lyall considers 
himself justified in writing that "the emotions are just the 
feelings" (Ibid., 287)  . Now is this new "qualification", this new 
achievement a legitimate one? On the one hand, it xrtakes sense if one 
takes into account Lyallfs desire to "stay in the domain of cownon 
sense". But on t h e  o ther  hand, it diminishes the c l a r i t y  of h i s  
exposit ion,  Lya l l  i s  g u i l t y  of l eaving  tnings unexplained and 
considering t h a t  nuances a re  not  re levant ,  As observed by Amour and 
Trot t :  "One would suppose t h a t  h i s  system could, i n  t h i s  respect ,  be 
t id ied"  (1981, 7 4 ) .  If Lyall were concerned w i t h  t he  use of ordinary 
language and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  t e =  "emotion" got t o  t he  point where 
it cm be used interchangeably with t h e  term "feeling", he would have 
discovered t h a t  t h i s  term denotes d i f f e r e n t  things i n  d i f f e r e n t  
contexts.  Feeling words a re  not  always employed i n  t h e  same w a y ,  as 
one can see  i n  examples l i k e  '1 feel that t h i s  is t he  r i g h t  way" and 
'1 f e e l  pain" o r  '1 f e e l  bad". 
Moreover, t h e r e  i s  another s e t  of problems t h a t  a r i s e  when 
emotion is defined on t h e  bas i s  of an analogy w i t h  t h e  'motion" of 
t h e  body which impiies that we have, more o r  l e s s ,  an analogy w i t h  
t h e  phenomenon of  sensation,  T h i s  means t h a t  L y a l l  gives an account 
of ernotions i n  terms of sense percept ion which does not  hold very 
well for various reasons: i n  the f i r s t  place, sense perception 
implies t h e  existence o f  an organ of perception. B u t  t h i s  i s  not t r u e  
w i t h  regard t o  emotions- There i s  no organ f o r  sensing t h e  emotions. 
A question l i k e  "What organ do you use when you fee l  sad?" is 
nonsense, Also, t h e  objects and s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  i n  sense perception 
e x i s t  independently of them being perceived. Can that be s a i d  about 
emotions? C a n  one have an ernotion without knowing t h a t  one has that 
emotion? Can one a l s o  have an emotion without knowing w h i c h  one it 
is, o r  genuinely mistaken about it? Perhaps we  can as it happens when 
we are angry without knowing it. We seem qui te  r e a d i l y  deceived, 
self-deceived, and a l s o  wi l l ing  and able  t o  deceive o thers  about it. 
However, Lyall  does not  s h o w  any interest i n  a t tacking  t h i s  problem. 
Moreover, s ense  perception involves  percept ion of t h e  
i n t r i n s i c ,  non-re la t ional  p roper t i es  of t he  objects perceived.  1s 
t h a t  true about emotions? Warren Shib les  i n  h is  book on Emotion 
(1974) d i s t i ngu i shes  emotions from f e e l i n g s  on t h e  fol lowing basis: 
Because emotions involve cogni t ion  they  can be 
shared, w h e r e a s ,  feelings cannot D e  shared. 
Sympathy involves  having s imilar f e e l i n g s  o r  
understanding ano ther r s  f e e l i n g s .  Feelings do no t  
have objects  as emotions do. '1 enjoy g o l f r  and 
'1 enj oy a f ee l i ng r  , bu t  'painr  i n  '1 f eel painr 
i s  no t  an ob jec t  of the f e e l i n g  b u t  the  f e e l i n g  
i t s e l f .  One can enjoy a feeling but it is a 
category mistake t o  Say he f e e l s  an enjoyrnent. If 
emotion were a f e e l i n g  t h e n  it would seem t h a t  
phys ica l  i r r i t a t i o n s  and pains would have t o  be 
regarded as emotions. They are not .  (1974,  143) 
Thus, f e e l i n g s  and emotions a r e  d i f f e r e n t .  Shibles po in t ed  ou t  that 
f e e l i n g s  may be p a r t  o f  w h a t  w e  mean by  emotion. "They may precede, 
coex i s t  w i t h  o r  fo l low cognition" (Ibid. ,  1 4 1 ) .  But t h i s  does not 
imply t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a r e l a t i o n  of i d e n t i t y  between f e e l i n g s  and 
emotions. O f  course,  one can reply  t o  t h i s  t h a t  William James has 
built h i s  theory  o f  emotions on t h e  supposi t ion that emotions are 
feelings. For James, emotions a r e  nothing but i n t e r n a 1  bodily 
sensat ions .  t h a t  is, " the  f ee l i ngs  o r  subjective s e n s i b l e  a spec t s  of 
phys io log ica l  occurrences caused by perceptions" (Lyons 1980,  14). 
However, u n l i k e  James, Lyal l  sketches a d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
f e e l i n g  and emotion and then abandons it, leaving it undeveloped. 
Defining emotion by making use of the analogy with t h e  "motion" of 
the body, Lya l l  does no t  r a i s e  t h e  kind of quest ions  asked above and 
thus,  he fa i l s  t o  i n v e s t i g a t e  a very r i c h  area which would otherwise 
cast a brighter  light on the issue he wants t o  analyze.  But even i f  
he does not  rnake t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  very clear, he  does no t  f a11  i n t o  
the fallacy of ambiguity, reasoning now about emotions and then about 
feelings. 
However, Lyall does distinguish between emotion and passion 
and between emotion and desire. Lyall describes emotion by comparing 
it to passion: "Emotion is generic. Passion is specific [..-1 Passion 
is but a stronger emotion [..-] The desires are distinct States of 
mind. They may be accompanied with emotions, but they are not 
emotions" (Lyall 1855, 2 8 7 ) .  It seems that emotions are, as he said, 
quite generic, If any "movement of the mind" can be translated into 
emotion then we are under its spell for the majority of time- Indeed, 
if "the first essential condition of emotion would seem to be one of 
calm and placid enjoyment" and if this "might be taken as the first 
essential state of emotion" then "the balance of al1 the emotions 
would seem to require or necessitate a calm and settled state" 
( Ibid- , 2 91 1 . Anything disturbing this balance, this settled state, 
Fs an emotion but, in as much as emotion is 'the movement of the mind 
consequent upon some moving cause" it means that there must be an 
impulse which acts like a cause. The cause or the impulse is 
represented by the feeling which, as we saw above, is the "first and 
sudden excitement of the mind". This excitement of the mind occurs in 
the presence of the object of the emotion. mat then constitutes the 
object of the emotion? 
For Lyall, emotions have two sorts of objects. There are 
direct and indirect ob j ects . Thus, on one hand, when one loves 
somebody, when one is depressed about something, etc. we are dealing 
with direct objects. On the other hand, when the state of mind which 
"the emotion produces or the outcomes of the actions stimulated by 
the emotions" (Armour/Trott 1981, 75) are involved, we are dealing 
with indirect objec ts ,  Armour and Tro t t  explain. Examples of emotions 
awakened by a d i r e c t  objec t  are:  de l igh t ,  wonder, surprise and 
astonishment, admiration and adorat ion.  Delight, f o r  example, is 
produced by "every o ~ j e c t  h a t  can minis te r  t o  our  enjoyment, tha t  
can give  us  happiness, t h a t  a f fords  us pleasure" (Lyal l  1855, 3 4 8 ) .  
Wonder, i s  " tha t  emotion which is awakened on the contemplation of 
something great ,  o r  by what i s  extraordinary,  and o u t  of t h e  usual 
course of experience o r  observation" (Ibid. ,  358) .  A meteor i n  the 
sky ,  o r  'some phenomenon upon earth, which has never been seen 
before", o r  something t h a t  does not fit our ordinary,  day t o  day 
occurrences, induces us t o  experience t h e  m o t i o n  of wonder. 
Melancholy, sorrow, joy etc. are emotions which do not occur 
as  a r e s u l t  of t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  with a d i r e c t  ob jec t .  Rather, these  
m o t i o n s  rest on oner s s e l f  awareness, Thus, i n  Lyall' s account of 
emotion t h e  case t h a t  : 
X e  l i v e  i n  events and w e  a r e  connected with 
objec ts  [,.] The events and circumstances that 
t r a n s p i r e  da i ly ,  o r  t h a t  a r e  ever a r i s i n g ,  
produce joy o r  sorrow, o r  exc i t e  f r e t f u l n e s s  and 
impatience, o r  are lit up with the  calm and t h e  
sunshine of cheerfulness,  o r  again a r e  steeped in 
t h e  sombre shades of melancholy, T h e  da i ly  
h i s t o r y  of every individual  i s  made up of these  
events, these circumstances and they awaken such 
and such emotions i n  the breast ;  and thus  t h e  
t i s s u e  of l i f e  cons is t s  of those events  without, 
and t h e s e  emotions within.  ( Ib id , ,  3 4 6 - 3 4 7 )  
Sorrow, f o r  example, a r i s e s  out of our  thoughts about death. "Death", 
writes Lyall making use of metaphorical construct ions,  "is t h e  grim 
t y r a n t  that shakes his  sceptre over every ind iv idual  of our race,  and 
t h a t  will claim al1 for his dominion o r  his prey. W e  must bow our 
heads i n  death, and t h e  t r i b u t e  o f  sorrow we have paid t o  others  may 
5e rendered t o  us" ( Ibid. ,  340)  - 
There are, howeaer, two exceptions t o  the  =le of emotions not 
occurring as a r e s u l t  o f  i n t e rac t ion  with a d i r e c t  obj e c t .  T h e  f i r s t  
one - i f  'cheerfulness i s  t h e  harmony of a l 1  emotions" ( Ibid. ,  3031, 
2s L y a l l  writes, then t h i s  implies t h a t  cheerfulness does not  exactly 
have an ob jec t -  It is, as it w a s  said e a r l i e r ,  t h e  condition of a l 1  
emotions, t h e i r  balance. It is not  t h a t ,  when being cheerful ,  one 
lacks emotion. For Lyall, t he  mind, a t  a l 1  times, is informed by one 
emotion o r  another,  In the cheerful  s t a t e ,  a l 1  the  emotions a r e  
ac t ive  but they are ac t ive  i n  such a way that they counteract  each 
other  so they make possible  a balance,  Lyall  writes t h a t :  
I n  t h e  equil ibrium of t h e  atmosphere, al1 t h e  
elements seem t o  be a t  rest, and yet, they are 
a l 1  i n  harmonious action- When a balance i s  i n  
equil ibrium, ne i ther  of  t h e  sides s e e m  t o  be i n  
ac t ion;  and yet  it is because both are i n  ac t ion  
equal ly  that t he  equilrbrium i s  produced, o r  
thexe is a rest on the point  of equilibrium. So 
i s  it w i t h  emotions. None may be sa id  t o  be i n  
ac t ion ,  and yet  al1 may be s a i d  t o  be i n  action,  
o r  capable  of action,  and only await t h e  c a l 1  f o r  
thern a t  the  proper time, o r  i n  t h e i r  proper 
place. (Ibid., 303)  
Thus, cheerfulness,  being the  harmony of al1 emotions ac tua l ly  lacks 
a spec i f i c  objec t .  
T h e  second exception is represented by the  emotion of lcve. 'A 
th ing  loved", Armour and Trot t  explain,  "is loved f o r  its own sake. 
Since i t s  u l t ima te  sustaining ob jec t  must be something which can be 
loved f o r  i t s  own sake and not f o r  t h e  sake of  an i n d i r e c t  object ,  
love, combined w i t h  intellectual understanding, must lead on t o  the  
only thing actually capable of sustaining love for its awn sake. 
That, in Lyallfs view, is being i t se l f"  (1981, 7 5 )  . 
Since he views love as the most powerful emotion, Lyall 
dedicates numerous pages to it where he t a l k s  about different kinds 
of love: m a t e r n a 1  love, filial love, love for country, erotic love, 
etc., abbut different degrees of it, and about love in iés 
absoluteness, He starts in an Augustinian vein writing, more or less, 
that at the beginning there was love. "Lave may be contem;?lated as an 
absolute emotion existing even apart from an object to exercise it or 
call it forth. It is a s t a t e  conceivable p r i o r  to rhe existence of 
any being to call it f o r t h .  God was love in this absolute sense" 
(Lyall 1855,  4 0 5 )  . Everything that exists is an obj ect of Gadr s love. 
Every human being, everything that is endowed with life, as well as 
every tree and every stone, every grass leaf, came to being as an 
exercise of Godrs love. Love is that which binds us al1 together. " W e  
feel that we c m  regard with a kind of affection even inanimate 
objects; that our love, the absolute emotion, rests upon them" 
(Ibid., 4061, Lyall writes. This means that love, by itself has an 
intrinsic value. 
Through love, in Lyallrs account, we are capable of rising 
above the limitations of immediate objects as such and see them as 
participating in Being. What dues t h i s  mean? Amour  and Tro t2  
explain: 
we have then a link between thought and feeling. 
For only what is wholly unlimited can justify, 
finally, absolute allegiance. Suppose X loves Y. 
If X really does s o ,  he does so unconditionally 
and without reservation. But, as he reflects on 
his situation, the limitations of Y must, in the 
end, become clear to him. As limitations, they 
suggest that they are occasions on which he 
should not give h i s  unconditional allegiance to 
Y, bu t  t h i s  c o n f l i c t s  with h i s  love. In  t h e  end, 
he can only j u s t i f y  t h e  combination of t h e  two 
kinds of awareness i f  there  is an ul t imate  being 
which is i n h e r e n t l y  valuable and without 
l i m i t a t i o n  i n  i t s e l f  and with in  w h i c h  t h e r e  is  a 
special and unique place t o  be occupied by Y, In 
t h a t  case, t h e  l imi t a t i ons  of Y are simply p a r t  
of  what makes it possible f o r  Y t o  occupy that 
place i n  being, B u t  that is only  cornprehensible 
i n  t h e  case t h a t  being i tself does measure up t o  
t h e  conaitions . ( Ib id . ,  80) 
Therefore, t h a t  which gives rise t o  love does not have much t o  do 
with p a r t i c u l a r  beings but with Being i t s e l f .  By r e a l i z i n g  t h a t  we 
love something which is wor thy  of abso lu te  value w e  establish a 
connection between O u r  emotional s ide  and Our intellectual s i d e .  
B y  claiming tha t  "love i s  the necessary condi t ion of a  perfect 
moral nature" (Ibid,,  405), Lyall c o m e c t s  the r e a h  o f  emotions and 
the  realm of moral i ty ,  O u r  awareness of l o v e  i s  an i n c e n t i v e  f o r  u s  
t o  respond t o  our moral emotions. B u t  this awareness i s  an a c t  of the 
i n t e l l e c t .  By i tself the i n t e l l e c t  would not be able t o  reach Being  
and it does no t  have t h e  power t o  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  t h e  world. Through 
t h e  emotion of love w e  have the p o s s i b i l i t y  of conceiving that Being 
i s  intrinsically valuable  and, i n  a more general way, through our  
emotions w e  are able t o  bridge t h e  gap between the i n t e l l e c t  and t h e  
w o r l d .  
For L y a l l ,  a human being who lacks the  capacity of  having 
emotions is not  f u l l y  human. "The 'Stoic of the woods - t h e  m a n  
without a t e a r r ,  - ' impassive, fear ing b u t  t h e  shame of fearf was ye t  
capable of t h e  s t r o n g e s t  emotion - w a s  roused t o  ind igna t ion  - w a s  
f ired w i t h  revenge - w a s  touched with t enderness  - was moved t o  
sympathy - though he could  conceal al1 under an appearance of 
indi f ie rence ,  o r  r e s t r a i n  al1 within the bounds of comparative 
equanimity" (Ibid.,  252).  Being able to experience emotions i s  pa r t  
of oneself  and being conscious is another  p a r t .  One cannot e x i s t  
without t h e  other.  One's "mind warms under t h e  sun tha t  enlightens,  
k indles  witn emotion, and burs t s  i n t o  a l 1  t h e  f r u i t f u l n e s s  of moral 
and spiritual vegetation" (Ibid., 283 ) . 
NOW, what is t h e  l i n k  between i n t e l l e c t  and m o t i o n ?  The 
answer, Lyal l  th inks ,  lies i n  t h a t  faculty of mind t h a t  h e  calls 
Unagination.  Lyallf s chapter  on imagination i s  the  l a s t  one i n  the  
first par t  of Intellect ,  the Emotions and the Moral Nature and i t  
comec t s  it with t he  second part, the one on ernotions, Thus, i n  o r d e r  
t o  understand how it i s  that the  intellect and the  emotions are i n  
c lose  connection and how they i n t e r a c t ,  we  have t o  understand what 
imagination is, because t h i s  f a c u l t y  of mind, i n  Lyallf s view is the 
meeting place of t h a t  which links us,  as hunan beings who possess 
both t h e  capacity t o  th ink  and feel, with t h e  phenomenal world and 
makes it possible  for us t o  understand it. Following a Cartes ian 
account, L y a l l  seems t o  bel ieve t h a t  the i n t e l l e c t  has knowledge o f  
i t s e l f  and through t h e  emotions, has knowledge of  t h e  world, is 
comec ted  w i t h  it, b u t  only i n  imagination can it perceive of t h e  
human being as a whole i n  t h e  world. We w i l l  i n s i s t  on t h i s  i s sue  i n  
the n e x t  chapter. 
B u t  i n  t h e  meantime, l e t  us s e e  what imagination is  and how it 
woxks. L y a l l  t a l k s  about imagination a f t e r  al1 other f a c u l t i e s  of t h e  
mind have been looked a t :  conception, abstraction, judgment and 
reasoning. They a l 1  are facult ies of  the  mind but, u n l i k e  
imagination, they l a c k  t h e  pecul ia r  s t a t e  of mind which is t h e  
imaginative state. T h e  ideas of  t h e  mind, where imagination is 
concerned, 'are seen under o r  accompanied by a s t a t e ,  which gives t o  
them al1 their p e c u l i a r i t y ;  so  that w e  have not merely ideas, but 
ideas  of  t h e  imagination" (Ibid., 270)  , 
Imagination capable o f  bringing i n t o  emotional s t a t e  
because it f i l ters  r e a l i t y  i n  the sense  that it makes us resonate  
w i t h  t h e  phenomenal world. Through emot ions  attuned 
aspec t s  of r e a l i t y  which cannot be expressed using j u s t  the means 
o f f e r ed  by  o rd inary  language. T h i s  i s  where imagination and 
metaphoric language corne i n t o  play. Thus, due t o  our imaginative 
capaci ty ,  w e  a re  able t o  make s e n s e  out  of verses like t h e  ones 
Shakespeare wrote: s eeiing [sic] n igh t ,  /Scarf  up the  t ender  
eye of p i t i f u l  day" ( c i t e d  by Lyall, idem, 272) .  The eye i s  tender ,  
t h e  day p i t i f u l  and the nigh t  cornes sealing them. 
These words which provoke imagination c a s t  a d i f f e r e n t  
l i g h t  on t h e  real, on what is. By p u t t i n g  together  words l i k e  eye and 
t ender ,  day and p i t i f u l  o r  s e a l i n g  and n igh t ,  one awakens c e r t a i n  
emotions i n  onese l f .  L y a l l  asks how t h i s  happens, when he w r i t e s :  
Whence the power of t h e s e  conceptions? o r  what 
g ives  them t o  us? It is  t h e  analogy t h a t  i s  
couched i n  them? But every  imaginative conception 
does n o t  convey o r  embody analogy. And even where - 
it i s  analogy - as th is  unquestionably is the 
p r i n c i p a l  source o r  v e h i c l e  of imaginative 
conception - that i s  the  explanation of the 
beauty  of any thought, t h e  quest ion is, why 
analogy should be such a source of beauty o r  
produce such e f f e c t s ?  What i s  t h e r e  i n  analogy t o  
do th is ,  and only i n  some analogies  and not i n  
a l l ?  Many analogies  are s c i e n t i f i c ,  and have no 
imaginat ive  charac te r .  It is no t  t h e  analogy t h a t  
w i l l  exp l a in  the imagination,  ne i t he r  is  i t  
imagination t h a t  g ives  a cha rac t e r  t o  the 
analogy, but a certain s t a t e  which w e  c a l 1  t h e  
imaginat ive  s t a t e ,  and w h i c h  seems t o  be 
inexpl icab le ,  allows of certain analogies being 
imaginative,  while others are no t .  (Ibid. , 273) 
Lyall 's  conclusion is t h a t  it i s  not  the analogy t h a t  explains 
imagination but r a t h e r  t h a t  imaginative s t a t e  which, i n  i t s e l f ,  
def ies  d e f i n i t i o n .  T h e  season why it defies e x p l m a t i o n  is that it is 
par t ly  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and p a r t l y  emotional. 
M y  opinion is  t h a t ,  inasmuch as it is i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  imagination 
implies s e i z i n g  analogies o r  p u t t i n g  together  d i s p a r a t e  terms under 
one name- I n  as much as it is emotional, imagination connects us with 
Being, with " w h a t  is". The i n t e l l e c t u a l  pa r t  provides us with a 
t h e o r e t i c a l  frame, with a matrix, separa te  from r e a l i t y  which is 
f i l l e d  up with t h e  "flesh" of Being through the emotional p a r t .  As 
Lyall p u t s  it i n  his own more c a r e f u l  language: 'It is  i n  the  
imaginative state that the  mind is so active i n  perceiving analogies, 
'seeking concretes ' ,  animating and personifying na ture ,  and obta in ing  
those f i g u r e s  of speech which have t h e i r  element, o r  f i n d  t h e i r  
mater ia l ,  i n  resemblances and ânalogy" (Ibid, , 2 7 4 )  . T h i s  b i t  of text 
is one of t h e  inost important i n  Lyal l ' s  work on t h e  l i n k  between the 
i n t e l l e c t ,  t he  emotions and imagination. I t  i s  true, it is loca ted  
toward the end of his discussion of imagination but  it is the peak 
whose versants a r e  cons t i tu ted  by the  i n t e l l e c t  and t h e  emotions- I n  
t h e  imaginative s t a t e ,  we discover t h e  mind being ac t ive  and 
perceiving analogies.  I n  the  imaginative s t a t e  we f i n d  t h a t  Nature 
appears as animated, emotional. In this s t a t e ,  we a r e  under the s p e l l  
of the ernotions. T h i s  se= l i k e  magic. 
Now w e  m u s t  engage ourselves i n  the a c t  of in t e rp re t ing  t h i s  
t e x t ,  and look for what each important concept means, how are they 
comected,  how Lyal l  sees thern inter twined.  Most Unportantly, we must 
see how they w i l l  appear a f t e r  employing the  t o o l s  offered by a 
phenomenology of emotions complemented w i t h  a hermeneutical ap~rcach 
t o  metaphor, 
The bridge between t h e  i n t e l l e c t u a l  and t h e  emotional is, a s  
w e  saw before, tne imagination whose most important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  i s  
the  imaginat ive  state. Being able t o  imagine, t o  put ourselves i n  
t h a t  imaginat ive  s t a t e  is what de f ines  u s  a s  human beings, as  botki 
emotional and i n t e l l e c t u a l  beings.  The mind seeking " n e w  concretes" 
when perce iv ing  ana log ies  br ings  t o  mind what A r i s t o t l e  said, t h a t  
" to  be a t  i nven t ing  metaphors is t o  have an eye for resemblances" 
(Ricoeur 1976, 5 4 )  . 
The s e e i n g  of  s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  o r  analogies,  as Lyall  terms th-, 
is t h e  a c t i v i t y  of  t h e  mind which, a t  i t s  peak, creates metaphors. 
Thus, t h e  active mind, i n  an imaginat ive  s t a t e ,  w h i c h  perceives 
analogies  and p e r s o n i f i e s  Nature, express ing it i n  a f i gu re  of  
speech i s  i n  fact t h e  mind involved i n  t h e  act of c r ea t i ng  metaphors. 
Moreover, i n  t h e  imaginative s t a t e ,  pe r son i f i ed  and animated 
Nature is connected t o  us through Our emotions. Thus, w e  have t h e  
metaphor which is a c r ea t i on  of our i n t e l l e c t  and thus separated from 
the  phenomenal r e a l i t y  but through emotion we are able t o  understand 
it 'as i f "  it refers t o  something real. 
Now t h a t  w e  have a r r i ved  a t  t h i s  point ,  1 want t o  t ake  t h i s  
f i n d i n g  and in t roduce  it i n t o  a new t e r r i t o r y ,  whose coordinates a r e  
metaphor and emotion, this t ime though, viewed as t h e y  are regarded 
i n  modern phi losophy-  More s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  by us ing Jean-Paul S a r t r e ' s  
e x i s t e n t i a l  analysis of emotions and Paul Ricoeur's theory of 
metaphor. I w i l l  make emotion and rnetaphor t h e  f o c i  of t h e  next two 
chapters . 
An emotion refers back t o  what it s i g n i f i e s .  
And, i n  effect, what it signifies i s  the 
t o t a l i t y  of t h e  r e l a t i onsh ips  of t h e  human 
r e a l i t y  t o  the world. The passage t o  emotion 
is a  t o t a l  modificat ion of 'being-in-the- 
world' according t o  the  very p a r t i c u l a r  laws 
of magic. 
J. P. S a r t r e  
I n  t h i s  chapter  1 w i l l  inquire  i n t o  how it i s  pos s ib l e  for t h e  
emotions t o  connect u s  with t h e  phenomenal world and in doing so, 1 
w i l l  explore t h e  c o m e c t i o n  between imagination and emotion, al1 
t h i s ,  with t h e  i n t e n t i o n  t o  develop L y a l l r s  c la im about t h e  cogn i t i ve  
va lue  of emotions. For Lyal l  the  imaginative s t a t e  has two parts, an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  one and an emotional one, and t h e  emotional element i s  
what connects us with r e a l i t y .  How does t h i s  work? How do o u r  
emotions l i n k  us t o  r e a l i t y ?  And what kind of r e a l i t y  i s  t h a t ?  I n  
order to answer t he se  ques t ions  1 look f o r  h e l p  i n  J . P ,  Sartre's 
theory  of emotion, 
For Sartre, emotion is a conscious t ransformat ion of the 
world, a "magical" world t h a t  i s .  I b e l i e v e  t h a t  Lyall ,  i f  offered 
t h e  g i f t  of phenomenology, would reach very similar conclusions to 
t h o s e  of Sartre o r ,  t o  put it i n  a d i f ferent  way, Lyal l  seems t o  
anticipate Sartre by p u t t i n g  h i s  analysis of emotions i n  a framework 
which is not at al1 common to his time. However, Sartre's approach 
offers just a fictitious connection with the world because he was 
only able to see emotions 'as fictive idealism", as Joseph Fe11 puts 
it in his book on the 5zot ion in the Thouqht of S a r t r e  (1966, 2 3 6 )  . 
Now, Lyallr s assertion that emotions connect us with Being which, of 
course, should be understood as asserting motion as an expression of 
God's existence, Thus, he avoids reaching Sartre's unhappy 
conclusion. 
This chapter begins with a survey of four different theories 
which attempt to understand the complex phenomenon of emotion. We 
need to do this survey in order to discover a framework that will 
best suit Lyall's views. What follows is a discussion of Sartre's 
theory which 1 consider most successful and its applicability to 
Lyallf s, stressing their s t r i k i n g  svnilarities and their important 
difference . 
FOUR THEORIES OF EMOTfON 
William Lyons, in his book on Emotion (1980), distinguishes 
among four classical theories of emotion: the feeling theory, the 
behaviorist theory, the psycboanalytic theory and the cognitive 
theory. m i l e  the feeling and the cognitive theories of ernotions have 
been the most influential and important in philosophy, the 
behaviorist and the psychoanalytic theories were valued the most in 
psychoiogy. In what follows 1 will give a short description of each, 
intending to mphasize their merits as well as their flaws. What 1 am 
fooking for is a theory that connects emotion and imagination and 
involves the intellectual side as well and one that considers 
emotions able to create a l i n k  between the emotional person and the 
phenomenal world. 
Tbe F e e l i n g  Theory 
The feeling theory is based on the Cartesian account of 
emotions, as it appears in The Passions of the Soul .  For Descartes, 
soul and body have different functions. The body's functions are 
movement and heat. A i l  the movements of the lunbs are explained by 
drawing on the movements of the animal spirits which are extremely 
small material bodies and "the most animated and subtle portions of 
the blood" (Descartes 1985-1991, 335). The soulrs function is tnought 
and it is of two sorts: actions or desires which either aim at 
sornething immaterial, for example God, or at moving our body; and 
passions which represent our reflective awareness of the disturbances 
occurring in the body. "Fear, for example, is the awareness of the 
animal spirits causing or tending to cause us, Say, to turn our back 
and run away, and is caused by these animal spirits. That is why, for 
Descartes, emotions are passive or passions" (Lyons 1980, 4 1 , 
This explanation of emotion as passion implies that in 
experiencing an emotion we are merely aware of what our soul feels 
when there i s  something going on in the body. But the connection 
between emotion and behavior thus described has a major flaw, pointed 
out by Lyons: 
Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with 
Descartesr view of emotions is that it does not 
separate off what are cornmonly agreed to be 
emotions from what are commonly agreed not to be 
emotions. Given his theory, Descartes is forced 
to grant not merely that the subjective awareness 
of the bodily movements and physiological changes 
following on a perception of something such as a 
frightening animal, is an emotion, but also that 
the subjective awareness of the bodily movements 
and physiological changes following the injection 
of a drug or the onset of a disease, should merit 
the title \emotionr- For after al1 the perception 
of the external object is not central to 
Descartes' account of emotion, for he does allow 
that some emotions, such as objectless and 
imaginary-object fears are caused entirely by 
'temperaments of the body or [..,] impressions 
which are fortuitously met with in the 
nrain' (1985 - 1991, 356), and there is no rubric 
laid d o m  as to how these in turn must be caused. 
So it seems that there is nothing against a 
disease or drug causing them. (Ibid- , 7-8) 
William James tried to straighten out Descartesr account of emotion 
by considering that, even though emotions are feelings, they are 
feelings "of the physiological changes and disturbances that went on 
during an emotional occurrence". According to Lyons, "[James8] hope 
was that, at least eventually, psychology would be able to 
dist inguish emotions f rom one another, and from non-emotions , by 
reference to these observable changes" (Ibid., 12). 
For William James, it is impossible to imagine an emotion 
occurring without physiological change. The emotion is our awareness 
or feeling of the bodily changes which themselves are ignited by the 
perception of the object  of the emotion. This way, the only link 
between emotion and consciousness is the perception of the object. 
But it too acts only as a "causal antecedent to emotion". The idea of 
an emotion dissociated from Our feeling of the body is non-sense 
. because then there is nothing left to it, James considers. If there 
is no increase in our heart beat making our blood rush madly through 
our veins, if our muscles do not contract and our hands do not become 
clenched into a fist, then how can we know that we are experiencing 
the emotion of rage? Feeling al1 these changes is what constitutes an 
emotion. 
To sum it al1 up, even though James writes from a Cartesian 
perspective, "he took the feeling out of the sou1 and put it into a 
purely bodily arena, fox his feeling was just the subjective side of 
the physiological changes involved, so that if the feeling was 
different for each emotion it was because the physiological changes 
accompanying each emotion must be different as well" (Ibid., 15). 
This distinction opens up the way to objective quantitative 
measusement in which the modern psychology of emotions is rooted. 
Once it had a specific given with which it could work, which could be 
used in experiments, psychology detached itself from philosophy and 
became a sepazate discipline, However, this approach to emotions, 
besides being too wide and inclusive, does not allow for any - 
cognitive element to enter the discussion, Save for the "perception 
of the object" which only acts as a 'causal antecedent to ernotion". 
Behaviorisrn, roughly defined, is the theory or doctrine that 
human or animal psychology can be accurately studied only through the 
examination and analysis of o b j e c t i v e l y  observable and q u a n t i f i a b l e  
behavioral  events ,  i n  con t r a s t  w i t h  sub jec t ive  mental  s t a t e s .  Two o f  
the most in£ luential exponents o f  t h e  behavior i s t  t h e o r y  a r e  J. B. 
Watson who is u s u a l l y  considered t o  be t h e  "father" of behav io r i s t  
psychology, and B.F. Skinner, a m o d e r n  represen ta t ive .  W i l l i a m  Lyons 
observes t h a t :  " T h e  behav io r i s t  t h e o r y  of emotions, like ~ e h a v i o r i s m  
i t s e l f ,  is a product  of  t h a t  period when psychology w a s  breaking away 
from philosophy and seeking t o  e s t a b l i s h  i t s e l f  as a na tura l  science" 
(Ibid., 1 7 )  . 
Watson considered emotions t o  be p a r t  of the behavior  pa t t e rns  
which a r e  s o m e h o w  i n h e r i t e d  and not so much acquired. New-born 
ch i l à r en  have t h e s e  p a t t e r n s  u n a l t e r e d  and, thus, t h e  place t o  look 
f o r  "pure" emotions is in i n f an t s .  "An e m o t i o n  i s  an h e r e d i t a r y  
'pa t te rn- reac t ionr  involving profound changes of the bod i ly  mechanism 
as a whole, but p a r t i c u l a r l y  of  the v i s c e r a l  and g l andu la r  systems. 
B y  p a t t e r n  r e a c t i o n  w e  mean t h a t  the sepa ra t e  de ta i l s  of response 
appear with  some constancy, w i t h  some r e g u l a r i t y  and i n  approximately 
t h e  same s e q u e n t i a l  o r d e r  each t h e  t h e  exc i t i ng  s t imulus  is 
presented" (Watson 1919, 195) . The emotion occurs when everything 
t h a t  concerns the s t imulus  and t h e  mechanism o f  phys io log ica l  
response i s  j u s t  r i g h t  so  the  effect groduced by  the s t imulus  is t h e  
intended one. But following t h i s  account we have to favor some 
s t i m u l i  over o t h e r s  and also we have t o  be able t o  e x p l a i n  why t h e  
same stimulus causes different emotional  react ions  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
sub jec t s .  For example, the s igh t  and t h e  closeness o f  a big dog might 
f r i g h t e n  a l i t t l e  ch i l d  b u t  t h e  same b i g  dog might be t h e  p r i d e  of 
h i s  owner. How can t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  emotions be explained i n  these  
circumstances? 
One w a y  t o  explain emotional difference is by dec la r ing  that 
h e r e d i t a r y  p a t t e r n s  change w i t h  o n e f s  psychological  development. 
Acquired c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  corne ont0  t h e  scene and they d i s t o r t  t h e  
h e r e d i t a r y  ones. In f a c t ,  there cannot be a l i n e  drawn between what 
i s  i n h e r i t e d  and what is  not ,  between h e r e d i t a r y  p a t t e r n s  and 
acquired f e a t u r e s .  This means t h a t  a very clear account of what it 
is  t o  have an emotion is no t  r e a l l y  poss ib le .  For  s imi l a r  reasons  it 
is  n o t  r e a l l y  pos s ib l e  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  c l e a r l y  among mot ions .  Even 
though Watson d i s t i ngu i shed  emotions which occur  when 'the 
adjustments c a l l e d  out  by t h e  s t imulus  a r e  i n t e r n a 1  and conf ined t o  
the s u b j e c t ' s  body". f o r  example blushing, f r o m  i n s t i n c t i v e  reactions 
which happen when "the s t imulus  l eads  t o  adjus tment .of  t h e  organism 
as a whole t o  objects". f o r  example, i n  defens ive  responses, 
grasping, e t c . ,  h i s  argument is no t  s t rong  enough. 
Watson affirms t h a t  the he red i t a ry  p a t t e r n  i s  thus s h a t t e r e d  
apart and it l a r g e l y  disappears .  Lyonsr assessment is t h a t  when this 
occurs we are left with very  l i t t l e  t o  c i rcumscr ibe  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
emotion : 
Watson has t o l d  u s  t h a t  an emotion i s  a 'pat tern- 
r e a c t i o n f ,  c h i e f l y  o f  phys io log ica l  changes, 
which is found i n  i ts unadul te ra ted  form only i n  
t h e  new-born c h i l d ,  though it is d i f f i cu l t  t o  get 
clear evidence of t h i s .  Since he admits that t h i s  
'pa t tern-react ionr  is a d u l t e r a t e d  o r  becomes 
e t i o l a t e d ,  o r  both,  soon after infancy,  he is 
admitting i n  e f f e c t  t h a t  w i t h  a d u l t s  one cannot 
d i s t i n g u i s h  one emotion from another.  o r  
emotional r eac t i ons  from o ther  s o r t s  of react ion,  
by m e a n s  of a behaviorist account. Indeed, given 
the admitted pauc i ty  of h i s  evidence concerning 
emotional r eac t i ons  i n  the new-born, one can 
doubt his cla im t o  be a b l e  t o  do t h i s  even with 
i n f a n t s  . ( Ib id . ,  18  ) 
Thus Watsonrs behavioral explmation o f  emotions is circulas.  H e  
affims tha t  pure emotions a re  only experienced by new-born chi ldren 
and that emotional reactions alter soon after infancy t o  t h e  extent  
that adults are no longer able t o  discern among di f ferent  îmotions. 
Eowever, he brings l i t t l e  evidence i n  support of t he  idea t h a t  
"pattern-reactions" i n  new-born children are pristine and thersfore 
he fails t o  explain how they become al tered with the passing o f  time. 
Watsonrs v i e w  is taken further and somehow improved by B.F. Skinner. 
Unlike Watson, Skinner does not stress t h e  physiological changes nor 
the reflex behavior, Instead, he emphasizes the operant behavior 
which i s  that behavior whose outcome is the desired one. 
m a t  does it mean f o r  Skinner t o  say the desired resul t  is 
brought about by operant behavior? Suppose, f o r  example, that X 
offends  Y. As a r e su l t ,  X gets angry, clenches h i s  f i s t s ,  pounds t h e  
table, slams t h e  door, e tc .  T h i s  kind o f  behavior will drive Y out  of 
the w a y  and t hus ,  Y's offensive behavior, which s ta r ted  the scene 
w i l l  not be persisted in nos, probably, repeated. X was predisposed 
t o  emit t h i s  specific operant behavior (pounding the  table and 
slamming the door) and the offensive behavior of Y w a s  t h e  promoter 
of it. But nothing quarantees that the  above behavior i s  always 
exhibited by everyone. X might react i n  t h e  way  described above o r  
might j u s t  calmly walk away and breath deeply, pretending there was 
no harm done. Moreover, it would be an impossible t a s k  t o  l is t  a r U  
features of  a spec i f i c  behavior ( a n g r y )  t ha t  must be present for t h a t  
behavior t o  be considered as angry. William Lyons argues tha t :  
Skinner's behaviorism, much more than Watson's 
version, i s  open t o  the  d i f f i cu l t y  t h a t  many 
instances of some emotions, and most instances of 
the others,  exh ib i t  little or no operant 
behavior. Grief, especially when it is about 
something i r r e t r i e v a b l y  l o s t  o r  dead, does not 
lead t o  much, if any; operant behavior, because 
no behavior can b r i n g  about any des i red  resul ts .  
For the des i red  result - t h a t  what is àead be 
brought back t o  life or what is irretrievably 
l o s t  be found - is  clear ly  impossible t o  
achieve.  B u t  even angry people can be angry and 
not  show it i n  operant  behavior. That is, some 
people a r e  j u s t  con t ro l l ed ,  undemonstrative 
people. (Ibid., 22) 
Simply put ,  Skinner's account takes  away any chance f o r  freedom w e  
might have because there i s  no p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  us t o  behave i n  a w a y  
t h a t  we consciously choose. I n s t e â d  w e  only exhib i t  an operant 
behavior , 
In  the  in t roduc t ion  t o  Exfstential Psychoanalysis (a  
t r a n s l a t i o n  of a m a j  o r  section of Sartref s B e i n q  and Nothingness, 
about the connection b e t w e e n  e x i s t e n t i a l i s m  and psychoanalysis) ,  
Rollo May gives a brief  account of t h e  exchange b e t w e e n  Car1 Rogers 
and B.F.  Skinner a t  a 1960 conference.  Told from Rogersf viewpoint, 
t h e  exchange between them is  t h e  following: 
From what I understood Dr. Skinner t o  Say, it is  
h i s  understanding t h a t  though he might have 
thought he chose t o  corne t o  t h i s  meeting, might 
have thought he had a purpose i n  giving h i s  
speech, such thoughts  are r e a l l y  i l l u so ry .  H e  
a c t u a l l y  made certain marks on paper and emitted 
c e r t a i n  sounds h e r e  simply because h i s  genetic 
make-up and his p a s t  environment had operant ly  
condit ioned h i s  behavior  i n  such  a w a y  t h a t  it 
was rewarding t o  make these  sounds, and that he 
as a person doesn't enter i n t o  t h i s -  I n  fact if 1 
get  h i s  thinking c o r r e c t l y ,  from h i s  s t r i c t l y  
s c i e n t i f i c  point  o f  view, he, as a person, 
d o e s n r t  exist'. In h i s  reply D r .  Skinner s a i d  
t h a t  he would not  go i n t o  t h e  quest ion of whether 
he had any choice i n  t h e  matter (presumably 
because t h e  whole i s s u e  is i l l u s o r y )  b u t  s t a t e d ,  
'1 do accept your c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n  of my own 
presence herer. 1 do not need t o  l abo r  the p o i n t  
t h a t  f o r  D r .  Skinner the concept o f  'learning t o  
be freer would be quite meaningless. (Sartre 
1966, 4 )  
T h e  kind of explanat ion of emotions of fe red  by t h e  behavior is t  theory 
takes away any conscious in t e rac t ion  between us, as  human beings and 
t h e  surrounding w o r l d .  Everything happens without us p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  
it. W e  j u s t  r e a c t ,  w e  jus t  perform i n  the  presence of certain 
s t imul i .  Thus, bes ides  being too  narrow and exclusive, t h i s  theory 
has nothing t o  o f f e r  i n  the  way of a cogni t ive aspect  underlying our  
emotions . 
The Psychozrnalytic Theozy 
Another approach t o  the sub jec t  of emotions is  offered by 
psychoanalysis. O f  course, t he  inventor  and chief  exponent of t h i s  
theory i s  Freud- Even though he did no t  have a specific and c l e a r  
account of emotions: Freud ca l l ed  emotions 'affects". However, 
because of Freud8 s main preoccupation with t r e a t i n g  h i s  emotionally 
d is turbed  p a t i e n t s ,  t h e  only emotions t h a t  were considered were the 
negat ive emotions l i k e  fear, anxiety,  etc. T h e  emotions of t h i s  kind 
are resur rec t ions  of traumatic events which were repressed i n  the 
individual's unconscious. "Affective states", considers Freud i n  
Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (19711, 'have become 
incorporated in t h e  mind as  p r e c i p i t a t e s  of primaeval t raumatic 
experiences, and when a s imi la r  s i t u a t i o n  occurs they are revived 
l i k e  memic symbols" (1971,  9 3 ) .  For Freud, an emotion has more t o  do 
with the  ind iv idua l ' s  inher i ted  repressed memories which themselves 
primarily because there is an external cause for it but rather 
because it is connected with an originally traumatic and subsequently 
repressed memory. Lyons explains that: 
Unlike the Cartesian, or the Behaviorist accounts 
for that matter, the Freudian account sees the 
external stimulus as acting only as remote cause 
of emotion- Events in the world cause us to react 
emotionally only insofar as they first stir up in 
us some instinctual drive or impulse, and insofar 
as this drive or impulse is repressed or blocked. 
Emotion is the safety vaive that lets off psychic 
s t e m  w h e n  the repression or blocking of the 
normal outlets becomes unbearable . " (Lyons 198  0, 
2 9 
This implies that emotion is not primarily a reaction to the world 
but to something that is in our unconscious. ".In anxiety", Lyons 
writes, "1 am anxious, not because the situation is difficult or 
threatening, but because it triggers off some unconscious repressed 
desire which 1 find threatening or difficult to cope with" (Ibid., 
2 9 ) .  But this sort of explanation would raise immediately some 
questions because there can be a great number of possible 
manifestations of anxiety, and choosing the one that fits best is a 
pretty d i f f  icult j ob. 
William Lyons believes that J. P. Sartre proposes quite an 
interesting variation on the Freudian account of emotion. Sartre's 
account substitutes Freud's concept of unconscious with the concept 
of "magical" behavior But the idea that emotionfs significance does 
not consist in "ordinary perceptual consciousness" is still at work 
(Ibid., 28) .  Sartre's rejection of the unconscious is based on the 
fact that he observes that consciousness must always be aware of 
i tself-  T h i s  awareness, however i s  not constantly made e x p l i c i t  i n  
re f fec t ion;  Sa r t r e  calls it a pre- ref lec t ive  consciousness which does 
not t ake  t h e  self as an objec t ,  The two theor ies  analyzed above - t h e  
fee l ing theory and the  behavior is t  theory  f a i l e d  t o  look a t  the body 
as a subjec t ,  ûnly t r e a t i n g  it as an objec t ,  they f a i l e d  as w e l l  a t  
giving a per t inent  account of emotions, 
For Sartre, thoughts, dreams and fee l ings  depend on 
consciousness, and consciousness Fs where one should look for 
explanations f o r  them. Mental events are in ten t iona l  events;  they  a r e  
always meaningful and they a r e  always d i r ec ted  towards objec ts  of 
their own. Thus, Sartre moves a long way away from Freud's 
perspective:  "The Freudians are held t o  be wrong because they 
overlook t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  of mental events,  and think t h a t  t h e r e  
can be an induct ive ly  de temined causa l  r e l a t ion  between my dream, 
l e t  us Say, and some ex te rna l  o b j e c L a  re l a t ion  of which 1, t h e  
pa t i en t ,  am not aware s i n c e  the  connection is made by m e  
subconsciously. So the argument aga ins t  bare causal explanat ions of 
mental phenornena and aga ins t  t h e  unconscious come t o  the same" 
(Sartre 1976, 9). Sartre sees  emction not  as an accident ,  but as a 
'mode of our conscious existence,  one of the ways i n  which 
consciousness understands ( i n  Heidegger's sense of Verstehen) i t s  
Being-in-the-World" (Ibid., 9 1 ) .  This, 1 think, br ings  him c l o s e r  t o  
a cogni t ive theory of  emotion, which will be discussed next ,  
As r ega rds  t h e  cogni t ive  tbeory  of emotion, A r i s t o t l e  s e e m s  t o  
be t h e  f i r s t  who took t h i s  approach among philosophers.  However, he 
did no t  analyze it i n  D e  Ilnima as one would expect ,  but r a t h e r  i n  t h e  
Rhetoric. I n  h i s  book on A r i s t o t l e '  s concept of emotion, W, W. 
Fortenbaugh n o t e s  t h a t  : 
I n  the second book of  t h e  Rhetoxic, A r i s t o t l e  
de f ines  anger as  a desire f o r  revenge accompanied 
by pain on account o f  (dia) an apparent  s l i g h t  t o  
onese l f  o r  t o  one r s  own, t h e  s l i g h t  being 
c n j u s t i f i e d  (1378 a 30-2)  [...] Anger is not pain 
which happens t o  occur together  with ( m e t a )  t h e  
thought  of outrage. O n  t h e  contrary,  anger is 
n e c e s s a r i l y  caused by t h e  thought of outrage,  so 
that such a thought is  mentioned i n  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  
d e f i n i t i o n  of anger. The same is t r u e  of f ea r .  It 
is caused by the thought of imminent danger, so  
that t h e  appearance of f u t u r e  e v i l ,  de s t ruc t ive  
o r  p a i n f u l ,  is mentioned i n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
f e a r  (1382 a 21-2) . Fear is not  some pain o r  
b o d i l y  dis turbance d i s t i n c t  f r o m  cogni t ion.  It i s  
a complex phenomenon which necessarily involves 
no t  only  pa infu l  disturbance b u t  a l s o  t h e  thought 
of danger.  (1975, 1 2 )  
Lyons stresses t h e  fact t h a t  t h i s  l a s t  theory is most l i k e l y  c l o s e r  
t o  a cornprehensive explanation of emotion because it explains what 
t h e  theor i e s  p rev ious ly  analyzed did not .  A person experiencing an 
emotion, i n  A r i s t o t l e '  s v i e w ,  has a c e r t a i n  percept ion of t h e  world. 
One th inks  i n  a c e r t a i n  way about t h e  people oce is angry with and 
one ih inks  t h a t  way because of  a c e r t a i n  reason. However, j u s t  t h i s  
is not  enough t o  make up an emotion. Besides t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
percept ion of  t h e  world one has f ee l ings  and impulses which are 
t r i gge red  by what one t h inks  about t h e  world, T h i s  means t h a t  t h e  
primary cause f o r  phys io log ica l  changes is c o n s t i t u t e d  by one's 
belief. Believing t h a t  sornething i s  going t o  affect our phys ica l  
i n t e g r i t y ,  f o r  example, causes us t o  experience fear. 
The cogni t ive  theory stresses t h e  importance of t h e  f a c t  that 
emotion i s  not  something that rests j u s t  on feeling, o r  j u s t  on 
behavior, o r  is just a r e a c t i o n  t o  a traumatic event- Au contraire, 
t h e r e  is an i n t e l l e c t u a l  p a r t  t o  it a l so .  
An emotion t hen  is no t  something t h a t  has t o  do exc lus ive ly  
with t he  body o r  exclusiveiy with t h e  mind but r a t h e r  it has t o  do 
with both of t h e m ,  T h i s  happens because through emotions one becomes 
p a r t  of the w o r l d ,  Through emotions it i s  the body and the mind, 
intertwined,  that p a r t i c i p a t e  t o  t h e  world. I t r s  not j u s t  a reaction 
toward an ex t e rna l  stimulus and it is  not  a r e a c t i o n  t o  a suppressed 
trauma. Rather, it has to do with belief in a specific apprec i a t i on  
of the w o r l d .  
How does W i l l i a m  Lya l l  relate t o  t h e  foregoing accounts of 
emotion? Under which heading should  h i s  theory of- emotion be 
c l a s s i f i e d ?  Lyall's ideas about emotions seem t o  corne very close t o  
the cognitive view. He too believed t h a t  emotions tell us something 
about the  f a b r i c  of the world. However, as we s a w  i n  the  previous 
chapter, L y a l l  has i d e a l i s t  t endenc ies .  T h i s  implies that for him the 
world i t s e l f  has been "poured" i n t o  a specific £rame, ~ e i n g  s o  very 
c lo se  t o  the s p i r i t  of Romanticism, w e  can understand how he r e l a t e s  
t o  na ture  within t h e  ideal is t  framework. Tt is an underlying theme of  
t h i s  per iod of t ime  t h a t ,  once the  subject and t h e  ob jec t ,  mind and 
nature have been separa ted ,  once an unbridgeable gap has  been placed 
b e t w e e n  thern, one concludes that t h e  on ly  w a y  t he  s u b j e c t  can know 
i t s e l f  i s  through what it does t o  t h e  o b j e c t ,  and t h e  only  way the 
objec t  can be known i s  through what it does t o  the subject, What can 
w e  t a l k  about, then?  The i n t e r ac t ion  between t h e  two, the  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l  tension between mind and world. Nei ther  t h e  s e l f ,  
nor  t h e  world cari be known, t b a t  is, t a l k e d  about; they  c m  only be 
experienced, t h e  one i n  terms of the o t h e r ,  Reality, then,  is what 
t h e  mind has done t o  t h e  world and what t h e  world has done to the 
mind. Spirit i s  t h e  term many Romantics used f o r  i n t e r p r e t i n g  the  
tens ion  between the  s u b j e c t  and the  o b j e c t  o r  r e a l i t y .  
L y a l l  seems t o  regard t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  between t h e  s u b j e c t  and 
t h e  ob jec t  as a challenge and h i s  account o f  emotions can be taken as 
h i s  answer , Unlike Berkeley' s idealism, f o r  example, o r  Hegel' s, 
Lya l l  bu i lds  h i s  case by considering t h a t  the l i n k  between the world 
and t h e  s e l f  is  f a c i l i t a t e d  by the  emotions. Moreover, for Lyall, 
imagination i s  of foremost importance when it cornes t o  explaining the 
l i n k  between the  world and the s e l f .  I n  t h e  imaginative s t a t e ,  both 
emotions and t h e  i n t e l l e c t  meet. Ernotions, i n  Lyall's view, reach out  
f o r  r e a l i t y  and through them, the intellect grasps i t s  essence,  B u t  
t h i s  can not happen i f  w e  l a c k  imagination. Imagination is both 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  and emotional .  
Now, from the  foregoing theo r i e s  of emotions, t h e  one t h a t  
cornes very close t o  L y a l l r s  p a r t i c u l a r  v i e w  is t h e  one developed b y  
J- P. Sartre- Sartre links consciousness and emotions and w r a p s  them 
up in the v e i l  of a "magical behavior". Being able to use our 
imagination is what brings us into the presence of the  world as our 
emotions discover it. 
Sartre: imagination anci Rnotions 
W i i h  reçard to this issue, Sartre asks "what must be the 
nature of  consciousness i n  general in order that the construction of 
an image should always be possible?" (1966, 259). In imagination, 
thought does not reach out for the object, but rather "appears as the 
object". Sartre tells us what it means : 
If the development of an idea occurs in the form 
of a series of imaginative consciousnesses that 
are synthetically linked, it will irnbue the 
object as an image with a sort of  vitality. It 
w i l l  appear now under one aspect, now under 
another, now with this determination, now with 
some other. To judge that a coachman whose face 
one imagines vaguely had a mustache is t o  see his 
face appear as having a mustache. There is an 
imaginative form of the judgment which is nothirig 
else than the addition to the object of new 
qualities, accompanied by the feeling of 
venturing, promising, or of assuming 
responsibilities [,.] If we think imaginatively of 
some individual objects it will be these objects 
themselves that will appear to our consciousness. 
(Ibid. ,  160) 
Thus, for S a r t r e ,  the images acquire the right to existence -"as any 
other existence". The only difference between the type of existence 
given to us in imagination and the real existence is the w a y  in which 
we grasp them. While the real existence is perceived as forming a 
whole, where 'my attention is CO-present as an essential condition of 
the existence of the reality actually perceived" (Ibid., 2 6 2 ) ,  we 
grasp the existence given to us in imagination by isolating it from 
the perceived reality and by positing it as empty of data- "To posit 
an image is to construct an object  on the fringe of the whole of 
reality, which means therefore to hold the real at a distance, to 
free oneself from it, in a word, to deny it" (Ibid., 266) . 
Consciousness cannot exist without imagining because this ability is 
consciousnessr ticket for freedom, "In order to imagine, 
consciousness must be free from al1 specific reality and this freedom 
must be able to define itself by a 'being-in-the-world which is at 
once the constitution and the negation of the world" (Ibid., 269- 
2 7 0 ) .  Imagination is where consciousness realizes its own freedom by 
withdrawing from the real, by always being able, at any moment, to 
produce the unreal. This is how consciousness works when imagining. 
Now, w i t h  regard to emotions, Sartre affirms that emotional 
consciousness is not reflective consciousness, An emotion does not 
present itself as a state of mind of which the one experiencing. the 
emotion is conscious. This would be equivalent to saying that the 
perception of this paper is consciousness of perceiving the paper. 
The emotional consciousness is "prirnarily consciousness of the 
world". "In a word, the emotional subject and the object of the 
emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis. The emotion is a 
specific manner of apprehending the world" (Sartre 1976, 57). The 
world is continuously present to tne emotional subject. There is an 
intercomection which avoids the reflectivity of consciousness. For 
Sartre, emotion is "a transformation of the world", Now, the world 
i t s e l f  is regarded under two d i f f e r e n t  aspects: the world is e i t h e r  
"instrumental" o r  "dif f i c u l t "  . 
There is ,  first, an instrumental  perspective on t he  world. 
Joseph Fe l l  explains cha t  i n  S a r t r e r  s view, "Men perceive their 
environment as a complex of instruments, a medium i n  which, provided 
w e  know cer ta in  r u l e s  o r  techniques, w e  can manipulate people and 
things so  as t o  achieve ce r t a in  ends-. We assume t h i s  r e g u l a r i t y  every 
tine we act" ( F e l l  1906, 15) . As long as things happen following t h e  
sarne s t ruc ture ,  as long as they are out-there, t h e y  are ,  a t  the same 
tirne, i n  one's amSiance, t o  use a term employed by Gabriel Marcel in 
his metaphysical journal. W e  are ,  more o r  l e s s ,  comfortable with what 
goes on around us. W e  do things i n  a c e r t a i n  way because w e  know what 
t o  expect; w e  know what s o r t  of reac t ions  a ce r t a in  ac t ion  would 
cause as long as t h e  world unfolds i n  the  way w e  a r e  used t o  it. T h i s  
does not mean, however, t h a t  we merely f o l l o w  habits- S a r t r e  would 
r eac t  v i ru len t ly  aga ins t  t h i s  idea. Orestes, the chief charac ter  i n  
Sa r t r e r  s play,  The  F l i e s ,  would be the  most representat ive character 
w i t h  regard t o  t h i s .  He shouted against a manipulating and d i l e t t a n t e  
Zeus, as  Sa r t r e  doubt less  would do, '1 am my freedom!". F l h a t  S a r t r e  
means by t h i s  kind of dec lara t ion  i s  t h a t  t h e  world, i n  i t s  
instrumental pragmatic feature is an easy world. This world se- t o  
be determinis t ic  because it follows Our expectations and we are no t  
deceived by it, as Sartre explains : 
From t h i s  point  o f  view, t he  world around us - 
t h a t  which the Gemâns c a l 1  t h e  Umwelt - t h e  
world of  our  desires, our needs and o f  our 
a c t i v i t i e s ,  appears to be a l 1  furrowed with 
s t r a i t  and narrow paths leading t o  such and such 
determinate ends - t h a t  is, it has t h e  appearance 
of a created object .  Natusally, here and there ,  
and t o  some extent  everywhere, there  are p i t f a l l s  
and t r a p s  ... This world is d i f f i c u l t .  T h e  notion of 
d i f f i c u l t y  here is n o t  a re f lex ive  not ion which 
would irnply a re la t ion  t o  oneself .  It is out  
there ,  in t h e  world, it is  a qual i ty  of t he  world 
given t o  perception ( j u s t  a s  t h e  paths t o  t h e  
poss ib le  goals, t he  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  themselves and 
the exigencies of o b j e c t s  - books t h a t  ought t o  
be read, shoes t o  be resoled,  etc. ) , it is the  
noet ic  c o r r e l a t e  of the a c t i v i t y  w e  have 
undertaken - o r  have only conceived, (Ibid., 63) 
Therefore, t h e  world i s  double-faced. These is an easy world, on the 
one hand, and there is a d i f f i c u f t  world, on the  other hand. T h i s  
d i f f i c u l t  world, however, i s  also t h e  world i n  which w e  lFve and i n  
which we must act, Sometimes it becornes unbearable but  we  s t i l l  need 
t o  a c t ,  t o  continue l i v i n g  even though the  things cf t h e  world do not  
follow t h e i r  expected paths, even though they happen as i f  they are 
out of control .  
For S a r t r e  though, w e  a r e  our  freedom which i n p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  
w o r l d  i s  "out of control",  i f  the 'time i s  out of  joint" ,  as 
Shakespeare said through Hamletrs voice, w e  cannot a f f o r a  to remain 
immobilized and p r o s t r a t e  waiting f o r  it t o  change and becorne 
instrumental again. Rather, we change t h e  world i t se l f  by making it a 
magical world. What t h i s  means i n  Sartre's v i e w  i s  explained a t  least 
i n  p a r t  by F e l l :  
Emotion is a way of a c t i n g  on ourselves when 
ac t ion  i n  t h e  p r a g m a t i c  w o r l d  i s  of no a v a i l .  T h e  
\magicr cons i s t s  i n  t h e  fact t h a t  our a c t i o n  on 
ourselves (e. g- , f a i n t i n g )  is intended as a 
transformation of t h e  world, not of ourselves.  We 
have remarked t h a t  i n  emotion a t t en t ion  i s  
d i r ec ted  outward, on the object. To be sure ,  w e r e  
the sub jec t  l a t e r  t o  r e f l e c t  upon h i s  a c t i o n  he 
would recognize h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  transform t h e  
world, Magic is  not e f f i cac ibus .  Bu t  Sartre 
repeatedly emphasizes t h a t  emotional behavior i s  
unref lec t ive .  And i n  the  unref lec t ive  s t a t e  t h e  
subject  ' l i v e s r  the magical t ransformat ion:  it is 
the w o r l d  which seems changed, (Fell 1966, 17) 
There are two different w a y s  i n  which consciousness can 'be-in-the- 
world", There is, first, a percept ion of t h e  world a s  a "cornplex of 
u t i l i z a b l e  th ings"  which are manipulated in orde r  t o  obta in  such and 
such r e s u l t s ,  'If one wants t o  produce a p r e d e t e d n e d  e f f e c t ,  one 
must act upon t h e  determinable  elements of t h a t  complex"(Sartre 1976, 
90)  - Thus, a c t i ng ,  asserting oner s freedoxu has a major s igni f  i cance ,  
However, a t  t h i s  level, there i s  no abso lu te  ac t i on ,  there i s  no 
possible way in which t o  act i n  osder for a 'radical changef t o  
occur ,  Rather, 'we have t o  modify one particular u tens i l ,  and t h i s  by 
m e a n s  of another which refers i n  its t u r n  t o  y e t  another, and s o  to 
i n f i n i t y "  (Ibid, , 9 0 )  . 
B e s i d e s  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t  way of being-in-the-world, t h e r e  
i s  ano ther  one, where the world does not  p r e s e n t  i t s e l f  as an 
utilizable whole any l onge r .  Acting, now i s  set on a d i f f e r e n t  
pe r spec t ive .  This t h e ,  there is nothing a t  hand t h a t  can be used in 
o r d e r  t o  change it, t h e r e  is no intermediary between us and the 
world. T h e  world l o se s  its structure and i t s  ca tegor ies ,  Sartre 
explains when, f o r  example, w e  are f r i gh t ened  by someone seen through 
a window : 
the face t h a t  f r i g h t e n s  u s  through the window 
acts upon us  without any means; there i s  no need 
f o r  t h e  window t o  open, for a man t o  leap i n t o  
t h e  room o r  t o  w a l k  across the f loor) . And, 
conversely,  t he  consciousness tries t o  combat 
there dangers o r  t o  rnodify t h e s e  objects a t  no 
distance and without  means, by some absolute,  
massive modif ica t ion  of  the world. This aspect  of  
t h e  world i s  an e n t i r e l y  coherent  one; t h i s  is  
t h e  rnagical world. (Ibid., 9 0 )  
This is the kind of magic that occurs when we experience an emotion- 
On Sartre's view, emotion is not comprehended any longer as something 
that cornes from outside, Rather, it is something that begins with 
consciousness, where consciousness returns to the magical attitude 
which is characteristic of a magical world. "Clearly to understand 
the emotional process as it proceeds £rom consciousness, we must 
remember the dual nature of the body, which, o~i the one hand is an 
object in the world and on the other is immediately lived by the 
consciousness" (Ibid., 77), writes Sartre. Thus, emotional 
consciousness does more than merely "projecting affective meanings 
upon the world around it", because the body is not j u s t  an 
ins t m e n t .  
The Magieaï W o r l d  
The human body, in Sartre's account is also something through 
which consciousness lives the world. If the world happens to be a new 
magical world into which 
experiencing emotion then, the 
consciousnes s leaps 
body also there . 
when 
a££ ected, 
it undergoes changes. TQe body, "considered as the point of view upon 
the universe immediately inherent in consciousness" alters itself in 
t he  behavioral manifestations . Sartre believes that : 
the origin of emotion is a spontaneous debasement 
lived by consciousness in face of the world. What 
it is unable to endure in one way it tries to 
seize in another way, by going to sleep, by 
reducing itself to the States of consciousness in 
sleep, dream or hysteria. And the bodily 
disturbance is nothing else than the belief lived 
by t h e  consciousness, as it is seen from 
outside. (Ibid., 79)  
However, t h e  magic of the  world is no t  only a temporary q u a l i t y  w h i c h  
is p r o j e c t e d  upon t h e  w o r l d  according to our p a r t i c u i a r  emotional 
s t a t e .  
T h e  emotional world often presen t s  itself t o  us as being 
magical, as breaking free f r o m  any s t r u c t u r e  and thus it provokes us 
t o  change i n  t h e  following ways h igh l igh ted  by Sartre: 
Thus, t h e r e  are two forms of einotion, according 
t o  whether it i s  w e  who c o n s t i t u t e  t h e  magic of 
t h e  world t o  replace a de te rmin i s t i c  a c t i v i t y  
which c a m o t  be r e a l i z e d ,  o r  whether the world 
itself is  unrea l izab le  and revea is  i t s e l f  
suddenly as a magical environment- I n  the s t a t e  
of horror ,  w e  a r e  suddenly made a w a r e  t h a t  the 
de t e rmin i s t i c  b a r r i e r s  have givea way- That face 
which appears at the window, for i n s t ance  - we do 
n o t  a t  f i rs t  take it as t h a t  of a m a n ,  who might 
push t h e  door open and take twenty paces t o  where 
w e  are standing. O n  t h e  contrary,  it presents 
itself, motionless though it is, as acting a t  a 
d i s t ance ,  The face o u t s i d e  the  window is i n  
iwnediate r e l a t lonsh ip  with our body; w e  are 
l i v i n g  and undergoing i ts  s i g n i f i c a t i o n ;  it is 
with Our own f l e s h  that we c o n s t i t u t e  it, but a t  
the  same t h e  it imposes itself, ann ih i l a t e s  t h e  
d i s t a n c e  and e n t e r s  i n t o  us. Consciousness 
plunged i n t o  t h i s  magic world drags the body with 
it i n  as much as the body i s  b e l i e f  and the 
consciousness believes in it. (Ibid, ,  86-87) 
B u t  t h e  "magic" q u a l i t y  o f  t h e  world does n o t  p e r t a i n  exc lus ive ly  t o  
the human. 'It extends t o  things a l s o ,  in  as  much as they may presen t  
themselves as human (the d i s t u r b i n g  impression of a landscape, of 
c e r t a i n  ob jec t s ,  o r  a room which r e t a i n s  t h e  t r a c e s  of some 
mysterious v i s i t o r )  o r  bear the  imprint of the psychic" (Ibid. ,  8 7 ) .  
This happens, S a r t r e  thinks, because consciousness grasps t h e  world 
as having magical features and because it can perceive these magical 
f ea tu res  as r e a l  f e a t u r e s .  It i s  not  j u s t  one oSject  o r  another, 
taken away from t h e  surrounding world, t h a t  can be perceived as Say, 
frightening o r  i r r i t a t i n g .  
According t o  S a r t r e ,  when someone experiences on emotion, t h e  
whole world is changed. T h e  whole world tsansforms i ts  structure, i s  
a l t e r e d ,  on Fe l l ' s  account of his theory, i n  t h e  following way: 
W e  may Say t h a t  i n  emotion consciousness 
perceives a world txansformed by  i t s  a f fec t ive  
pro jec t ions .  This 'newr w o r l d  is a 'magical' one 
f o r  two reasons.  F i r s t ,  i n  it t h e  order ly  and 
regular  paths w h i c h  permit t h e  achievement of 
ends by determinate  means a r e  o b l i t e r a t e d  by a 
spe l lb inding  q u a l i t y  ( 'hor r ib le ' ,  ' r evol t ingr ,  
e t c .  ) . Second, consciousness f a l l s  under t h i s  
s p e l l  and is deceived by i ts  own sleight of hand. 
It i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  Sa r t r e  refers t o  emotion 
as a 'degradation' of consciousness- In  emotion, 
~consciousness  is caught i n  i t s  own trapf. 
Sar t r e r  s ca ta log  of emotions i s  a catalog of 
self-decept ions [...] Furthermore, f o r  Sartre, 
emotional deceptions seem predominantly of a 
negative - even d i r e  - sort: fear,  sadness, 
horror, anger, disgust, and the  like, (Fe l l  1966, 
22-23) 
S a r t r e  follows t h e  phenornenoiogical t r a d i t i o n  and pra ises  Husserl f o r  
tu rn ing  t o  t h e  " things i n  themselves". "To Heidegger, t o  S a r t r e ,  t o  
Merleau-Ponty, Husserl i s  something of a savior :  the  phi losopher  who 
f i n a l l y  has assembled t h e  proper conceptual apparatus ... f o r  rejoining 
sub jec t  and world, value and f a c t ,  i n  a Long-lost inmediate  r e l a t i o n .  
Sartre's theory of emotion is one phase of this attempt" (Ibid. ,  
2 2 6 ) .  For Sa r t r e  o b j e c t s  a r e  o r ig ina l ly  charged with an a f f e c t i v e  
meaning. "Al1 t h i s  cornes t o  pass as  i f  w e  corne t o  l i f e  i n  a universe 
where feel ings and acts are al1 charged w i t h  something m a t e r i a l ,  have 
a s u b s t a n t i a l  stuff, are r e a l l y  s o f t ,  d u l l ,  slimy, low, e l eva ted ,  
etc. and i n  which material substances have o r i g i n a l l y  a psychic  
meaning w h i c h  renders them repugnant, ho r r i fy ing ,  a l lu r ing ,  etc - " 
(1956, 605) , For S a r t r e ,  the meaningfulness of a "thing" is the 
r e s u l t  of a fusion between one's p ro j ec t  t o  appropriate It and the 
t h ing f  s disobedience t o  appropriat ion.  There i s  a constant interplay 
between t h e  pour-soi and the en-soi, 
But Sa r t r e ' s  conception of the  i n t e r p l a y  of consciousness and 
B e i n g  whenever one experiences an emotion i s  a conscious s e l f -  
deception.  T h e  world is a magical world, and thtrs t h e  r e l a t i o n  
between it and consciousness is a f i c t i t i o u s  r e l a t ion ,  as  Fe11 
[Sar t re]  t e l l s  us  that t h e r e  is an intermonde 
between pour-soi and en-soi but that it is a 
f i c t i o n ,  The intermonde i s  the r e l a t i o n  1 t r y  t o  
e s t ab l i sh ,  t h e  r e l a t i o n  which t h e  ob jec t  r e s i s t s -  
There is  thus  a ' m i d w o r l d r  r e l a t i n g  pour-soi and 
en-soi, but t he  r e l a t i o n  i s  one of denia l  o f  
r e l a t ion ,  o f  a n t i t h e s i s .  Here, as always i n  
Sa r t r e ' s  pos i t i on ,  a n t i t h e s i s  p reva i l s ;  there  can 
be -no synthes i s ,  no continuum. Relations are 
always f i c t i o n s ,  If al1 r e l a t i o n s  a r e  a t tempted  
appropria t ions ,  and i f  appropr ia t ion  i s  a 
f i c t i o n ,  then  al1 r e l a t ions  are f i c t i v e .  T h i s  
r e a l l y  amounts t o  saying (a)  t h e r e  is  
'pro ject ion '  b u t  it i s  not unref l e c t i v e l y  
recognized as such; (b) t h e  'p ro jec ted  meaningr 
is abrogated by  the r e c a l c i t r a n t  ob jec t  whose own 
'meaningr ( o r  u l t i m a t e  on to log ica l  s ignif icance)  
is i t s  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  ' p ro j ec t ive  meaningr ; (c)  
therefore  recogni t ion of t h e  real na ture  of 
a f f ec t ive  i n t e n t i o n a l i t y  involves  a divorce of 
t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  value from i t s  objec t ,  an 
abrogation of 'naïve c o n t a c t  wi th  t h e  worldr, an 
aff i rmat ion of the fundamental on to logica l  
d i s p a r i t y  between sub j ect and obj e c t  . ( F e l l  1966,  
228) 
This d i s p a r i t y  between sub jec t  and o b j e c t  reigned i n  the history of 
philosophy since Descartes' s p l i t  between mind and matter. What 
Sartre does i s  t o  b u i l d  a br idge between res cogitans (the t h i n k i n g  
mind) and res extensa (the extended body) fashioned by the new and 
appealing phenomenological perspect ive which recognizes bodi ly  
subjectivity. 
Eowever, t h e r e  i s  something pecul iar  i n  t h e  way Descartes had 
been understood: h i s  ideas  developed i n  d i f f e r e n t  ways i n  G e r m a n  
philosophy and i n  French philosophy. Descartes, without t h e  proof of 
Godr s existence can be regarded as  an i d e a l i s t  - This, a s  Anthony 
Beavers explains, is how t h e  Germans saw him: 
Kant labels him a 'problematic i d e a l i s t f  f o r  whom 
' there i s  only  one m p i r i c a l  asser t ion  t h a t  is 
indubi tably c e r t a i n ,  namely t h a t  1 am' (Cr i t ique  
of Pure Reason B27 4 ) , suggesting t h a t  , as  f a r  a s  
Kant is  concerned, Descartesf attempt t o  prove 
the reaf exis tence  of anything outs ide of his 
mind, including God, does not work. And 
Schopenhauer, j u s t  before claiming t h a t  'true 
philosophy must a t  a l 1  costs be i d e a l i s t i c , '  
p ra ises  Descartes f o r  f inding t h e  'only cor rec t  
s t a r t i n g  po in t  [...] of al1 philosophy' (World as 
W i l l  and Representation II, 4). Husserl is so  
taken by t h i s  s t a r t i n g  point t h a t  he w i l l  t i t l e  
one of h i s  in t roduct ions  t o  pure phenomenology, 
Cartesian Meditations, t h u s  inv i t ing  h i s  reader 
t o  repea t  Descartes1 Meditations, t h i s  t i m e ,  
without t h e  proofs f o r  God's existence and d iv ine  
ve rac i ty -  Due t o  t h e  t r ad i t ion  i n  which he has 
been passed d o m  t o  us, Descartes may be c a l l e d  
not only t h e  ' f a the r  of modern philosophy,' bu t  
a l so  ' the grandf a t h e r  of transcendental 
phenornenologyf . (Beavers 1990)  
However, f o r  Descartes, p r a c t i c a l  l i f  e has a p a r t i c u l a r  importance 
and meditating on t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of metaphysics w i l l  not b r i n g  about 
i t s  s ignif icance.  
According t o  Descartes, imagination and t h e  senses a r e  t ù  be 
focused upon a f t e r  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  existence of God and of t h e  soul .  
In  Descartes' words : 
1 think t h a t  it i s  very necessary t o  have 
understood, once i n  a l i fe t ime,  t h e  p r inc ip le s  of 
metaphysics s ince  it is by them that w e  corne t o  
the knowledge of God and of our sou l .  But 1 t h ink  
also that  it would be very h a m u 1  t o  occupy 
oners i n t e l l e c t  f requent ly  i n  med i t a t i ng  upon 
them, since t h i s  would impede it from cievoting 
itself t o  the imagination and the senses. (1970, 
143) 
Thus, f o r  Descartes t h e  ep is temologis t  t h e  human being is  composed of 
two s e p a r a t e  e n t i t i e s  the mind and t h e  body. Epistemology needs t h i s  
d i s t i n c t i o n  because t h i s  is the  only way it can work. But there is 
something m o r e  t o  human n a t u r e  than  t h i s .  
B e s i d e s  the mind and t h e  body t h e r e  is another  "pr imi t ive  
notion" as Descartes calls it and t h a t  i s  " the  union of sou l  and 
body" : 
T h e  s o u l  can b e  conceived only by pure i n t e l l e c t :  
t h e  body (i , e . , extensioc ,  shape and movement) 
can l ikewise  be known by pure i n t e l l e c t ,  but  much 
b e t t e r  by t h e  i n t e l l e c t  aided b y  the  imagination; 
and f i n a l l y  what belongs t o  the union o f  t he  s o u l  
and body can b e  known only obscurely by pure 
i n t e l l e c t  o r  by the i n t e l l e c t  a i d e d  by the 
imagination,  b u t  it can be known ve ry  c l e a r l y  by 
t h e  senses. That is why people who never 
phi losophize  and use only t h e i r  senses  have no 
doubt t h a t  t h e  s o u l  moves the body and t h e  body 
acts on the soul. ( I b i d . ,  141) 
Here imaginat ion and t h e  senses  are given t h e i r  due and it would be 
u n f a i r  t o  Descar tes  t o  c a t e g o r i z e  him h a s t i l y  as 'the father of 
transcendental phenomenology". Descartes ho lds  t h a t  mind and body a r e  
bo th  divorced and i n  a union. But because t h e  intellect cari see 
c l e a r l y  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  and only obscurely t h e  union it does n o t  
c o n s t i t u t e  a concern. 
Descar tesr  idea of t h i s  union o f  mind and body is not a clear 
and d i s t i n c t  idea .  But most c e r t a i n l y  it i s  present i n  Descartes' 
ph i lo soph ica l  letters and he makes u s e  of it i n  his attempt to 
unders tand t h e  way human beings exist i n  t h e  world, i n  the  practical 
world- A person emerges i n  the w o r l d  of everyday involvements as 
thought t oge the r  with t h e  body- Otherwise, t h e  world would be merely 
a theoretical one which is an object  o f  s c i e n t i f i c  inves t iga t ions .  1 
am f u l l y  a w a r e  of the ideaç expressed by Descartes at the end of the  
second Meditation: 
it i s  now manifest  t o  me  t h a t  even bodies a r e  not 
proper ly  speaking known by t h e  senses  or by t h e  
f a c u l t y  of imagination, but by the understanding 
only, and since they are not known £rom the f a c t  
t h a t  they  are seen o r  touched, but only because 
t h e y  are understood, 1 see clearly t h a t  there i s  
nothing which is easier f o r  m e  t o  know than my 
mind. (1985-1991, 157) 
1 do not want t o  turn Descartes on h i s  head. 1 j u s t  want t o  p o i n t  out  
an idea t h a t  is meaningful and which has had a much greater in f luence  
l a t e r  i n  the a rea  of French phenomenology. 
T h e  i dea  of bodily s u b j e c t i v i t y  is something which w i l l  l a t e r  
becorne valuable  i n  t h e  hands of  Merleau-Ponty, for  example, and, t o  a 
c e r t a i n  extent, t h i s  is how Descartes is perceived i n  the French 
phi losophica l  t r a d i t i o n .  For Merleau-Ponty: 
Being thought u n i t e d  with a body, it [ the  union] 
cannot, by d e f i n i t i o n ,  r e a l l y  be thought 
(conceived). One can practice it, and, so t o  
speak, e x i s t  it; y e t  one can draw nothing from it 
which deserves t o  be ca l l ed  t r u e  . . . The truth is 
t h a t  it is absurd t o  submit t o  pure  
understanding, t h e  mixture of understanding and 
body. These would-be thoughts a r e  t h e  h a l h a r k s  
of 'ordinary usagef ,  mere verba l iza t ions  of t h i s  
union, and can be allowed only if they are not 
taken t o  be thoughts. They are indices of an 
order  of exis tence - of man and world as ex i s t i ng  
- about which w e  do not have t o  th ink .  (1964,  
176 )  
The Car te s i an  observation that once the mind i s  incarnate i n  t h e  body 
and l i v e d  as a uni ty ,  it appears i n  the world of daily involvements, 
has not only been picked up by Merleau-Ponty. It also appears in t h e  
works of Sartre and Levinas, who recognize a bodi ly  intentionality 
that is directed towards an other person who exists outside of the 
horizons of reason or beyond the cabinet of consciousness. 
In al1 four cases - and here 1 am including Descartes - 
affectivity is an intimate characteristic of embodiment thzt enables 
the practical connections that make up daily life, Here we are again: 
affectivity! !Xe get in touch with ourselves as bodies and minds (at 
the same time) and with the surrounding world through affectivity. 
Sartre, as noted above, did not ignore this phenomenological 
approach. Moreover, he tried to reassess it through his own 
existentialist perspective. In this regard, Fe11 considers Sartre to 
be indebted to both Kierkegaard and Hegel, Fe11 notes that: "Sartre 
himself refers to existentialism as 'this idealist protest against 
idealism' " (1966, 233) . Thus, he is indebted to Kierkegaard because 
h i s  thought has at its centre the problern of the individual and his 
persona1 or subjective existence or his existence as "inwardness" 
which is something that most speculative philosophies, like Hegelrs, 
overlook. Against Hegelianism, Kierkegaard urged that the distinction 
between being and non-being be firmly maintained, on pain of l o s i n g  
the human proportion and perspective. The distinction between Being  
and Nothingness, as the t i t l e  of Sartre's major work indicates, is 
something on which his philosophical work is based. However, praising 
Husserl and the phenomenological idea of "turning to the things in 
thenselves", Sartre realized the importance of building a bridge 
between subject and object, between the individual and the world. 
The link between hman beings and the world is established, 
Sartre considers, through our emotions. In having an emotion we 
transform the  world and f o r  t h i s  w e  connect with it. Moreover, an 
emotion is a conscious transformation of t h e  world. Emotion, he 
affirms, "is not  an accident, it i s  a mode of our conscious 
existence,  one of the  ways i n  which consciousness understands i ts  
Being-in-the-World" (Sartre 1976, 9 1 ) .  But emotion i s  a l so  decept ive 
and ineffective because it i s  a f i c t i t i o u s  r e l a t i o n .  T h i s  amounts t o  
saying t h a t :  'If Kierkegaard was r igh t  (against Hegel) i n  arguing 
t h a t  thought does not, by any kind of h i s t o r i c a l  automatism, 
translate i t s e l f  i n t o  r e a l i t y ,  Hegel was r i g h t  (against  Kierkegaard) 
i n  arguing t h a t  thought c m  be translated i n t o  objective change, is 
not limited t o  i so la t ed  s o l i p s i s t i c  decision" (Fell 1966, 234). Thus, 
even though Sartre's project stasts with Kierkegaard, he  f inds  t h a t  
consciousness cannot be t r u l y  "free" i f  thought cannot be t r a n s l a t e d  
in to  objective change. By saying t h i s  Sa r t r e  is paying t r i b u t e  t o  
Hegel's specula t ive  philosophy- Fe11 concludes: " S a r t r e  is only a b l e  
to see emotion as f ictive idealism because he identified e m o t i o n  with 
t h o u g h t "  . (Ibid. ,  2 3 6 )  
Lyall and Sartre 
T h e  foregoing exposit ion of Sar t re ' s  theory of emotion 
provides us with a new f r a m e w o r k  i n  which Lyal l ' s  ideas about 
emotions can be analyzed. For Lya l l  t h e  emotions and espec ia l ly  the 
emotion of  love connects us  with t h e  world. Exnotions are the l i n k  
between our i n t e l l e c t  and the phenomenal world. "Without emotion, i n  
h i s  v i e w " ,  Armour and Trot t  note, "the mind is empty, incapable of 
action. [Exnotion] is to be welcomed in a l1  its richness, and the 
hazards it presents by way of the stimulation of rash acts are to be 
faced cheerfully and without regret. Indeed, without emotion we would 
have no connection with the objective world" (1981, 79) . L y a l l  was 
interested in finding a way to bridge the gap between the subject and 
the object, between us, as human beings and the world. Sartref s 
endeavor is similar. Both wanted to produce a means for making human 
beings part of the world, in a more intimate and immediate way. 
Both Sartre and Lyall were looking for a return to things in 
themselves, The only possibility through which this connection could 
be established is offered by the emotions. Lyall says of emotion, 
that : 
[it] is not an idea; it is not an act of 
intellect, or exercise of intelligence; it is not 
memory; it is not imagination, although emotion 
accompanies every act of imagination, and is 
essential to it [..,] An emotion is not a 
sensation, although it is more nearly allied to 
that than  to what is purely mental or 
intellectual; while, again, it does not belong to 
that lower department of mind to which sensation 
is referable, and ranks higher than even the 
exercise of intelligence or intellect, Emotion is 
a higher state than pure intellect; not this or 
that emotion, but the region or susceptibility of 
emotion. (1855, 285) 
Thus, in Lyall's view, emotion is a higher state than pure intellect 
because, extended into the world, it grasps Being and informs the 
intellect, Emotion cannot be reduced to imagination, even though 
imagination is "essential" when experiencing an emotion, Also, 
emotion is not the same as ssnsation, even though they present 
similar features, 
Emotions, f o r  L y a l l ,  reach out  i n t o  t h e  world; t h e y  a r e  
e x t e n s i o n s  i n t o  t h e  wor ld  of o u r  e x i s t e n c e  as bo th  mind and body. L e t  
us t a k e ,  f o r  example, t h e  case  o f  Armour and T r o t t  e x p l a i n i n g  what 
L y a l l  means when he w r i t e s  t h a t  love  is an emotion t h a t  "71enninates 
on being": 
Suppose l o v e  could  be conceived without r e f e r e n c e  
t o  being i t se l f -  Then i f  it needed an o b j e c t  it 
would become r e l a t i v e  t o  the occurrence o f  t h a t  
ob jec t .  B u t  i f  it did n o t  need an obj e c t ,  t h e n  it 
would no t  m o t i v a t e  us t o  seek t h e  good. T t  would 
be  a  s imple  a b s t r a c t i o n .  But love  is n o t  i n  t h a t  
way r e l a t i v e  and it does mot iva te  u s .  There fo re ,  
w e  a r e  n o t  wnolly without  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n  
supposing t h a t  w e  can go beyond p a r t i c u l a r  t h i n g s  
t o  being i t s e l f .  (1981, 8 1 )  
That l o v e  goes 'beyond p a r t i c u l a r  t h i n g s  t o  being i t s e l f "  i n  L y a l l ' s  
v i e w ,  Unplies  t o  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  a t r ans fo rmat ion  of t h e  world so  
t h a t  the gap between t h e  subjec t  and p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t s  vanishes  when 
w e  grasp, through emotions,  Being i tself .  When e x p e r i e n c i n g  t h e  
emotion of love  which L y a l l  c a l l s  " t h e  abso lu te  emotion", we do no t  
l o v e  w h a t  i s  a c c i d e n t a l  i n  the o b j e c t  of our love.  A c t u a l l y ,  it is  
wrong t o  speak of o b j e c t s  a t  all, L y a l l  cons iders ,  because love  
t e r m i n a t e s  on Being, "The one s t a t e  o f  love  exists; e v e r y  o b j e c t ,  
eve ry  be ing,  shares  i n  its exerc i se :  it has  s e l e c t e d  no o b j e c t  for 
i t s  exercise; but  every o b j e c t  r e c e i v e s  a  p a r t  o f  i t s  r e g a r d  as it 
cornes w i t h i n  i t s  sphere .  In  i t s  most a b s o l u t e  c h a r a c t e r ,  being i s  i ts  
o b j e c t "  ( L y a l l  1855, 4 0 8 ) .  Our love  is d i r e c t e d  toward something t h a t  
l a s t s ,  something that is  n o t  r e l a t i v e ,  namely Being, even though it 
presents t o  u s  i n  v a r i o u s  forms. 
Another emotion t h a t  Lyall emphasizes when t a l k i n g  about t h e  
"most powerful emotions" i s  sympathy. L y a l l  remarks tha t :  
W e  sympathize even with t h e  aspects  of  na ture ,  as  
t h e s e  a r e  i n d i c a t i v e  of c e r t a i n  f e e l i n g s ,  whether 
e s s e n t i a l l y ,  o r  by a r b i t r a r y  circumstances of 
a s soc i a t i on ,  and w e  e n t e r  i n t o  t h e  very  mood of 
e x t e r n a l  c rea t ion ,  A l 1  n a t u r e  speakç t o  us,  has a 
vo ice  and an aspec t  that w e  understarid 1-1 T h e  
a i r ,  t h e  ear th ,  the w a t e r ,  al1 changes, and al1 
seasons,  speak t o  t h e  mind, and impress t h e i r  
p e c u l i a r  lessons,  o r  beget  t h e i r  app rop r i a t e  
emotions- And w e  communicate Our f e e l i n g s  again  
t o  outward ob jec t s  - AL1 na tu re  is joyous o r  sad 
as we are so ou r se lves -  Half of i t s  power over us 
is from ourselves.  T h e  in ternalmind is  imaged on 
t h e  ex t e rna l  world. ( I b i d , ,  061) 
For Lyal l ,  our emotions a r e  a t t u n e d  t o  Nature- W e  a r e  sympathetic t o  
t h e  changes i n  Nature and Nature i tself changes according to Our 
emotions, A b e a u t i f u l  day can make us  happy. However, when w e  are 
sad, the whole world looks g ray -  What Lyal l  wrote above, t h a t  t h e  
" interna1 mind i s  imaged on t h e  e x t e r n a l  world" i s  something t h a t  
br ings  him a t  l e a s t  momentarily very c lo se  t o  S a r t r e ' s  view on t h i s  
matter .  S a r t r e  too ,  i n  The  Wall, descr ibes  Pablo I b b i e t a  who is 
imprisoned, wa i t i ng  f o r  h i s  execut ion.  The hero f i n d s  himself i n  a 
world which does not  have any appeal .  Everything i s  gloomy and bleak. 
The people and t h e  objects  t h a t  previously  w e r e  f a s c i n a t i n g  became 
du l l ,  f a i n t .  
Lyall '  s approach, however, and t h i s  is c r u c i a l  i n  understanding 
Lyal l ' s  p o s i t i o n ,  d i f f e r s  from S a r t r e ' s  i n  a very  s u b t l e  way. Sartre 
s t r e s s e s  t h e  dual nature  o f  our body, f i r s t  as an instrument b u t  then  
a l s o  as something tkrough which consciousness l i v e s  t h e  world. B y  
t r y i n g  t o  c o n c i l i a t e  t h i s  d i s p a r i t y  he arrives a t  t h e  i dea  of a 
magical world i n  which w e  p r o j e c t  ourselves when experiencing zn 
m o t i o n  as t h e  following passage from Sartre's Sketch f o r  a Theory of  
Emotions i n d i c a t e s  : 
A l 1  emotions have t h i s  i n  cornori,, that they evoke 
the  appearance of the sâme world, c r u e l ,  
t e r r i b l e ,  bleak,  j oy fu l ,  e t c . ,  b u t  i n  which t h e  
r e l a t i o n s  of t h i n g s  t o  consciousness are always 
and exc lus ive ly  magical .  W e  have t o  speak of a 
world of emotions as w e  have t o  speak o f  a world 
cf d r e m  o r  of  worlds of madness. (1976, 81) 
Now the whole process  i s  an illusory process .  A t  l e a s t  t h i s  i s  t h e  
conclusion t h a t  w e  reach i f  w e  t r y  t o  understand Lyal l  only through 
Sa r t r e ' s  con t r ibu t ion  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  emotions. 
However, f o r  Lyall,  t h i n g s  a r e  a b i t  d i f f e r e n t  . For Lya l l ,  as 
w e  saw above, l o v e  connects u s  wi th  Being itself, P a r t i c u l a r i t i e s  a r e  
unimportant. Love endures t h e  apparent  changes i n  t h e  ob jec t ,  it goes 
beyond acc iden t s ,  "Love absolute", L y a l l  w r i t e s ,  "presents no 
modification,  and e x i s t s  f o r  no purpose bu t  i tself" ( L y a l l  1855, 
0 0 8 ) .  He p o i n t s  ou t  t h e  "unifying" nature  o f  love.  Through love  w e  
become p a r t  of  t h e  world, an i n t e g r a l  p a r t ,  t h a t  i s  . Thus, when 
loving, tne f e a t u r e s  of t h e  world change s o  t h a t  t h e  world is seen 
no t  through i t s  d i f f e r ences  but  through i ts  sirnilarities. The world 
i s  t h a t  which is, it i s  Being i t s e l f .  Now, w e  know that every ob jec t  
rece ives  a p a r t  of  love. W e  a l s o  know t h a t ,  as Lyal l ,  says,  "It is 
t h e  soul ,  and the  highest  p r o p e r t i e s  of the  s o u l  that a r e  t h e  t m e  
ob jec t s  of l ove -  The body can be  but t h e  index of these and it i s  
w h e n  these attract  through t h e  ex t e rna l  form, t h a t  love is worthy of 
t h e  name" ( I b i d , ,  407). What t h i s  pos i t i on  c a l l s  t o  mind i s  that 
Lyal l  seems t o  be a proponent o f  animism. 
If love  b r ings  us i n  c o n t a c t  with the world and i f  love r e s t s  
no t  on w h a t  changes but on Being i t s e l f ,  i f  t h e  body i s  "an index" of 
t h e  soul ,  then Lya l l  manages t o  avoid S a r t r e ' s  f a i l u r e .  The world i n  
which we dwell when experiencing an emotion is not a world made up of 
our projections, It is the world in its very essence- 
What is fictitious in our relationship with the world when we 
are wder the spell of emotions is not the relationship itself but 
the way the object is characterized. There is not and cannot be a 
fictitious interaction with the world but jus t  a fictitious 
characterization of the object- The mundane relationship itself is a 
true relationship- Lyall does not see this as fictitious. It is 
independent of the characteristics of the objects in the world 
because it grasps Being, that which goes beyond particularities. The 
phenornenal world is not just a projection, as Sartre considers. 
At this point we can see that for Lyall the Other is not 
really out there and that the Other is not really the other. Emotions 
integrate us into the world; they make us realize that we are a part 
of it. The Other is not "set at a distance" and there is no need to 
appropriate it, to make it ours. The "magical world" is rnagical 
because we find ourselves in it as identical and different from it at 
the sarne time and not because w e  project ont0 it. 
I n  t h e  c a s e  of  metaphor, t h i s  r e d e s c r i p t i o n  
[of r e a l i t y ]  i s  guided by the i n t e r p l a y  
between d i f f e r e n c e s  and resemblances t h a t  
g i v e s  rise t o  the  t e n s i o n  a t  the l e v e l  of t h e  
u t t e r a n c e .  It i s  p r e c i s e l y  from t h i s  t e n s i v e  
apprehension that  a new v i s i o n  o f  reality 
s p r i n g s  f o r t h ,  which o rd ina ry  v i s i o n  resists 
because  it is a t t a c h e d  t o  the o r d i n a r y  u s e  of  
words. T h e  e c l i p s e  of  the o b j e c t i v e ,  
manipulable world t h u s  makes way for the 
r e v e l a t i o n  of a new dimension o f  r e a l i t y  and 
t r u t h  , 
Paul  Ricoeur 
We have seen t h a t  L y a l l  is able t o  p r o v i d e  t h e  b a s i s  f o r  a 
c o n s i s t e n t  t h e o r y  of ernotion, even though he did n o t  develop it 
thoroughly.  T h i s  i s  w h y  Sartre's i n s i g h t  w a s  welcomed. It o f f e r e d  a 
more advanced t h e o r e t i c a l  basis rooted  i n  the phenomenological 
t r a d i t i o n  and a more r e f i n e d  set of  d i s t i n c t i o n s  which when a p p l i e d  
t o  L y a l l r s  ideas made it p o s s i b l e  f o r  u s  t o  see more clearly h o w  it 
is t h a t  th rough  our  emotions w e  are l i n k e d  t o  t h e  phenomenal w o r l d .  
However, this is not  a l 1  there i s  i n  L y a l l  t h a t  dese rves  our  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  
Bes ides  emotions, there i s  t h e  intellect which Lyall b e l i e v e d  
t o  be d i v o r c e d  from t h e  world. This i s  where L y a l l  e r r e d ,  because t h e  
i n t e l l e c t  t o o  b r i n g s  i t s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  o u r  i n t e r a c t i o n  with t h e  
world. For Lyall, t h e  mind i n  t h e  imaginative s ta te  is composed of 

In his article on "Metaphor" in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(ed. Paul Edwards, 1972, vol. 5&6), Monroe C. Beardsley considers 
that we can talk about four distinctive theories of metaphor, They 
are: the emotive theory, the conparison theory, the iconic 
signification theory, and the verbal opposition theory. The purpose 
of going through this typology is to find whether there is a theory 
that construes metaphors in a way that is adequate to explain and 
expand Lyallr s ideas on the sub j ect. 
The Emotive Theory 
The emotive theory is based on the fact that metaphors, in 
virtue of their deviant meaning, cannot be verified. From Aristotlers 
definition of metaphor which will be discussed later in this chapter, 
we find out that a metaphor is "the application to a thing of a name 
that belongs to something else". This ambiguity inherent in metaphor 
implies that metaphorical constructions are not capable of 
verification and therefore, they do not bear any cognitive meaning at 
all. Thus, w h a t  tells a metaphor apart from a non-metaphorical 
construction is the emotive meaning which springs up in the "process 
of r e l i nqu i sh ing  i t s  cogni t ive  o r  descr ip t ive ,  meaning' (Beardsley 
1972a, 285) . For example, if w e  have t h e  fol lowing two l i n g u i s t i c  
const ruct ions:  " T h e  is an uncle" and "Time is, of al1 modes o f  
exis tence,  most obsequious CO the imagination'' (Samuel Johnson) , w e  
can s e e  t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  one i s  n o t  a metaphor s i n c e  t h e r e  i s  no 
powerful emotive meaning a t t ached  t o  it. This is not  t h e  case with 
t h e  second example which is w h e r e  t h e  emotive theory  of m e t a p h o r  
s t ops .  Tt does no t  go any f u r t h e r .  T t  can be said t h a t  i d e n t i f y i n g  
metaphors i s  as f a r  as it g o t .  It does not  Say anything about w h a t  a 
metaphor is i n  i t s e l f .  For example, t h e  percep t ion  of time bowing t o  
imagination, can rouse a c e r t a i n  emotion i n  ourse lves  on t h e  basis of 
a t ens ion  between t h e  perception of cime and t h a t  of imagination.  It 
a l s o  tells us t h a t  w e  can elude time by making use  of Our 
imagination, whereas seeing t ime  as  an uncle does nothing of t h e  
s o r t .  Thus, t h e r e  i s  knowledge t o  be  gained through metaphor. Th i s  i s  
what t h e  r ep re sen t a t i ve s  o f  the  emotive theory  overlookea, which is 
t h a t  metaphors have a cogni t ive  s ide .  They d i f f e r  from nonsense 
cons t ruc t ions  because they a r e  beare rs  of cogn i t i ve  meaning. 
I n  sum, t h e  emotive t h e o r y  of  metaphor, thus f a i l s  t o  p rov ide  
a good b a s i s  f o r  explaining i n d i v i d u a l  metaphors. Emotions a l o n e  are 
no t  s u f f i c i e n t  i n  t h i s  at tempt.  T h i s  theory r ep re sen t s  a rudimentary 
approach "which has been broached, although never  very thoroughly 
worked out", on Beardsley1 s assessment (Beardsley 1972a, 285)  . 
The C-son Tbeory 
T h i s  theory of  metaphor, t h e  comparison theory, i s  t h e  
oppos i te  of t h e  one above. It emphasizes the  i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  of 
metaphor t o  t he  de t r iment  of i t s  emotional t ens ion .  Bas ica l ly ,  i n  
t h i s  view, metaphor does no t  differ very much from a simile- The only 
d i f f e r ence  l i e s  i n  dropping t h e  use of words such "as" o r  " l i k e "  i n  
metaphors. Thus, t h e  metaphor "love i s  a red rose" can be r e w r i t t e n :  
"love i s  l i k e  a red rose" and there fore ,  through the  metaphor we 
compare two terms ("love" and t h e  "red r o s e " ) .  By  doing t h i s  w e  a r e  
ab l e  t o  know something about "love", i.e., t h a t  it has some £ s a t u r e  
i n  common with the 'red rose". According t o  Beardsley: 
This comparison theory ev iden t ly  makes t h e  
metaphorical  a t t r i b u t i o n  i n t e l l i g i b l e ,  but it has 
d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  explaining what i s  s o  special  
about it. There are two r e l a t e d  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  
One is t o  make a d i s t i n c t i o n  between, Say \ c lose '  
and \remotef comparisons, and exp la in  the  tens ion  
i n  t e m  of remoteness: t h e  t ens ion  is present  
when time is compared t o  a river (Herac l i tus )  o r  
t o  a c h i l d  a t  p l ay  (or  when Bergson says t h a t  
'real dura t ion  i s  that duration which gnaws on 
th ings ,  and l eaves  on them t h e  mark of i t s  
toothr ) , but  absent when t i m e  i s  compared w i t h  
space. The c r i t e r i a  of remoteness hâve not proved 
easy t o  provide.  A second p o s s i b i l i t y  is t o  
measure t h e  degree of metaphoricalness (so t o  
speak) a s  t h e  i nve r se  o f  r e l a t i v e  f  requency ... B u t  
t h a t ,  too,  seems i n s u f f i c i e n t :  even i f  one 
compared, f o r  t h e  f i r s t  time, t h e  co lo r  o f  a 
f r u i t c a k e  ta t h e  c o l o r  of a newly cleaned 
Rembrandt, a metaphor would n o t  thereby be 
e s t ab l i shed ,  (Ibid.,  285) 
Usually, t h e  comparison theory  of metaphor i s  a s soc ia t ed  with o b j e c t  
comparison w h i c h  means t h a t  metaphor focuses on comparing ob jec t s -  
This implies t h a t  the connotations of the  words used i n  metaphor 
derive from "what i s  genera l ly  t r u e  of the  objects" - 
Now t h e r e  are new d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  a r i s e  with t h i s  n e w  theory  
which Beardsley quickly  p o i n t s  out,  t h i s  time i n  t h e  essay The 
Metaphorical Twist (1972)  . For example, Beardsley cites from T .  S.  
E l i o t r  s Four Q u a r t e t s :  "f r i g i d  purga tor ia l  f i r e s /  Of which the  f lame 
is  roses, and t h e  smoke i s  b r i a r s "  (Beardsley 19725 ,  7 4 )  . Beardsley 
considers that : 
some of t he  important marginal meanings of 
' b r i a r s r  i n  t h e  E l i o t  poem cornes, of course, from 
t h e  way t h e  crown of thorns  f igures  i n  t h e  
Chr i s t i an  s t o r y -  And q u i t e  apart  from i t s  
h i s t o r i c a l  t r u t h ,  t h e  existence of t h a t  r e l ig ion  
is s u f f i c i e n t  t o  g ive  t h e  word t h a t  meaning. If 
i n  expl ica t ing  t h i s  l i n e  w e  l i m i t  ourselves  t o  
what w e  know about briars, we would not  fully 
understand it. ( I b i d - ,  75)  
O n e  has t o  have some p a r t i c u l a r  knowledge of the  world i n  order  to 
understand it. Not knowing w h a t  t h e  connotation of t h e  word nbr ia rs"  
is as it i s  used i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  context, makes it impossible t0 
grasp the  metaphor. Another d i f f i c u l t y  remarked upon by Beradsley i s  
that "once we commit ourselves  t o  f inding, o r  supplying, an o b j e c t  t o  
be compared with the  s u b j e c t  of t h e  metaphor w e  open t h e  way for t h a t  
flow of id iosync ra t i c  imagery t h a t  is one of t h e  s e r i o u s  b a r r i e r s  
between a reader  and a poem" ( Ib id .  , 75)  . 
These then are the  f l a w s  of t h e  comparison theory.  Jus t  by 
comparing terms o r  ob jec ts  even though sometimes w e  can a r r i v e  a t  
something t h a t  is meaningful, t h a t  can be understood, w e  are n o t  
n e c e s s a r i l y  producing metaphors. It leaves aside any t e n s i o n a l  
element and any m o t i o n a l  component as well .  
The Iconic Signification Theory 
Out o f  t h e  comparison t h e o r y  grew t h e  i c o n i c  s i g n i f i c a t i o n  
theory  which regards rnetaphor as i n v o l v i n g  a double  semantic 
r e l a t i o n s h i p .  F i r s t ,  t h e  modi f i e r ,  which Beards ley  def i n e s  a s  "the 
metaphor ica l  p r e d i c a t e  o r  term, whether n o m  o r  ad jec t ive" ,  leads us 
t o  a  s p e c i f i c  occurrence  o r  s i t u a t i o n .  Then, t h i s  occurrence o r  
s i t u a t i o n  i s  brought  f o r t h  as an i c o n i c  s i g n  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t .  An 
i c o n i c  sign should  be  understood i n  C.S. Pierce's sense ,  a s  a  sign 
capable of s ign i fy ing  through i t s  s i m i l a r i t i e s  t o  what it s i g n i f i e s  . 
"The meaning o f  t h e  metaphor", Beards ley  e x p l a i n s ,  "is obta ined b y  
reading o f f  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  thus i c o n i c a l l y  a t t r i b u t e d r '  (Beardsley 
1972ar 2 8 5 )  . For exa-aple, when say ing  t h a t  "Tirne i s  a r iverf ' ,  the 
word "river" is used here  s o  t h a t  it f u n c t i o n s  a s  an i c o n i c  s ign fo r  
time, t h u s  c o n f e r r i n g  on us  an i n s i g h t  i n t o  the nature of t h e ,  
narnely t h a t  it i s  d i r e c t e d  one-dimensionally, that it cannot be 
reversed ,  etc. 
T h e  trouble here ,  Beardsley t h i n k s ,  i s  t h a t  the  i c o n i c  t h e o r y  
imports a f o r e i g n  object of a c e r t a i n  kind and t h u s  it is subj ect  t o  
t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a r i s i n g  wi th  r e g a r d  t o  what o b j e c t  works b e s t  i n  
order t o  bring f o r t h  t h e  f u l l  meaning of  t h e  metaphor. Moreover, the 
i c o n i c  s i g n i f i c a t i o n  theory, because it is based on t h e  o b j e c t  
comparison theory ,  allows f o r  swaps between t h e  modi f i e r  and t h e  
modified subject. Thus, i n  t h e  exarnple above "Time i s  a river",  w e  
c m  inverse the metaphor and say "The r i v e r  is the". The only 
dif ference,  Paul Henle, azz exponent of t h e  i c o n i c  s i g n i f i c a t i o n  
theory, th inks  i s  t h a t  sometimes, "the f e e l i n g  tone i s  d i f fe ren t" .  
Beardsley ob jec ts :  "1 d o n f t  b e l i e v e  t h i s  w i l l  do: t h e  d i f fe rence  
between ' t h i s  man i s  a l ion '  and ' t h i s  l i o n  is a manf i s  i n  what t h e  
dif  f e ren t  metaphorical modif iers a t t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  subj  ects" (1972b, 
78 ) .  The examples above a r e  no t  comparable t o  each o the r  s ince  i n  
c a l l i n g  men l i o n s  and l i o n s  men w e  a r e  no t  a t t r i b u t i n g  the  same 
proper t ies  £rom one t o  t h e  o the r .  The p rope r t i e s  of  l i ons  t h a t  we 
a t t r i b u t e  t o  men a r e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  the  p r o p e r t i e s  of men t h a t  w e  
a t t r i b u t e  t o  l i o n s  and the re fo re ,  t h e  metaphor cannot be inver ted .  
The i con ic  s i g n i f i c a t i o n  theory of metaphor presents  us with a 
refinement o f  t h e  comparison t n e o r y  i n  t h a t  it br ings  i n  a t e n s i v e  
moment c rea ted  by p u t t i n g  toge the r  remote ideas .  "Time" and "r iver" ,  
i n  t h e  example above, a r e  t w o  remote ideas  which a r e  rnetaphorically 
connected. However, t h e r e  is n o t  enough place f o r  a well def ined  
emotive component s ince  t h e r e  is  a d i f f e rence  i n  t h e  "feel ing tone", 
as Henle considers ,  when a metaphor i s  inver ted .  This d i f fe rence  
however, does not  t ake  u s  too f a r  because, i n  Henlers view, w e  would 
be dealing with t h e  same metaphor: ' this  man is a l ion"  and ' t h i s  
l i o n  is  a man" a r e  b a s i c a l l y  expressions of t h e  same metaphor, even 
though t h e r e  might be a s l i g h t  d i f f e rence  i n  t h e  ' feeling tone". 
There is ,  however, another  a t t enp t  t o  expla in  metaphor f o r  
which t h e  f l a w s  encountered he re  are not  a concern. 
The Vetbal Opposition Theory 
The four th  t heo ry ,  t h e  verbal  oppos i t ion  theory  of metaphor, 
b r ings  toge ther  words or  phrases  whose c e n t r a l  meanings c o l l i d e .  They 
e n t e r  i n t o  a l o g i c a l  c o n f l i c t  and t h i s  is  an i n d i c a t i o n  of a 
necessary s h i f t ,  a  s h i f t  from the c e n t r a l  meaning t o  the marginal  
meaning. Beardsley's  view of  metaphor w i t h  r egard  t o  t h i s  t h e o r y  is 
t h a t  : 
In many common words and phrases ,  w e  can roughly 
d i s t i n g u i s h  two s o r t s  of meaning: (1) t h e  c e n t r a l  
rneaning, o r  meanings - what is c a l l e d  designation 
o r  ( i n  M i l l r  s sense) connotation,  and rnay be 
recorded i n  a d i c t i ona ry  a s  s tandard;  and ( 2 )  t h e  
marginal meaning, cons i s t i ng  of t hose  proper t ies  
t h a t  t h e  word suggests  o r  connotes ( i n  t h e  
l i t e r a r y  c r i t i c r s  sense of t h i s  term) [--1 This 
theory thus rests upon (1) a d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
two levels of  meaning, and ( 2 )  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  
metaphor involves  e s s e n t i a l l y  a l o g i c a l  c o n f l i c t  
of c e n t r a l  meanings. (Beardsley 1972 ,  286)  
This c o n f l i c t  i s  what alerts us  t o  t h e  fact t h a t  t h e  word o r  ph ra se  
has t o  be taken rnetaphorically,  It i s  what Beardsley c a l l s  "the 
metaphorical  t w i s t " .  This approach t o  metaphor, however, does n o t  
a l low f o r  words t o  acqui re  new meanings because words corne i n t o  p l a y  
wi th  a s e r i e s  of meanings which a r e  e i t h e r  c e n t r a l  o r  marginal and a s  
a r e s u l t  of t h e  l o g i c a l  opposi t ion w e  p i c k  from t h e  " r epe r to i r e  of  
marginal  meanings (and from t h e  non-conf l ic t ing p a r t  of t h e  c e n t r a l  
meaning) those  proper tkes  t h a t  can s e n s i b l y  be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  
subject - th ing,  and s o  read  t h e  metaphor as making t h a t  a t t r i b u t i o n "  
(Beardsley 1972a, 28 6 )  . Foreseeing t h i s  problem, ~ e à r d s l e ~  xpanded 
the  t h e o r y  o f f e r i n g  i n  h i s  essay  T h e  Metaphorical Twist a r e v i s e d  
vers ion of  t h e  verbal  oppos i t ion  theory.  
Metaphor, Beardsley cons iders ,  br ings  i n t o  p lay  some p r o p e r t i e s  
of t h e  words o r  phrases used i n  i t s  s t r u c t u r e  t h a t  were n o t  
previously i n  t h e  foreground of t h e  meaning. He expla ins  t h a t  t h e r e  
are a t  l e a s t  t h r e e  s t eps  t h a t  make up t h i s  process:  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  we have a word and p rope r t i e s  
t h a t  are d e f i n i t e l y  no t  p a r t  o f  che in tens ion  of  
t h a t  word. Some of t hose  p roper t i es  a r e  e l i g i b l e  
t o  become part of t h e  in tension,  t o  j o in  the 
range of connotat ion,  I n  order  t o  be e l i g i b l e  
they  have t o  be f a i r l y  common prope r t i e s  ... When t h e  
word cornes t o  be used metaphorical ly i n  a c e r t a i n  
s o r t  of context ,  t hen  what w a s  previously  only  a 
p roper ty  is m a d e ,  a t  l e a s t  temporari ly i n t o  a 
meaning. And widespread f a m i l i a r i t y  with t h a t  
metaphor, o r  similar ones, can f i x  t h e  proper ty  
a s  an e s t a b l i s h e d  par t  of t h e  meaning [...] When a 
connotat ion becomes s o  standardized f o r  a c e r t a i n  
types  of context ,  it may be shifted t o  a n e w  
status, where it becomes a necessary condi t ion 
f o r  applying t h e  word i n  that context .  It 
c o n s t i t u t e s  a new standard. (Beardsley 1 9 7 2 ,  84 ) 
Thus, a t  first, a word has a d e f i n i t e  s e t  o f  p roper t i es  t h a t  make up 
t h e  i n t e n s i o n  o f  t h a t  word, Then, o the r  p roper t i es  a r e  brought f o r t h  
inasmuch as they  could, p o t e n t i a l l y ,  become p a r t  of t h a t  word's 
i n t ens ion .  Then, when t h a t  word is used metaphorically, t h e  p rope r ty  
a c t u a l l y  becomes p a r t  of t h e  word's in tension and t he re fo re  a new 
meaning is c rea t ed .  
To i l l u s t r a t e  how t h i s  works, 1 w i l l  borrow Beardsley 's  
example- H e  w r i t e s  t h a t  t h e  word \warmt was ex t rapo la ted  from t h e  
area o f  sensory experience and employed i n  descr ib ing  human 
p e r s o n a l i t y  : 
1 should th ink t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  app l i ca t ion  of  
'warmy t o  a person had t o  change some acc iden ta l  
p rope r t i e s  of warm things i n t o  p a r t  of a new 
meaning o f  the word, though now w e  e a s i l y  thinK 
of t h e s e  p rope r t i e s  as connotations of 'wamy - 
f o r  example, approachable, pleasurable-in-  
acquaintance, i n v i t i n g  . These q u a l i t i e s  were pa r t  
o f  t h e  range of connotations of 'warmf even 
before  they w e r e  noted i n  w a r m  things, which may 
no t  have been u n t i l  t hey  were noted i n  people and 
u n t i l  sorneone, c a s t i n g  about f o r  a word t h a t  
would metaphorically descr ibe  t h o s e  people, h i t  
upon t h e  word 'wann '  But before t h o s e  q u a l i t i e s  
could corne t o  belong t o  t he  s t a p l e  connotation of  
'warmf, it had t o  be  discovered t h a t  they  could 
be  meant Dy t h e  word when used i n  an  appropr ia te  
metaphor. ( Ib id . ,  8 5 )  
Thus, i n  o rde r  Co understand t h e  metaphor "she i s  a warm person", one 
has t o  t h i n k  of p roper t ies  o f  t h e  word 'warm" such as  i n v i t i n g ,  
approachable, etc., which i n i t i a l l y  w e r e  not  among the  connotat ions  
of t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  word. Through metaphorical use, t h e  word expanded 
i t s  range of meanings and became f u l l e r .  
Now, t h e  verbal  opposi t ion theory of metaphor, even though it 
does not  inc lude  an emotive component, seems t o  be a very e l a b o r a t e  
approach t o  t h e  study of metaphor allowing f o r  metaphor t o  augment 
t h e  use o f  words i n  a language, allowing f o r  new rneanings t o  occur ,  
allowing f o r  su rp r i s ing  ideas  t o  emerge from t h e  jux tapos i t ion  of 
words. Two exponents of t h i s  v i e w  a r e  Colin T u r b a y n e  and Philip 
Wheelwright, both s t r e s s i n g  t he  importance of metaphor i n  br inging 
f o r t h  new rneanings fo r  words o r  phrases-  They a l s o  represen t  two 
opposed views on t h e  r e l a t i o n  between metaphors and r e a l i t y .  This 
con t rove r s i a l  r e l a t i o n  i s  of foremost importance because it 
represen ts  t h e  connection w i t h  L y a l l f s  ideas .  
In this section, 1 will critically examine Turbayne and 
Wheelwright's approaches, Through criticisrn of their views I will 
arrive at Paul Ricoeur's theory which I consider iç the most 
comprehensive one. Ricoeur retains what is fruitful from the above 
mentioned theories and tries to make them part of a very ambitious 
project which is representeü by his monumental work The Rule of 
Metaphor (1977) , In order to give a crude preliminary description of 
his theory it should be montioned that he manages to open a new 
dimension in the analysis of metaphor by linking it through a special 
use of imagination to the phenomenal world, and by according it the 
status of a statement by redefining Frege's sense and reference 
polarity. The issue of emotional rneaning is also an integral part of 
Ricoeur's work. This brings us back to tne framework of William 
Lyall's thought. Moreover, in as much as metaphors have an 
intellectual dimension, they do improve our relationship with the 
world. They augment the world itself, an insight that Lyall failed to 
achieve but nonetheless one which Ricoeur rightly emphasized. 
Thus, 1 will start with the two different views on this issue, 
f i r s t  that of Collin Turbayne, who develops a theory of metaphor 
based on the "as if" prescription and thus brings the whole 
discussion on metaphor to the field of reflective judgment. Then 
there is Philip Weelwrightrs theory which considers that metaphorical 
laquage, through its fluidity and tensiveness, is closely connected 
t o  "what is", t h a t  is, t o  the real. Then, by u s ing  these two t h e o r i e s  
a s  d i a l e c - t i c a l  counterpar ts ,  1 w i l l  t r y . t o  br ing them toge ther  i n  an 
a c t  of synthesis, a r r i v i n g  f i n a l l y  a t  Paul Ricoeur 's  theory  of 
metaphor. 
T h e  g o a l  of t h i s  chap te r  is t o  show that metaphors do "reach" 
r e a l i t y  and that Lyall, i n s t e a d  of r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  imaginative s t a t e  
a s  something t h a t  d e f i e s  explanat ion,  could have gone f u r t h e r  and 
thus  have r e a l i z e d  t h a t  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  i s  not  completely a l i ena t ed  
from t h e  phenomenal world because of i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  c r e a t e  metaphors- 
Of course ,  L y a l l r s  l ack  of t h e  phi losophical  tools necessary t o  
achieve t h i s  t a s k ,  such as t h o s e  of phenomenology and theory of 
metaphor, hampered h h  from developing these  ideas. Tnis chapter  thus  
amounts t o  a c r i t i q u e  of  Lyall which should a l s o  be understood as a 
con t inua t ion  of h i s  thought.  
Tuzbayne and the Myth of Metaphor 
T h e  c l a s s i c a l  d e f i n i t i o n  of metaphor i s  t h e  one given by 
Aristotle- For A r i s t o t l e ,  metaphors: "consis t  i n  giving t h e  t h i n g  a 
name that belongs t o  something else; the  t r ans fe r ence  (epi-phora) 
being ei ther  £rom genus t o  spec ies ,  o r  from spec i e s  t o  genus, o r  from 
spec ies  t o  spec ies ,  o r  on t h e  grounds of analogy" (Poe t i c s  1457 b 6- 
9 ) .  For example, t he  express ion  'love i s  a red rose" is a metaphor. 
To break d o m  A r i s t o t l e r  s d e f i n i t i o n ,  w e  can see t h a t  t h e  noun "love" 
is t h e  focus  of t h e  metaphor. Something happens t o  it: it i s  
explained,  it is  made unders tandable  by  employing a l e s s  abstract and 
more concre te  term, t h e  "red rose"- We a r e  dea l ing  with a movement 
£rom an a b s t r a c t  concept t o  a term which can be grasped more e a s i l y  
by t r a n s f e r r i n g  one name ont0 t h e  o ther .  "Love", f o r  t h e  person 
experiencing t h i s  emotion i s  t h e  same a s  a "red rose" f o r  our 
experience of beauty: i t s  r i c h  co lor ,  i t s  d i s p o s i t i o n  of ve lve ty  
p e t a l s ,  as w e l l  as i t s  perfume make us want t o  have it a s  c l o s e  a s  
poss ib l e  s o  w e  cari enjoy i t s  beauty.  The same happens when i n  l ove  - 
t h e r e  i s  a s t a t e  of in tense  longing f o r  union with  t h e  o ther  where 
t he  o t h e r  represen ts  everything t h a t  i s  beau t i fu l  and exci t ing.  In 
t h i s  case ,  t h e  t rans fe rence  happens "on the  grounds of analogy" 
between love and t h e  r ed  rose.  
Co l l i n  Turba~yne begins h i s  book The M y t h  of Metaphor (1970)  by 
chal lenging A r i s t o t l e f s  d e f i n i t i o n .  Turbayne i s  no t  s a t i s f i e d  wi th  it 
because he i d e n t i f i e s  cases of metaphors t h a t ,  i n  v i r t u e  of t h e i r  
ex i s tence ,  r e q u i r e  t h a t  the  d e f i n i t i o n  be e i t h e r  broader  o r  narrower. 
I t  should be broader because some metaphors do no t  have t o  be 
expressed i n  words. There can be metaphors t h a t  a r e  expressed through 
pa in t ing ,  scu lp ture ,  dance, etc. Turbayne explains  : 
Michelangelof f o r  example, used t h e  f i g u r e  of 
Leda, with t h e  Swan t o  i l l u s t r a t e  be ing  l o s t  i n  
t h e  r ap tu re  of phys i ca l  passion, and t h e  same 
f i g u r e  of Leda, only  this time without t h e  Swan, 
t o  i l l u s t r a t e  being l o s t  i n  t he  agony of dying. 
I t  w i l l  a l s o  allow t h e  concrete phys ica l  models 
of app l ied  s c i e n t i s t s ,  t h e  blackboard of 
teacherç ,  t h e  toy blocks  of children t h a t  may be 
used t o  represent  t h e  b a t t l e  of Trafa lgar ,  and 
t h e  raised eyebrow of t h e  ac tor  t h a t  may 
i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  whole s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  s t a t e  of 
Denmark, t o  be c l a s s i f i e d  a s  metaphor. ( Ib id . ,  
13 1 
In  o rde r  t o  so lve  t h i s  problem, Turbayne takes "name" £rom t h e  above 
d e f i n i t i o n  t o  mean 'a s i g n  o r  a co l l ec t ion  of signs" (Turbayne 1970 ,  
1 3 )  . Thus, f o r  Turbayne, t h e  a c t  o f  t rans fe rence  f epi-phora) from 
A. r i s to t le r s  d e f i n i t i o n  does not  occur from genus t o  species ,  o r  f r o m  
spec ies  t o  genus, e t c .  but from a 'sort" t o  o t h e r  "sort". A "sort"  is 
a p a r t i c u l a r  kind, class o r  group and he calls the t rans fe rence  
"sort-crossing". What t h i s  means is t h a t  now, every a c t  of 
t rans fe rence  can be perceived as a metaphor. The outcome of bu i ld ing  
t h e  metaphor on t h e  bas i s  of sor t -cross ing is  t h a t  suddenly i t s  whole 
meaning becomes uns tab le .  "If t h e  term metaphor be  l e t  apply t o  every 
t r o p e  of language, t o  every r e s u l t  of a s soc i a t i on  of ideas  and 
analogical  reasoning,  rio a r ch i t ec tu re ,  music, pa in t ing ,  re l ig ion ,  and 
t o  al1 t h e  s y n t h e t i c  processes of art, science,  and philosophy, t h e n  
indeed metaphor w i l l  be warred a g a i n s t  by metaphor [..-] and how then  
can i t s  meaning stand?" (Bedell 1936, 1 0 3 )  . This would mean, as no ted  
above, t h a t  every  sor t -cross ing would be a metaphor and thus t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  of metaphor should be narrower. The s o l u t i o n ,  Turbayne 
considers,  l i e s  i n  the f a c t  that every sor t -c ross ing  i s  j u s t  a 
potential metaphor. What makes a metaphor t o  be a metaphor i s  t h e  'as 
if",  t he  "make Sel ieve"  which i s  inheren t ly  p re sen t  i n  it . I n  t h e  
example usea above, "love is a red rose" t h e  metaphor e x i s t s  i n  as 
much as t h e  express ion  is taken t o  mean t h a t  l ove  i s  "as i f "  it i s  a 
red rose. The 'as i f "  p re sc r ip t ion  i s  imp l i c i t .  It involves a c e r t a i n  
l e v e l  of awareness without which t h e  metaphor does no t  occur t o  u s .  
Thinking of love  a s  being l i t e r a l l y  a red rose  does not  bring us  i n t o  
t h e  presence of  metaphor. What does, i s  perceiving- t h e  s i m i l a r i t y  and 
being aware of  it, knowing t h a t  t h ings  happen 'as i f "  they axe 
similar . 
Turbayne' s theory of  metaphor "represents t h e  facts [...] a s  i f  
they  belonged t o  one log i ca l  t ype  o r  category ( o r  range, o r  types  of 
c a t e g o r i e s ) ,  when they a c t u a l l y  belong t o  another". (Turbayne 1970, 
1 8 ) .  B u t  t h i s  new d e f i n i t i o n  happens t o  be t h e  very d e f i n i t i o n  t h a t  
Gi lber t  Ryle gave, not  f o r  metaphor, bu t  f o r  t h e  category mis take  ( o r  
c a t e g o r i a l  confus ion) ,  The rnetaphor f i n d s  i t s  essence i n  t h e  act of 
so r t - c ros s ing  o r  d u a l i t y  o f  sense,  bu t  it does t h a t  by f i l l i n g  up the  
"as i f"  p r e s c r i p t i o n ,  " fus ing  two senses by naking believe t h e r e  i s  
only one sense". 
Thus, metaphor on Turbayne' s  account s h i f t s  from being a 
category confusion t o  a "category fusion", What Turbayne meam is  
t h a t  t h e r e  is no mistake i n  se l f -consciously  c ross ing  s o r t s  f o r  
otherwise a l1  metaphors w i l l  be nothing b u t  mistakes.  This does no t  
imply t h a t  one is r i g h t  i n  "presenting t h e  f a c t s  of one s o r t  i n  t h e  
idioms o f  another  without awareness" (Ibid.,  2 2 ) .  This i s  p l a i n  
confusion of d i spa ra t e  senses  of a s ign  which su re ly  does n o t  give 
b i r t h  to a metaphor. If t h e  quest ion i s  when does a metaphor occur,  
then Turbayne r e p l i e s  t h a t  : 
T h e  answer l i es  i n  t h e  a s  if o r  make-believe 
f e a t u r e  [,.] When Descartes says t h a t  t h e  world i s  
a machine o r  when 1 Say with Seneca t h a t  man is  a 
w o l f ,  and n e i t h e r  of us in tends  our a s se r t i ons  to 
be taken l i t e r a l l y  büt only metaphorically,  bo th  
of us  are aware, i i r s t ,  t h a t  w e  a r e  so r t -  
cross ing,  t h a t  is,  re-present ing t h e  f a c t s  of one 
s o r t  i n  t h e  idioms appropr ia te  t o  another,  o r ,  i n  
o t h e r  words, of t h e  dua l i t y  of sense .  1 Say 'are 
awaref ,  but of course,  we must be, otherwise 
t h e r e  can be no metaphor. W e  a r e  aware, seconcLLy, 
t h a t  we are t r e a t i n g  t h e  world and man a s  i f  they  
belong t o  new s o r t s .  W e  a r e  aware of  t h e  d u a l i t y  
o f  sense i n  'machinef and 'wolf , bu t  w e  make 
believe t h a t  each has  only one sense  - t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  no d i f f e r ence  i n  kind, only  i n  degree, between 
t h e  g i an t  clockwork of na ture  and t h e  pygrny 
clockwork of m y  w r i s t  watch, o r  between man- 
wolves and t h b e r  wolves. (Ibid., 1 7 )  
Thus t h e r e  are two d i f f e r e n t  ways f o r  looking a t  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between s o r t s :  t h e r e  is  sor t -c ross ing ,  which a c t u a l l y  defines 
metaphor, and t h e r e  is so r t - t r e spas s ing  which brings f o r t h  the  i s s u e  
of being used by t h e  rnetaphor because i n  t h i s  ca se  t h e  'as i f "  
p r e s c r i p t i o n  is overlooked and t h e  metaphor i s  t aken  l i t e r a l l y  ( s e e  
It follows t h a t  be ing  a b l e  t o  'see" t h e  metaphor Unplies an 
awareness w i t h o u t  which one m e r e l y  g e t s  l o s t  i n  the  m i d s t  o f  
recognizing various s enses  of a sign. An example would be r e a l i z i n g  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between "seeing t n e  po in t  of a need le  and see ing  t h e  
point  o f  a joke", In  t h a t  moment when only one o f  t h e  two d i f f e r e n t  
senses f u s e d  is  metaphor ical  bu t  i s  taken l i t e r a l l y ,  we are d e a l i n g  
with sor t - t respass ing ,  as Turbayne recognizes t h a t :  
The v ic t im o f  metaphor accepts  one way of s o r t i n g  
o r  bu i ld ing  o r  a l l o c a t i n g  t h e  f a c t s  as t h e  only 
way t o  sort, bundle, o r  a l l o c a t e  thern. T h e  victim 
not  only has a s p e c i a l  view of t h e  world bu t  
regards  it as t h e  only  v i e w ,  o r  r a t h e r ,  he 
confuses a s p e c i a l  view of t h e  world with the 
world. H e  is t h u s  a rnetaphysician. H e  ha s  
mistaken the mosk f o r  t h e  face .  Such a v i c t i m  who 
i s  a metaphysician malgré  l u i  i s  t o  be 
d i s t i ngu i shed  f rom t h a t  o t h e r  metaphysician who 
i s  aware t h a t  h i s  a l l o c a t i o n  of t h e  f a c t s  i s  
a r b i t r a r y  and might have been otherwise.  ( Ib id . ,  
27 1 
For Turbayne, t h e  encounter  with a metaphor provokes our awareness. 
We have t o  perform t h r e e  opera t ions  i n  order t o  understand a 
metaphorical  cons t ruc t ion .  W e  must be able, first, t o  spot  t h e  
metaphor, t o  d iscover  it i n  a t e x t ,  i n  a work of a r t  o r  i n  music. 
Then, we have t o  i d e n t i f y  i t s  literal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  and w e  have t o  
p o i n t  it o u t  i n  order  t o  g e t  r i d  of  it so  t h a t  w e  are l e f t  with t h e  
metaphorical  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  Af t e r  doing t h a t  w e  are t h e n  a b l e  t o  
r e s t o r e  the metaphor as a metaphor, as something where the process  of 
sor t -c ross ing  happens bu t  t h i s  t h e  with  awareness of its occurrence. 
Turbaynefs theory of metaphor r e s t s  upon r e f l e c t i v e  judgment. 
H i s  f e a r  of  being vic tun ized  by metaphor can only be e r a d i c a t e d  if we 
a r e  c o n s t a n t l y  aware and make use of t h e  above operat ions .  Metaphor 
i s  something t h a t  i s  c r e a t e d  by breaking p a t t e r n s ,  and making n e w  
connections i n s t ead  of preserving o ld  a s soc i a t i ons .  T h i s  must be 
accompanied by t h e  "v ig i lance  of t h e  a s  if", as Ricoeur p u t s  it i n  
The R u l e  of Metaphor (1977)  . 
To summarize, Turbayne is advocating a theory of metaphor i n  
which every  s i n g l e  use of sor t -c ross ing  must be  very lucid aEd 
r a d i c a l l y  i n t e l l e c t u a l .  He under l ines  t h i s  c la im i n  The M y t h  o f  
Metaphor as follows: "the main theme of t h i s  book is t h a t  w e  should 
cons t an t ly  t r y  t o  be aware o f  the presence of metaphor, avoiding 
being v i c t imized  by our own a s  w e l l  a s  by others"  ( I b i d . ,  217)  . B u t  
how i s  it possible f o r  a metaphor t o  p re sen t  i t s e l f  i n  i ts f u l l n e s s  
and with  al1 i t s  power without us  b e l i e v i n g  i n  i t s  d e s c r i p t i v e  and 
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  value? Throughout h i s  book, Turbayne is worried t h a t  
w e  no t  fa11 prey t o  "believing" t h a t  which rnetaphor r ep re sen t s  which 
w i l l  l e a d  u s  t o  take t h e  metaphor l i t e r a l l y .  
However, Ricoeur as ks, 'can one create metaphors wi thout  
be l i ev ing  t h e m  and without be l iev ing  t h a t ,  i n  a c e r t a i n  way, ' t h a t  
is' ?" (Ricoeur 1977, 2 5 0 )  . Should t h e  c r e a t i v e  dimension of  language 
be divorced £rom t h e  c r e a t i v e  aspect  of r e a l i t y  i t s e l f ?  TurSaynefs 
prescription f o r  netaphor limits imagination. It subjects it to the 
"philosophy of the a s  if". T h e  spark fired by the metaphor i n  poetry,  
f o r  example, i s  prornptly put out  the moment w e  become "aware" t h a t  it 
is j u s t  an a r t i f i c e  which, once spot ted ,  canriot have t h e  power t o  
l i f t  us  up on r e v e r i e ' s  s u r m n i t .  When th ink ing  about t h e  ' love i s  a 
red r o s e r  metaphor, Turbayne would l i k e  us t o  enjoy t h e  c leverness  of 
t h e  cons t ruc t ion .  H e  rernarks t h a t  "the invent ion of a rnetaphor f u l l  
of i l l u s t r a t i v e  power is t h e  achievement of genius" (Turbayne 1970,  
5 7 ) .  O n  h i s  account t h e r e  should be nothing beyond t h i s .  The sole joy 
t h a t  w e  r e t r i e v e  f r o m  metaphor should oniy be de l ive red  by our 
capac i ty  f o r  r e f l e c t i v e  judgment. But t h e r e  is more t o  metaphor than 
t h i s .  A l o t  more! 
Philip Wheelwrightr s Metaphor and Reality 
It  is Phi l ip  Wheelwright's pos i t i on ,  developed i n  h i s  book 
Metaphor and Reality ( 1973 )  t h a t  t h e r e  is a very s t rong  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between language and phenomenal r e a l i t y ,  and metaphor i s  t h a t  which 
i l l u s t r a t e s  it t h e  best. Wheelwright adopts  a pos i t i on  con t r a ry  t o  
t h a t  o f  Turbayne. If Turbayne i s  prcne t o  draw a t t e n t i o n  t o  what t h e  
metaphor i s  not,  t o  make it c l e a r  t h a t  everything t h a t  p e r t a i n s  t o  
metaphorical  c r ea t ion  happens within t h e  l i m i t s  determined by t h e  "as 
if", Wheelwright l e a n s  toward emphasizing what the  metaphor is, how 
it i s  s o  very s t rong ly  in te r twined  with phenomenal r e a l i t y .  With 
Wheelwright, metaphor o f f e r s  more than  t h e  kind of p l easu re  r e s t i n g  
e n t i r e l y  on our capac i ty  f o r  r e f l e c t i v e  judgment. Through rnetaphor we 
become capable of be ing  in t imate ly  connected with "What Is", as he 
w r i t e s ,  with what i s  r e a l i t y  and how it presents i t s e l f  t o  us.  
For Wheelwright. reality can be descsibed as having three 
important f e a t u r e s  : it i s  p re sen t i a l ,  it i s  coa lescen t  and it is 
The t h a t  p r e s e n t i a l  
of presence which can be f e l t  wi th  regard  
that t he re  
being, another pexson, and t o w a ~ d  haai rnate beings 
t o  another human 
The other 
i s  p re sen t  f o r  us not  a s  an ob jec t ,  not  as something out  there ,  ou t  
of reach, bu t  rather as something with which we are linked. We 
experience t h e  presence of the-other-than-us we connect with it: 
Every presence has an i r r e d u c i b l e  core of 
mystery, so  long as it retains i t s  p r e s e n t i a l  
charac te r .  Explanations, theories, and s p e c i f i c  
quest ionings  a r e  d i r e c t e d  toward an o b j e c t  i n  Its 
thinghood, no t  i n  its presentness.  An object  i n  
i t s  thinghood i s  charac te r ized  by spatio-temporal 
and causal relations to other objects i n  t h e i r  
thinghood: w e  i n q u i r e  about i t s  name, i t s  
p l a c e , i t s  w h y  and whither, i t s  status accordinq 
t o  some system of values .... m e n ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand, two persons meet and t h e i r  meeting i s  one 
of mutual presentness ,  t h e  e s s e n t i a l i t y  of t h e i r  
rneetinq has nothing t o  do with names and 
a a d r e s ~ e s - ~ N o  mul t i p l i ca t i on  of  such d e t a i l s ,  
however full and meticulous, cari be a s u b s t i t u t e  
f o r  t h e  r e a l  meeting .... The same is true when no 
other human being is  involved, and hence no 
assured mutual i ty .  The sense of presence t h a t  
occuss t o  one who catches  a s~dden glimpse of ,  
Say, a c e r t a i n ,  contour of h i l l s  o r  of a red 
wheelbarrow i n  the  r a in ,  d e f i e s  explanation;  for 
when explanations are begun o r  sought t h e  sheer  
presentness  diminishes o r  d i sappears .  
(Wheelwright 1973, 150-1591 
Being open t o  sensing t h e  presence of t h e  surrounding world, means 
t h a t  t h e  Cartesian dualism between m i n d  and body does no t  hold any 
lonqer. As a consequence, there i s  something more here  than just t h e  
mind as perceiving subj ect and the body as perceived obj ect.  Both of 
them a r e  blended toge ther ,  both of them are uni ted;  they  a r e  nothing 
but t h e  two s i d e s  o f  a co in ,  R e a l i t y ,  f o r  Wheelwright, su rpasses  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  l i k e  s u b j e c t  and object ,  o r  mind and body- Rea l i ty ,  h e  
w r i t e s ,  "is That t o  w h i c h  every [...] category  tries t o  r e f e r  and which 
every p h i l o s o p h i c a l  s tatement  tries t o  desc r ibe ,  always £rom an 
i n t e l l e c t u a l  p o i n t  of v i e w  and always with u l t i m a t e  inadequacy" 
T h e  a s p e c t  r e a l i t y  w h i c h  i t s  Wheeiwright 
r e p r e s e n t s  by using t h e  term "coalescent" .  To c o a l e s c e  means t o  grow 
t o g e t h e r  o r  i n t o  one body; t o  u n i t e ,  j o i n  t o g e t h e r .  What Wheelwright 
seems t o  p o i n t  o u t  i s  t h a t  w e  are part of t h e  world and we grow 
t o g e t h e r  w i t b  the  environment. The the 
s u b j e c t / o b j e c t  s p l i t  have unfor tuna te  consequences- Wheelwright 
c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  it: 
gives undue p r e s t i g e  t o  c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  of 
exper ience  ( those  which we c a l 1  c o l l e c t i v e l y  t h e  
'phys ica l '  a spec t s )  a t  t h e  expense of o t h e r  and 
perhaps i n t r i n s i c a l l y  m o r e  important a s p e c t s ;  
moreover, it genera tes  a r t i f  i c i a l  q u e s t i o n s  - To 
as k (as phi losoph ica l  a e s t h e t i c i a n s  o f t e n  do)  
whether t h e  beauty o f  a r o s e  is i n  t h e  r o s e  o r  i n  
t h e  eye and mind of t h e  beholder  is  p a l p a b l y  an 
u n r e a l  ques t ion ,  for t h e  concre te  answer is 
\Bothr ; and i f  the answer looks c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  s o  
much t h e  worse for the d u a l i s t i c  s t r u c t u r e  of 
thought  t h a t  makes it look  so. T h e  1 w h o  am aware 
and t h e  t h a t  of which 1 am aware a r e  b u t  two 
a s p e c t s  of a s i n g l e  s u r e  a c t u a l i t y ,  as 
i n s e p a r a b l e  as the convex and t h e  concave a s p e c t s  
o f  a s i n g l e  geometr ica l  curve.  ( Ibid.  , 1661 
W n a t  Wheelwright means is t h a t  t h e  world i s  no t  an i n e r t  mechanical 
o b j e c t  b u t  a l i v i n g  f ie ld ,  an open and dynamic landscape .  The w o r l d  
does n o t  d e r i v e  from an impersonal or o b j e c t i v e  dimension of 
s c i e n t i f i c  f a c t s ,  It i s  no t  a c o l l e c t i o n  of d a t a  "from which a l 1  
s u b j e c t s  and s u b j e c t i v e  q u a l i t i e s  a r e  pared away, but it i s  r a t h e r  a n  
in te r twined  matr ix  of s ensa t i ons  and percept ions"  (Abram 1997, 3 9 )  . 
Thus, w e  are n o t  mere observers .  W e  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  r e a l i t y .  
The last f ea tu re  of r e a l i t y  d iscussed by Wheelwright r o f e r s  to 
it a s  be ing  perspec t iva l .  T h e  f a c t  that r e a l i t y  possesses a 
p e r s p e c t i v a l  and contextual  cha rac t e r ,  imp l i e s  t h a t  i t s  n a t u r e  i s  
cons t an t ly  problematic, it cannot be c o r s e t e d  wi th in  formulas o r  
systematized.  We, as  complex human beings are d i v e r s e  and w e  are a l s o  
i n  t h e  presence of a r e a l i t y  i tself  d ive r se  and complex, w e  are p a r t  
of it and t h u s  w e  cannot p o s t u l a t e  'a s ingle type of r e a l i t y  as 
ult imate" - For Wheelwright, it i s  evident  t h a t  : 
The communication of  p r e s e n t i a l  and coalescent  
r e a l i t y  is no t  p o s s i b l e  by r e l y i n g  on words with 
i n f l e x i b l e  meanings; i f  it i s  t o  be achieved a t  
a l 1  (and t h e  achievement is always imperfect  a t  
b e s t )  t h e  common words must be chosen and 
contextual ized wi th  d i s c r imina t ing  s u i t a b i l i t y .  
Much of the  con tex t  is cons t ruc ted  i n  t h e  a c t  and 
b y  t h e  manner o f  saying fo r th ;  it is not  a l 1  
previously  given.  The f r e s h  con tex t  may be 
regarded a s  an ang le  of v i s ion ,  a  perspec t ive ,  
through which r e a l i t y  can be beheld  i n  a c e r t a i n  
way, a unique w a y ,  no t  e n t i r e l y  cornmensurate w i t h  
any other  way. ( 1 9 7 3 ,  170) 
This b r i n g s  us  t o  t h e  i s s u e  of language and, i m p l i c i t l y ,  t o  metaphor. 
Language, Wheelwright cons iders ,  in a s  much as it i s  used t o  express  
t h e  complexity and t e n s i v i t y  of t h e  phys i ca l  world and a l s o  t h e  
complexity of human na ture ,  i s  i t s e l f  i n t r i c a t e ,  engulfed i n  t e n s i o n s  
between s u i t a b l e  word combinations used t o  " represen t  some a s p e c t  o r  
o ther  of  t h e  pemas ive  l i v i n g  tension" ( Ib id . ,  48). On Wheelwrightrs  
approach, language i s  i t se l f  a l i v e ,  i n  continuous change because  
those  who use  it try t o  f ind b e t t e r  and s imp le r  w a y s  t o  exp re s s  
themselves o r  t o  r e f l e c t  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i th  t h e  surrounding 
world. Wheelwright argues t h a t :  
language t h a t  s t r i v e s  toward adequacy - as  
opposed t o  signs and words of practical i n t e n t  o r  
o f  mere habit - is  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  t ens ive  t o  
some degree and i n  some marner o r  o the r .  This is 
true whether t h e  language c o n s i s t s  of  ges ture ,  
drawings, musical compositions, o r  (what o f f e r s  
by f a r  t h e  l a r g e s t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of development) 
ve rba l  language cons i s t ing  o f  words, idioms, and 
syntax. ( I b i d . ,  46-47)  
A t  the core  o f  t h i s  s t r i f e  within language i s  t n e  metaphor. Quot ing 
John Micidleton Murry, Wheelwright r e f e r s  t o  metaphor a s  be ing  "as 
u l t ima te  a s  speech i t s e l f ,  and speech as u l t ima te  as thought". 
Metaphor i s  t h a t  which r e f l e c t s  be s t  t h e  t e n s i v e  nature of language 
and, a t  t h e  same the, t h a t  which provokes our th inking and 
imagination.  
As  we have seen above, where we presen ted  A r i s t o t l e r s  
d e f i n i t i o n ,  t h e  metaphoric process impl ies  a t r a n s f e r ,  a movement 
wi thin  t h e  semantic field of a s p e c i f i c  s o r t  t o  t h e  semantic f i e ld  of 
another  . T h i s  t r a n s f e r  ( "phora") has, as Wheelwright notes ,  two 
d i s t i n c t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  a "double imaginat ive  a c t  of outreaching 
and combining t h a t  e s s e n t i a l l y  marks t h e  metaphoric process" ( I b i d . ,  
7 2 ) .  But t h e s e  two components of metaphor appear, i n  t h e  most 
eloquent cases a s  working together  and thus ,  they should n o t  be 
regarded sepa ra t e ly  bu t  r a t h e r  as two dimensions of metaphor. 
However, i n  o rder  t o  b e t t e r  understand them, Wheelwright names and 
analyzes t h e m  one a t  a time. Their names are epiphor, which s t a n d s  
f o r  " the  outreach and ex tens ion  of meaning through cornparison" and 
diaphar, meaning "the c r e a t i o n  of a new meaning by j ux t apos i t i on  o r  
synthesis"  - 
Epiphor 
The metaphor a s  epiphor  i n  i t s  essence does nothing more than 
express a s i m i l a r i t y  between two d i f f e r e n t  tems where one of them 
has a commonly known sense  and i s  used as a vehicle t o  shed l i g h t  on 
a more important  but,  a t  t h e  same time, more d i f f l c u l t  t o  comprehend 
term, t h e  tenor- Thus, by e a s i l y  bringing i n  a context ,  ep iphor ic  
metaphor make-believes sornething about something e l s e  which i s  
usua l ly  obscurely  known. For example, when Seneca s a i d  t h a t  " M a n  i s  a 
wolf", he did not  mean that  t h e  s o r t  "man" is  included i n  t h e  s o r t  
"wolf", b u t  r a t h e r  b y  t r a n s f e r r i n g  the name "wolf" t o  t h e  name "man", 
he a s s e r t e d  something about human nature ,  namely t h a t  it shares  some 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  with t h e  na tu re  of t h e  wolf. T h i s  i s  a metaphor 
because h e r e  t h e r e  are two d i s t i n c t  ideas between which, through t h e  
a c t  of t r ans f e r ence ,  a connection i s  r ea l i zed  which i s  not v a l i d  i n  
the case  of " the  Tasmanian wolf i s  a wolf" where " the  Tasmanian wolf" 
is a sort included i n  a l a r g e r  s o r t ,  t h e  one o f  "wolf" with which it 
shares  s iLdlar  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  It i s  i n  t h e  l a t t e r  ins tance when t h e  
word 'wolf" i s  taken i n  i t s  l i t e r a l  meaning whi le  it i s  i n  t h e  former 
where it i s  taken metaphor ical ly .  
Therefore,  t h e  ep ipho r i c  metaphor assumes a s i m i l a r i t y  between 
the modifier (wolf) and t h e  modified (man) and it i s  primariiy based 
on t h e i r  comparison. But, as Wheelwright p o i n t s  out ,  these  two 
elements of s i m i l a r i t y  and comparison need not  be obvious, nor  
e x p l i c i t .  If they a re ,  t h e  t ens ion  provoked by t h e  t rans fe rence  would 
be diminished and the metaphor would lose  i t s  depth.  'A t e n s i v e  
vibrancy can  be achieved on ly  where an ad ro i t  choice of d i s s i m i l a r s  
is made, s o  that  t h e  comparison cornes as a shock which is  yet  a shock 
o f  recognition" (Ibid., 7 5 ) .  This i s  what gives "freshness" t o  t h e  
epiphoric metaphor a t  i t s  bes t .  When saying t h a t  "Time is  û r iver",  
t h e r e  a r e  no obvious s L n i l a r i t i e s  between "time", which i s  an 
a b s t r a c t  notion and "river", which has a cancrete, empir ical  
experience. Connecting these  two terms cornes as a s u r p r i s e  a t  f i r s t  
bu t  soon, when consider ing t h e  f l o w  of t he  r i v e r  as being s imi l a r  t o  
t h e  flow of t h e ,  w e  r e a l i z e  t h e  depth of the metaphor. 
Another source  f o r  v i t a l i t y  is offered  by synes thes i s ,  a têrm 
which expresses t h e  work ing  t oge the r  of d i f f e r e n t  sense  organs. 
Synesthesis  l eads  t o  c rea t ion  of metaphors, Wheelwright considers ,  
"s ince the  comparison of one type of  sense-impression with t h a t  given 
by a d i f f e r e n t  sense-organ s t i rs  t h e  reader  t o  r e f l e c t i v e  
contemplation a long two of h i s  avenues of sense a t  once" (Ibid., 7 6 ) .  
Examples of synesthetic expressions a r e  " b i t t e r  colors",  "gray 
whispers", "green s m e l l s " ,  etc. 
Diaphor 
Besides t h i s  kind of t ransference  through comparison, t h e r e  i s  
another one which Wheelwright c a l l s  "diaphor" (from the  Greek dia  - 
th rough) .  I n  t h i s  case ,  the semantic rnovement t akes  p l ace  not by 
comparing, but by juxtaposing d i s t i n c t i v e  s o r t s .  Taken alone, as 
p a r t s ,  t h e  elements of t h e  metaphor do not sây anything but  a t  the 
moment when they  a r e  put  toge ther  a whole new rneming is unveiled. As 
an example, l e t  us  t a k e  Descartesr r h e t o r i c a l  statement i n  T h e  World, 
chapter  V I ,  where he wri tes  about the  world as being a machine: "Give 
me extension and motion and I w i l l  cons t ruc t  t h e  world" ( C i t e d  by 
Turbayne 1970,  6 7 ) .  
Descartes p r e s e n t s  us with a relation between the  world as 
ex tens ion  and t h e  world as motion which p u t  toge ther ,  juxtaposed and 
metaphor ica l ly  interpreted gives us an i d e a  about the  world 's  
essence.  There can be  de t ec t ed  a c o n t r a s t  between ex tens ion  and 
motion. But on ly  when t h e y  a r e  pu t  t oge thex  can they  g i v e  u s  
something new. Leaving a s i d e  whether Descar tes  perceived t h i s  a s  a 
metaphor n o t  , obvious t h a t  u s ing  t h e  combinat i o n  
express ions  he w a s  a b l e  t o  produce a new meaning f o r  the  concept  
"world". T h e  world,  f o r  Descartes,  is t h a t  which has n o t  only 
ex tens ion  bu t  motion a s  well, 
Bowever, the  best examples of d i a p h o r i c  metaphor a r e  t o  be 
area a r t i s t i c  product ion a b s t r a c t  pa in t i ng ,  
where combinations of  colored l i n e s  o r  brush s t rokes  o r  p a i n t  sp i l l s  
open up d i f f e r e n t  spaces  transforming canvas'  Sidimensional  space  
i n t o  fou r  continuum, where t r id imens iona l  coord ina tes  
are enr iched w i t h  t h e  add i t i on  of an i n n e r ,  personal  t h e  o r  music, 
where t h e  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  var ious  ins t ruments  and vo i ce s  c r e a t e s  
emot ional ly  meaningful  s t a t e  i n  t h e  l i s t e n e r .  Thus, f o r  Wheelwright: 
[ t l h e  e s s e n t i a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  diaphor l i e s  i n  
the b road  on to log ica l  fac t  t h a t  new q u a l i t i e s  and 
new meanings can emerge, simply come i n t o  be ing ,  
out  o f  some h i t h e r t o  ungrouped combination of 
elements, If one can imagine a s tate of the 
un ive r se ,  perhaps a t r i l l i o n  yea r s  ago, be fo re  
hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms had ever come 
t o g e t h e r ,  it rnay be presumed that up t o  that t i m e  
w a t e r  did n o t  e x i s t .  Somewhere i n  t h e  l a t e r  
v a s t i t u d e  of t h e ,  then, water f i rs t  came i n t o  
be ing  - when j u s t  those  two necessary  elements 
came t o g e t h e r  a t  l a s t  under  t h e  r i g h t  cond i t i ons  
of  t empera tu re  and pressure .  Analogous n o v e l t i e s  
occur i n  the sphere  of meanings as well.  A s  i n  
n a t u r e  new q u a l i t i e s  rnay be engendered by  t h e  
j u x t a p o s i t i o n  of p rev ious ly  un- j oined words and 
images. (Ibid.,  85-86) 
However, pure d iapho r i c  metaphor can hard ly  be found. It r a t h e r  
exisis i n  combination wi th  ep ipho r i c  metaphor. Together, t h e y  can 
b r i n g  d i f f e r e n t  s o r t s  c lo se .  
Through t h e  cornparison v i r t u e s  of  epiphor and through t h e  fresh 
jux t apos i t i on  of " severa l  veh i cu l a r  images" of diaphor, new meanings 
emerge. A s  an example, t h e  fo l lowing t e x t  from the r e f l e c t i v e  poet ry  
of Egyptian Pyramids can i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  co l labora t ion  of  ep iphor  and 
diaphor  : 
Death is i n  m y  eyes today: 
As i n  a s i c k  man b e g i m i n g  t o  recover 
From a deep i l l n e s s .  (Erman 1927,  1 0 )  
Thus, t h e  phrase "death is i n  my eyes  today" represen t s  an ep ipho r .  
However, t a k i n g  s e p a r a t e l y  the rest of t h e  verse :  "As i n  a s i c k  man 
b e g i m i n g  t o  recover /  From a deep i l l n e s s "  w e  w i l l  f ind  t h a t  it is 
n o t  a metaphor. On ly  i n  combination with t h e  f i rs t  p a r t  it can  be 
regarded  metaphor ica l ly .  The whole verse is a diaphor. 
The e s s e n t i a l  cha rac t e r  o f  t h e  metaphor, as Wheelwright sees 
it, i s  t h e  a b i l i t y  t o  provoke a t e n s i o n  which, as Ricoeur pu t  it, 
"guaran t ies  the ve ry  t r ans f e r ence  of meaning and gives p o e t i c  
language i t s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of semantic 'plus-valuer,  i t s  c a p a c i t y  t o  
be open towards n e w  a spec t s ,  new dimensions, new horizons, new 
meanings" (Ricoeur 1977,  2 5 0 )  . The epiphor and t h e  diaphor are the 
revo lv ing  e l e c t r o n s  around the nucleus  of metaphor's meaning. 
To sum up, i t  can be a f f i rmed  that throughout Metaphor and 
Reality, Wheelwright continuously stresses t h e  "tensive" c h a r a c t e r  of 
language. To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s ,  he makes use  of words l i k e  " l iv ing" ,  
"a l ive"  o r  "intense" which a l1  are meant t o  c a s t  a l i g h t  on the f a c t  
t h a t  language is so similar t o  l i f e ,  t o  w h a t  is real, t o  "What 1s". 
Language and 'h?hat 1s" have =alogous on to log ica l  f e â t ü r e s  and t n i s  
e n t i t l e s  Wheelwright t o  thirik of  metaphor, s ince  it r ep re sen t s  b e s t  
t he se  f e a t u r e s  of the t e c s i v e  language, as having the p o w e r  t a  reacn 
r e a l i t y  . 
However, Wfieelwrightrs account of the connection between 
r e a l i t y  md language r e f l e c t e d  through metaphor cannot surpass t h e  
t r a p  of an "on to log ica l  naiveté", Ricoeur considers  i n  The X u l ê  of 
Mstaphor. The power of t h e  d i a l e c t i c  between diaphor and epiphor 
which started Wheelwrightrs ana lys i s  fades away when t h e  
" i n t u i t i o n i s t  and v i t a l i s t  tendency" is disc losed  toward t h e  end of 
h i s  book. Ricoeur thinks that: 
Wheelwright i s  not  wrûng t o  speâk of 'presêntial 
r e a l i t y r r  but he neg lec t s  to d i s t i n g u i s h  p o e t i c  
truth from mythic âbsu rd i ty -  H e  who does s o  much 
t o  have t h e  ' tens ional '  c h a r a c t e r  of language 
recognized misses t h e  ' t en s iona l '  charac te r  of 
truth, b y  simply s u b s t i t u t i n g  one not ion of t r u t h  
for another ;  accordingly, h e  goes over t o  t h e  
s i d e  o f  abuse by aproximating poe t i c  t e x t u r e s  
slmply ta pr imi t i ve  a n i m i s m -  ( IS id . ,  255) 
Thus, i i i coeur  r e p ~ o a c h e s  Wheelwright arguing t h a t  h ï s  âccount , sven 
though bo ld  i n  i t s  at temgt,  i s  d i s appo in t ing  in i t s  outcome. For 
Wheelwright, Ricoeur th inks ,  t h e  b o r d e r  between language and t h e  
w o r l d  i s  b l u r r e a  t o  such an extent  t h a t  it ha3 almost vanished.  Words 
and the re fo re ,  metaphors and th ings  zre e s s e n t i a l l y  s i m i l a r .  I n  t h i s  
r e spec t ,  Wheelwright w e n t  too  far, abusing the tensional use of 
language, overemphasizing t h e  s t rong  c a r r e l a t i o n  between metaphor and 
r e a l i t y  and thus  f a i l i n g  t o  observe t h e  d i f f e r ences  between t h e  two. 
Now Ricoeur uses Wheelwright' s approach t o  metaphor i n  oppos i t i on  to 
Turbayne's and considers them a s  s t e p s  of a d i a l e c t i c a l  p rocess .  H e  
brings them t o g e t h e r  i n  order  t o  shape his own theory of netaphor.  W e  
pointed out  w h a t  he  f i n d s  ü n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n  Wheelwright' s approach- 
As  regards Turbayne, "abuse is [...] t h e  'myth '  o f  h i s  t i t l e ,  i n  a more 
ep i s t eno log ica l  than e thnologica l  sense, scarce ly  d i f f e r i n g  £ r o m  what 
we j u s t  c ü l l e d  o n t o l o g i c a l  naiveté" (Ibid., 251)- Turbayners t h e s i s ,  
t h a t  metaphoricâl  cons t ruc t ions  a r e  pureiy i n t e l l e c t u a l  
cons t ruc t ions ,  implies t h a t  they do n o t  r e f e r  t o  r e a l i t y  d i f f e r e n t l y  
than s c i e n t i f  i c  formulas , Turbayne' s approach Is always eoncerned 
with truth from an epis temological  pe r spec t ive  which makes his 
endeavor very similar t o  t h e  pos i t i v i sm t h a t  ne c r i t i c i z e s .  Turbayne 
leaves  no room f o r  p o e t i c  language w h i c h  breaks through " the  very 
not ions  of  f a c t ,  ob j ec t ,  r e a l i t y  and t r u t h ,  âs de l imi ted  by  
epistemology, Turbayne's metaphor s t i l l  beiongs t o  t h e  o rde r  o f  t h e  
manipulable. I t  is something we choose t c  use, t o  not  use, t o  re-use. 
T h i s  power t o  decide, coextensive wi th  the absolute hg ld  of the 'as 
i f r ,  is without analogue on the  side of  p o e t i c  experience, i n  which 
imagination i s  'bound' " ( IbLd., 253 1 - 
Thus w e  have Turbayne' s p o s i t i o n  on t h e  one hand, and 
Wheelwrightfs, on the other .  Turbayne s t r e s s e s  what metaphor is not  
by smphasizing t h a t  rnetaphorical cons t ruc t ions  are pure ly  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  p roduc ts  with no real r e f e rence  whereas Wheelwright 
emphasizes what metaphar is by s t r ê s s i n g  t h e  fâc t  that metaphors a r e  
deeply rooted i n  t h e  n a t u r a l  world. T h e  former wants us t o  be aware 
of t h e  "as i f "  p r e s c r i p t i o n  of t h e  metaphor; the latter discovers  
deeper connections between metaphor and " W h â t  1s". 
=ter t h e  a n a l y s e s  o f  metaphor by w r i t e r s  such âs C o l l i n  
m lurbâ4;?;e, Philip Wheelwright aïîd, as we w i l l  ses, Baiil- Ricoeur, 
metaphor does n o t  allow itself t o  be regarded as a simple srriment 
AL CLL reeE t y or that cozveys r;o fiew xieouirg, that kas nathing ta do --'+L 
w i t h  our r e l â t i o n s h i p  to it. Ricoeur  breaks away from t h e  t r â d i ï i o n a l  
. -Aerstâadi~g . .-. of rnetâpricr which stârted s k o r t l y  âf ter k i s t û t l e  m U  
cuh ina t ed  with Romanticisrn. 
Ketâpkor bricgs remûte ideas together i i î t û  â ünitÿ a d  it dûes 
t h a t  by following the guidance offered by t h e i r  l i k e n e s s ,  as we have 
seez &ove, fvr exmple,  when "tLizef' w d  "riverfr wêre broüght 
t o g e t h e r  in the metaphor "The Is a r iver" .  T h e  fac t  that t h e  remote 
ideâs are a l i h e  LTLplies 4-L-t  4" . . L L A ~  saie the, s ~ ~ ü l â r  zd LLLSY âre, at th 
d i f f e r e n t .  I n  a rnetâphor, d i f f e r e n t  ideâs melt and t h e i r  likeness 
- -& - QLL3 as a cetàlyst .  III this wây,  xstâphûr acts l i k e  a szree: o r  â 
E i l t e r  i n  the d i s c u r s i v e  process. F i n a l l y ,  Ricoeur brings us  face to 
faCe .Y :  * A L L l  +L à r;ew s+ ,,,LLU,e W..-+--- of r e â l l t y .  This new s t r ü c t ü r e  xaUe visible 
by the metaphor emerges on t h e  ruins o f  the p r e v i o u s  s t r u c t u r e  t o  
w h i c h  tke risnote ideas previûüsiji  beloiqed, â3 w e  will see Selow. 
R e f e r e n c e  : Metaphors and Reality 
Metaphors are philosophically re levan t ,  argues Ricoeur, 
because they c r e a t e  new meanings, becaüse they are innovative. With 
Ricoeur the approach t o  metaphor implies a charrge of view inâsmüch as 
he brir;gs f o r t h  a riew understanding of sense and o f  reference, of 
imzgina t ion ,  to xhich he sdds an s m ~ t i v e  dhens ion .  
Ricoeür upgrades Got t lob Frege 's  d i s t i nc t i û r ,  bstweeri sense  
and meaning ixhere t h e  sense iç xhat t h e  p ropos i t ion  States; the  
deao ta t ion ,  o r  m e a ~ i n g ,  i s  t h a e  aSoüt which t h e  sense Is s t a t e d )  irito 
one between sense and re fe rence .  f o r  Ricoeur, sense resüits from a 
l â r g e l y  h o r i z o n t a l ,  s e m a i i t i c  proceeding and i den t i fLes  an e n t r y  i n  
the h a g i n a r y  c u l t u r a l  encyclopedis  c o n s t i t u t i n g  vhat eün be c a l i e d  a 
metaphoric p ropos i t i on .  Referezce is "[metaphor's] clâim t o  reach 
r e a l i t y "  (Ricoeur 198G, 140), even if o f t e n  a r ede f ined  reaiity. It 
adds t o  sense an zmotiorial and imaginâtive and prâgmatic v e r t i c a l i t y .  
For iiicoeilr, " the  l i t e r a r y  work through t h e  str-irctüre p m p e r  tu it 
d i sp l âys  a world on ly  under the condi t ion  that the  r e f e r ence  o f  
d e s c r i p t i v e  d i s cou r se  is suspended. O r ,  t o  p u t  it auo the r  way, 
d i scourse  i n  t h e  l i t e r a r y  wark s e t s  ou t  i t s  dena ta t ion ,  bÿ means of 
the suspension of t h e  f i r s t  level denotâ t ion o f  d i scourse"  (Ricoeur 
1 9 7 7 ,  2 2 1 ) .  Thus, f o r  Ricoeur, there a r e  two d i s t i n c t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
to refer to t h e  i s s u e  oz  reference ,  o r  denotat ion with regard t o  
metaphorical  s t a tements .  
In The i i u i e  o f  Metaphor, Sicoeur contwasts Go t t l ob  Frege's 
approach, with Emilz BenvtnFsters. H e  begins with the qzeçt ion:  "What 
does the  metaphor ica l  s t â t e n e n t  s ay  &o.-+ UL realitÿ? T h i s  qdes t ion 
carries us  ac ros s  t h e  t h r e sho ld  from t h e  sense towards t h e  reference 
of discourse" ( Ib id . ,  216). In other  words, i r i  o rdz r  t a  kïiow how 
metaphors relate t o  Eea l i t y  w e  have t o  f i n d  out first t o  what they 
rêf sr. 
Following Fregef s a r t i c l e  an Sense and Reference i196Û). we 
rcâlizt that the  reftrtnze, âs Ricoeur püts it, 'is corn-micâted frorn 
the propex nane to t h e  e ~ t i r e  propos i t icn ,  which, with respxt to 
218) . Proper mmes "pLck üp" objects  i r i  the xarld, they stand fûï OZ 
dssi,7;ats tbe i r  reference and, Secause tBeis reference is 
communicated t o  the e n t i r e  proposition, tha t  Fs, t h e  en t i r e  
referring t o  proper names. Thus, when w e  use a piopsr name, l i k e  "the 
2Jloozr', k;s do n o t  r î f e r  t o  o ü r  ides oE the moor; =or t o  a sgezific 
mentel event corresponding t o  it. N o r  do w e  refer Co some kind of 
ide& o b f s c t  'Lrr~ducibls t o  ariy xientâl evant" w h i c h  ws "prssnpposs 
besides a ref erence" . It is  Frege' s understanding that: 
T h e  sentence 'Cdysseüs waç s s t  àshore a t  Ithaca 
while sound asleepr obviously has a sense.  B u t  
sincs it iç doubtful whcther the nant 'Odysseus', 
occurring therein, has reference, it i s  a l s o  
do..k4- LiLLILLuI S.. 7 whether t h e  whcle senteixe has or,e 1.-.: 
For it is of the re ference  of t h e  name t h a t  the 
predizate is sffirmed o r  denisd. Whoever does n o t  
admit the name has reference can ne i the r  apply 
nor wlthhcld t h e  predica te .  (1960, 6 2 = S J  1 
Thus, once a name i n  a sentence has no clear r e f e rence  then the whole 
s z n t a x ê  l s c k s  reference- Frsgs considers that ouï qùest  for t r ü t h ,  
our " in t en t ion  on speaking and thinking" demands a reference, it 
daiânds t h â t  wa "advexe fron sens= t o  refêrence", Eowever, t h i s  
demand causes  us  to err ,  aicoeur t h i n k s .  " T h i s  s t r i v i n j  f o r  t r u t h  
süffüses the s a t i r e  proposition, t o  the sx ten t  t h a t  it cen 5s 
a s swla t ed  t o  a proper name: bu t  it is via the proper name as 
f nteLmediâry that ,  Tor Frege, the  propos i t ion  has ref erenze" ( R i c o e ü r  
1977,  2 1 8 ) .  Thus, because Odysseus has no reference, the sentence 
"Odysseas is a journey" o r  a ~ y  netaphor ica l  s t a t e r t ~ e n t  t h a t  fias t h e  
woxd Cûysseus i n  it, woüld have nû re fe re rxe  either which rrreaiis t h ~ t  
they  are mere i n t e l l e c t ü a l  productions. T h i s  Ricoeur considers to be 
a lLa i t a t ion  of Frege's posZ+- '  A ~ 1 û n .  
H o w e v e r ,  Ricoeur brings f o r t h  E n i l  Benvenister s theory of 
re fe rence  i~ order  t a  break awa j i  frorrr these 1 L ~ t t a t i o n s .  In the 
second volume of Problèmes de linguistique généraie  (19741, 
Benveniste irrites: "Le sense ci'-= m o t  cons i s t e râ  dâns sa cspâci tg 
df êtl- L,e f r i ~ t e g r a t  c i r  u .  s y n t a p e  p a r t i c u l i e r  e t  de remplir une 
foiictiûu p rûpûs i t i ons i l e "  (Benvtuiste 1974 ,  227 . Moreûver, f o r  
Benveniste, the sense of the words in a sentence " r é su l t e  précis6mect 
n r r a L  daes t h i ~  EEâII? de la niânière dont ils sont ~orntj i i i&~" (Ibid, ) , ""-'
Senveniste considers that taken In i s o l a t i o n ,  words have anly a 
p o t e u t l â l  meâning 'vv'hich Ls only- âztüal ized w h e n  it Fs us3d i n  â 
sentence. The  pctential meaning is made up of al1 the narginsl 
--- Li~~ariings thât s w x d  câz have depending ûf t h e  diversity of contexts 
i n  which they cm be üseü. Then, when they a r e  püt together  i~ a 
sêï~têuct this ntïltitüde of p û t z u t i â l  meauings is reduced tû j u s t  thê 
meaning funct ioning Ln t h e  " ins t snce  of discourse", L-e., a given 
It is now obvious why Benveniste's view is cûz t ras ted  w i t h  
Frege's. For Frege the sentcrics would play t h e  rûle of a prûper nane- 
Bÿ this I mean that the seatence itself being conposéd of words with 
specific meanirrg desiynates its reEertnce. On the other  haizd, for 
B e ~ v e n i s t e ,  t h e  re fe rence  of a sentence attribütes meaning to the 
- wurds -- in its composftfon. Ricoeur explains t h â t :  
These two conceptions of  reference are 
complementary and rec iproca l ,  wnether one r i s e s  
by s p t h e t i c  composition f r o m  t h e  proper nane 
towards t h e  p ropos i t ion ,  o r  whether one descends 
by a n a l y t i c  d i s s o c i a t i o n  from t h e  sentence  t o  the 
semantic u n i t  of t h e  word- A t  t h e i r  i n t e r s e c t i o n ,  
t h e  two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s  o f  reference  make 
apparent the pola r  c o n s t i t u t i o n  of t h e  reference  
itself, which can be c a l l e d  t h e  object when t h e  
r e f e r e n t  of  t he  name i s  considered, o r  t h e  state 
of affairs i f  one cons ide r s  t h e  r e f e r e n t  o f  t h e  
e n t i r e  statement", (1977, 2 1 8  ) 
B y  br inging Benvenistef  s p o s i t i o n  i n t o  d iscuss ion,  Ricoeur is  a b l e  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h  between two s o r t s  of r e f e r ence  - there i s  the f i r s t  l e v e l  
re fe rence ,  r ep re sen t ed  by Fregef s approach and t h e  second l e v e l  
re fe rence  recognized i n  Benvenister s approach. The metaphorical 
s tatement i s  t h e  most adequate i l l u s t r a t i o n  of t h i s  s p l i t  between 
levels of r e f e r e n c e  o r  denota t ion.  Metaphors acqu i r e  t h e i r  
metaphorical  meaning and achieve t h e i r  reference  on t h e  ruins of 
l i t e r a l  meaning and l i t e r a l  r e f e r ence .  Ricoeur exp l a in s  tha t :  
If it i s  true t h a t  l i t e r a l  sense and metaphorical 
s e n s e  a r e  d i s t ingu ished  and a r t i c u l a t e d  wi th in  an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  s o  t o o  it is w i t h i n  an 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  a second level re fe rence ,  
w h i c h  is properly t h e  metaphorical  r e fe rence ,  is 
set free by means of t h e  suspension of t h e  f i r s t  
l e v e l  r e f  erence,  (1977, 221) 
For example, i f  we t ake  t he  metaphor "Odysseus i s  a journey", then w e  
can s e e  t h a t ,  l i t e r a l l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  (i. e., f ollowing Frege) , it would 
have no impact on t h e  way we pe rce ive  o r  r e l a t e  t o  r e a l i t y  because 
Odysseus has no reference .  On the  o t h e r  hand, taken metaphorical ly,  
"Odysseus is a j ourney" desc r ibes  a new w a y  of r e l a t i n g  t o  r e a l i t y ,  a 
new way of look ing  a t  human beings  and t h e i r  s t r u g g l e  t o  a r r i v e  
"home". 
I f  metaphor is this d i a l e c t i c a l  c o r r e c t i v e  o f  a l1  a n a l y t i c a l  
language cen t e r ed  on concepts then, as  al1 language it also refers, 
among o t h e r  things,  t o  what a given cu l tu re  and ideology consider  as 
r e a l i t y -  This means t h a t  some conclusions t o  which any metaphor c m  
lead a r e  per t inent  t o  o r  c u l t u r a l l y  "true" t o  given understandings of 
r e l a t ionsh ips  i n  p rac t i ce ,  Metaphor can af f irm such an understanding 
or,  i n  the bes t  case, develop 'the before un-apprehended r e l a t i o n s  o f  
things" i n  ways a t  t h a t  m o m e n t  not otherwise able t o  be fomulated.  
For example, saying that "love is a wam feeling" we use warm i n  a 
d i f f e r e n t  way  than it is  usual ly  used and thus ,  w e  e s t ab l i sh  a new 
r e l a t i o n  between "love" and "feeling", 
Such i s  the s p l i t  becween the  two kinds o f  reference.  However, 
Ricoeur does not s top  here- When t a lk ing  about the re-descr ipt ive 
power of t h e  i n t e l l e c t  which makes it poss ib le  t o  d a i m  that 
metaphors do reach r e a l i t y ,  w e  have t o  ask ourselves how do they come 
t o  l i g h t ?  What i s  it that makes i t  possible for t he  i n t e l l e c t  rzo 
c rea te ,  t o  bring f o r t h  novel ideas, novel meanings? In  order  t o  
answer t h i s  question w e  have t o  see how Ricoeur understands 
imagination t o  work. 
imagination 
W e  have seen above t n a t  i n  the metaphorical use of language w e  
come across  an innovation a t  t h e  l e v e l  of reference.  Now, metaphor 
r e l a t e s  our  image of r e a l i t y  given t o  us through perception t o  t h e  
image of r e a l i t y  t h a t  is offered by language- 
Ricoeur takes inaginat ion t o  mean what Kant meant when he used 
t h i s  concept. T h e  act of imagination is that which puts t h e  s p a t i a l -  
temporal determinat ion of phenomena i n  correspondence with t h e  
conceptual determinat ion of  phenomena. 
determinat ions  a r e  b l i n d  on t h e i r  own. Conceptual determinat ion is 
empty when t a k e n  by itself. The act of imagination i s  fu s ing  them 
toge ther  and thus  a l lows us  t o  grasp t h e  phenomena. With Kant, 
imagination longer  t h e  f a c u l t y  w i t h  which reproduce images. 
It is no longer j u s t  reproduc t ive  imagination. G i l l e s  Deleuze, 
d i scuss ing  t h e  process of imagination as understood Kant, 
considers t h a t  "When 1 Say: 1 imagine my f r i e n d  P ie r r e ,  t h i s  is t h e  
reproduct ive  imagination. 1 could do something else besides  imagine 
Pierre, could  him, go t o  nis place ,  remember 
him, which i s  no t  the same t h i n g  as imagining him. Imagining rny 
f r i e n d  Pierre is t h e  reproduc t ive  imagination" (Deleuze 1 9 7 8 ) .  
However, Kant recognizes t h a t  imagination has another func t ion .  I t  i s  
a l s o  product ive ,  working a s  a kind o f  syn thes i s .  Deleuze exp la ins  
Kantf s concept of p roduc t ive  imagination a s  : 
determining a space and a t h e  i n  conformity t o  a 
concept, bu t  i n  such a way t h a t  t h i s  
determinat ion cannot flow f r o m  t h e  concept 
i t s e l f ;  t o  make a space and a time correspond t o  
a concept, that i s  t h e  a c t  of t h e  productive 
imagination. What does a mathematician o r  a 
geometer do? O r  i n  another way, what does an 
a r t i s t  do? They ' re  going t o  make productions of 
s p a c e - t h e .  (Deleuze 1978)  
product ive  h a g i n a t  ion ,  spat ia l - temporal  determinat  i ons  
not  merely fol low conceptual  determinations.  There is a "production 
of space and time", a s  Deleuze pu t  it, t h a t  goes beyond t h e  space and 
t ime given phenomena and t h a t  i s  how t h e  imagination 
productive.  
Now, when Ricoeur d i s t i ngu i shes  image as replica from image as 
fiction, t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  corresponds t o  that between Kant's 
reproductive imagination and product ive  imagination. These two r e f e r  
t o  d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g s  and t o  mristake the one f o r  t h e  o t h e r  is a 
f a l l a c y .  The image as r ep l i ca ,  as p o r t r a i t ,  is t h e  image t h a t  w e  g e t  
through percept ion,  It r e f e r s  t o  a s p e c i f i c  something that e x i s t s  i n  
t h e  r e a h  of reality. Thus, 1 can imagine my aog, t h e  one 1 used t o  
have a couple of yea r s  ago. The image 1 have here  and now r e s t s  upon 
the corresponding percep t ion  of t h e  r e a l  dog 1 had. T h e  same dog 
whose presence used t o  be  given i n  the past is now given i n  absence, 
O r ,  as Ricoeur puts it, "absence and presence are modes of givenness 
of t h e  same r e a l i t y " .  Now, the  other s o r t  o f  image, t h e  image as  
f i c t i o n ,  does not  rest upon a given model. It does no t  r e f e r  t o  
anythfng t h a t  was a l r eady  given a s  o r i g i n a l .  I n  t h e  image a s  f i c t i o n ,  
again,  w e  dea l  w i t h  an absent th ing ,  but t h i s  time t h e  absent  th ing  
r ep re sen t s  nothingness.  W e  imagine t he  centaur  but it e x i s t s  nowhere. 
It is unreal ,  even though w e  can have an image of  it. Thus, the image 
of m y  dog r e s t s  on t h e  absence of i t s  ob jec t ,  whereas t h e  image of 
t h e  cen taur  r e s t s  on t h e  un rea l i t y  of i t s  ob jec t .  M y  dog i s  r ea l ;  the  
cen taur  i s  un rea l ,  Ricoeur considers  t h a t  "the nothingness of absence 
concerns the mode of g ivemess  of a real  t h ing  i n  absentia, t h e  
nothingness o f  u n r e a l i t y  cha rac t e r i ze s  t he  r e f e r e n t  i t s e l f  of t h e  
f i c t i o n "  (1991,  120)  . 
The image as f i c t i o n  r e f e r s  t o  r e a l i t y  i n  a new way- This i s  
why w e  have t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  it f rom the  image a s  r e p l i c a -  The image as 
repl ica  "reproduces" r e a l i t y ,  whereas the image as f i c t i o n  "produces" 
reality. There is a productive r e f e r ence  a t  work i n  f i c t i o n .  Ricoeur 
considers  it t o  be  t h e  case  t h a t :  
f i c t i o n  changes r e a l i t y ,  i n  t h e  sense  t h a t  it 
both ' inventsr  and \d iscoversr  it, [which] could 
no t  be acknowledged as long a s  t h e  concept of 
image was rnerely i d e n t i f i e d  with t h a t  of  p i c t u r e -  
Images could no t  i n c r e a s e  r e a l i t y  s i n c e  they  add 
no r e f e r e n t s  o the r  t han  those  of t h e i r  o r ig îna l s .  
The only o r i g i n a l i t y  of  t h e  image had thus  t o  be 
found i n  t h e  spontane i ty  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h e  
production of t h e  image. ( Ib id .  , 121  1 
Imaginetion i s  thus  productive, n o t  only reproduct ive .  And it i s  
productive i n  as much as  thought i s  involved, i n  as much a s  language 
i s  challenged.  When 1 imagine my dog and reproduce h i s  irnage, t h e r e  
i s  no f u r t h e r  l abo r  involved i n  t he  process.  However, when 1 produce 
an image, when 1 descr ibe  an unreal object ,  when I t e l l  a s t o r y ,  when 
1 make a plan o r  make a model, 1 have t o  make use  of my i n t e l l e c t u a l  
capaci ty .  Imagination is product ive  not only o f  unrea l  o b j e c t s ,  b u t  
a l s o  of an unexplored v i s ion  of r e a l i t y .  "Imagination a t  work - i n  
work - produces i tself as a w o r l d "  (Ibid., 1 2 3 )  . 
To sum up, metaphor i s  t h a t  which relates r e a l i t y  and 
language, an expanded r e a l i t y  and a dynamic language, t ha t  is .  This 
t akes  p l a c e  with t h e  help  of imagination which does no t  reproduce 
images b u t  r a t h e r  produces n e w  ones. Inasmuch as imagination is 
productive,  it allows us t o  see s i m i l a s i t i e s  between t h e  remote i deas  
that make up metaphors. "Man i s  a wolf", says Seneca. W e  can only 
understand what he rneant no t  by simply having a mental p i c t u r e  o f  a 
woif-like man but by emphasizing r e l a t i o n s  i n  a dep ic t ing  mode. 
Moreover, imagination is h e l p f u l  when it cornes t o  pu t t i ng  i n  b racke t s  
t h e  f isst  l e v e l  reference,  t h e  l i t e r a r y  reference, allowing f o r  the 
pro jec t ion  of new p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  redescr ib ing  the  world. 
Now, l e t  us see how L y a l l  f i t s  i n t o  al1 t h i s -  For Lyafl, a 
human being as a whole i s  b a t h  capable of i n t e l l e c t u a l  e f f o r t  and 
capable also of  en-otional exper ience-  Thus it would appear t h a t  i n  
t h e  imaginative s t a t e  one would a s s e r t  one's existence i n  f u l l .  Why? 
Because i n  t h i s  case, one i s  re-affirming o n e r s  presence i n  the world 
by re-describing it and l i v i n g  it from within.  W e  see t h a t  f o r  Lya l l ,  
imagination bas to do more with t h e  production of images and less 
with t h e i r  reproduction:  
The ghosts and fair ies,  the gnomes and o t h e r  
Urtaginary beings of a rude s t a t e  of soc i e ty ,  owe 
theFr or ig in  t o  t h e  a c t i v i t y  of t h i s  p r i n c i p l e ,  
u n i t e d  with t h e  suggest ions  of a s u p e r s t i t i o u s  
fear.  In  c e r t a i n  circumstances t h e  imagination i s  
r e ady  enough, i n  t h e  most c u l t i v a t e d  age, t o  body 
f o r t h  these  imaginary c rea tures ,  and t o  e n t e r t a i n  
a c e r t a i n  dread which it requi res  some e f f o r t  of  
reason t o  counteract .  It i s  i n  those  very places 
where t h e  imagination has most scope t o  operate,  
o r  most suggest ives  t o  i t s  act ion,  t h a t  w e  f i n d  
t h e  s u p e r s t i t i o n s  p reva i l i ng  which are ccnnected 
with  t h e  ex is tence  and t h e  exp lo i t s  of  t h e  beings 
of imagination. (Lya l l  1855, 275)  
As we can s e e ,  f o r  Lyall, imagination i s  "ready enough t o  body f o r t h  
these  imaginary creatures".  It i s  t h e  act of producing t h e m  which i s  
t h e  big task of inaginat ion.  By  doing t h a t ,  i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
example, it stirs our emotions and it makes us  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  a new 
aspect  o f  r e a l i t y .  B u t  it a l s o  "requires some e f f o r t  of reason" t o  
counteract ,  It involves Lhus our  i n t e l l e c t  i n  as much as it has t o  
r e l a t e  t o  and deal with expanded r e a l i t y ,  a r e a l i t y  which was c r e a t e d  
i n  t he  f i r s t  p l a c e  by t he  mind i n  i ts  a c t i v i t y  of  perceiving 
analogies,  of animating and personifying na ture .  However, Lya l l  does 
no t  f u l l y  h i s  f ind ings  . content  wi th  j u s t  exposing t h e  
d i f f i c u l t y  of understanding t h e  inner workings of  t h e  imagination- 
"Why [does imaginat ion works as it does]?  It i s  impossible t o  say", 
he wri tes  (Ibid., 2 7 4 ) .  
However, it seems t h a t  Lyall,  l i n k i n g  t h e  i n t e l l e c t  and t h e  
emotions i n  the imaginative state took a s t e p  f u r t h e r  from t h e  
Romantic rnainstream. For the Romantics, understanding rests upon t h e  
connection wi th  t h e  s p i r i t  t h a t  is  behind any c r e a t i o n .  Lyall 
embraces t h i s  a t t i t u d e  bu t ,  i f  he had developed h i s  ideas ,  he could  
have come t o  t h e  conclusion t h a t  imagination no t  only  connects with 
r e a l i t y  bu t  a l s o  augments it, more meaningful and 
diverse. Through language, through tne c r e a t i o n  of metaphors, which 
is a f e a t u r e  of t h e  i n t e l l e c t ,  one improves one's r e l a t i o n s h i p  with 
L h e  and no t  only mi r ro r s  it. Through emot ions a r e  
in t imate ly  connected with it. 
I n  a l e c t u r e  given i n  1825 a t  t h e  opening of t h e  Free Church 
College of Halifax l a t e r  t o  be Dalhousie Univers i ty ,  Lyal l  talks 
about t h e  "philosophy of thought" and he says, when drawing on the 
importance of language: 
What an adap ta t ion  between t h e  mind and i t s  modes 
of expression! How the  one f i l l s  t h e  o t h e r  with 
life and meaning! - while t h e  l a t t e r ,  again,  
s u i t s  every varying idea and emotion of the 
former - now rouses  w i t h  energy, and now soothes 
wi th  p leasure ,  o r  t r anspo r t s  with d e l i g h t .  Kaving 
found such a vehicle, mind f r e e l y  expa t i a t e s  i n  
every region.  How much w e  owe t o  language perhaps 
cannot be t o l d ,  f o r  t he  excursiveness of mind - 
f o r  t h e  f i nenes s  of  i t s  imaginations and t h e  
s u b t l e t y  of i t s  conceptions. (Lya l l  1853, 5)  
Moreover, 'a tnought o f t en  lies i n  the s t a t e  of  a f e e l i n g  till a 
word, o r  words, evoke it from i ts  recess"  ( Ib id . ,  5 1 . As can be soen 
again, 
l i nked  
emotions which 
with thougnts . 
connect with phenomenal r e a l i t y  a r e  a l s o  
I t  is L y a l l f s  opinion t h a t  tne only way f o r  t h e s e  connections 
among emotions, phenornenal reality and thoughts t o  be expressed 
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  i s  when w e  make use of our imaginat,ion: 
There is a per iod of i t s  h i s t o r y  when Imagination 
has to do with outward forms and semblânces, a s  
express ive  of inward thoughts  and f e e l i n g s :  but 
t h e r e  cornes a time when t h e  most sub t l e  and 
evanescent f ee l ings  o r  conceptions a r e  made the  
syrnbols of mater ia l  o b j e c t s  o r  ideas; o r ,  t h e s e  
ob jec t s  o r  ideas  a r e  expressed o r  conveyed under 
t h e  most s u b t l e  conceptions of t he  rnind. Between 
Homer and Wordsworth, o r  Shelley,  t h e r e  seems the  
interval t o  which we have here alluded: 
Shakespeare may be said t o  u n i t e  t o  two per iods .  
Terms are appl ied t o  o b j e c t s  o r  circumstances t o  
which they  could never have been s u i t a b l e ,  bu t  
f o r  t h e  a b s t r a c t  sense  t h a t  has been a s s i g n e d  t o  
them, from t h e  s u 5 t l e  analogies  which t h e  mind 
can perce ive  between even t h e  most m a t e r i a l  and 
t h e  most s p i r i t u a l  circumstances o r  o b j e c t s .  
( Ib id- ,  6 )  
Poe t ic  creat ions ,  as those  of Homer, Shakespeare, Wordsworth o r  
Shelley,  b u i l t  on t h e  extensive use  of metaphors a r e  thus at t h e  
c e n t e r  of L y a l l r s  a t t e n t i o n .  He is  able t o  r e a l i z e  t h a t  metaphorical 
language, mastered by the i n t e l l e c t ,  under the  spe l l  of productive 
imagination has t h e  power t o  c r e a t i v e l y  improve our  r e l a t i o n s h i p  wi th  
the world. 
However, Lya l l  does not  fol fow up t h i s  discovery of t h e  
enormous csea t ive  capac i ty  of imagination.  H e  does n o t  spend much 
time explaining how it works because of t h e  limits of h i s  expos i t ion  
and because of he considered the faculty of imagination to be 
incomprehensible as such- Imagination avoids a pure ly  intellectuai 
approach since it is a composite of both intellect and emotions- 
Anotner reason would be his presupposition that the intellect itself 
is divorced from reality. Therefore, instead of sacrificing the 
Platonic view about the intellect i.e., considering it as 
transcending the woxld which is given to us in space and time, 
instead of sacrificing the intellect as representing order and as 
being an eternal principle, he sacrifices the creative power of the 
intellect, 
The Emotive D i m a r i s i o n  
For Lyall though, in the imaginative state, the intellect 
works together with the emotions. Moreover, Ricoeur, in his theory cf 
metaphor, links the two as well. However, he talks about feelings: 
To feel, in the emotional sense of the word, is 
to make ours what has been put at a distance by 
thougnt in its objectifying phase. They 
[feelings] are not merely inner States but 
interiorized thoughts ... Its function is to abolish 
the distance between knower and known without 
cancelling the cognitive structure of thought and 
the intentional distance which it impels . Feeling 
is not contrary to thought. It is thought made 
ours. (Ricoeur 1980, 154) 
Now, we have seen that Lyall does not distinguish drastically between 
feelings and emotions and that his basic idea at work in the theory 
of emotion is  t h a t  emotion is no t  opposi te  t o  thought. Q u i t e  t h e  
contrary,  emotion is t l i a t  which informç t h e  i n t e l l e c t  about what, f o r  
t h e  i n t e l l e c t  "is at a dis tance" ,  i - e .  t h e  phenomenal world- Through 
emotion w e  become c l o s e r  t o  t h e  world. 
Thus, Lyal l  and Ricoeur s e e m  t o  be i n  agreement with r ega rd  t o  
t h e  i d e a  t h a t  through emotion w e  become closer  t o  t he  world, w i t h  the 
d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  Ricoeur develops t h i s  idea  and completes h i s  t heo ry  
of metaphor, By following Ricoeur 's  thought 1 intend t o  expand 
L y a l l r s  i n s i g h t  and make it more complete along t h e  l i n e s  o f  
Ricoeurr s theory.  
For Ricoeur, f e e l i n g s  accompany imagination by adding t o  t h e  
"seeing as" what Ricoeur cal ls  t h e  dimension of "feel ing as"- In  
imagination,  as shown above, w e  "see" s i m i l a r i t i e s  i n  remote ideas, 
we grasp  t h e  "mixture o f  l ike  and unlike,  proper t o  s imi l a r i t y8 ' -  
Feel ing is thus  not j u s t  something t h a t  per ta ins  exclusively  t o  what 
happens t o  t h e  body, o r  j u s t  something t h a t  r e s t s  on a s t a t e  of mind. 
Feeling,  by accompanying imagination,  i s  pa r t  of  us  as knowing 
sub j ects . "We f e e l  l i k e  what we see  like" ( I b i d . ,  154 ) . Through 
f e e l i n g s  w e  are involved i n  t h e  process of grasping s i m i l a r i t i e s  
between remote ideas,  w e  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  i n t e l l e c t ' s  d iscovery of 
a new meaning, Without it, w e  would probably fa11 i n t o  merely 
apprec i a t ing  t h e  f ineness  o f  t h e  metaphorical construct ion,  as 
Turbayne would have l i k e d  us  t o  do. 
Ricoeur then recognizes  t h a t ,  f ee l ings  "accompany and complete 
imagination as picturing r e l a t ionsh ips"  (Ibid., 1 5 5 ) .  This a s p e c t  of 
f e e l i n g  iç what Northrop Frye, i n  The Anatomy of Criticism calls  
"mood". The mood i s  t h e  consequence of us being a f f ec t ed  by  a poem a s  
a whole, as a unique c h a h  of words. Thus, the  mood of t h a t  poem i s  
t h e  i c o n i c  r ep re sen t a t i on  of t h e  poem be ing  f e l t .  Now, Ricoeur refers 
t o  rnetaphor as being a poem i n  minia ture .  If t h i s  i s  t r ue ,  t h e n  
s e i z i n g  t h e  metaphor i s  not a complete p rocess  without  t h e  element of 
f e e l i n g  which i s  "the iconic a s  fe l t" .  ( I b i d . ,  155) 
Fina l l y ,  Ricoeur t a l k s  about f e e l i n g s  as t hey  b r ing  their 
con t r i bu t i on  t o  t h e  s p l i t  r e fe rence  of p o e t i c  d i scourse .  Through 
imagination thought can suspend i t s  d i r e c t  r e fe rence  t o  r e a l i t y  as we 
have seen.  Besides reproduc t ive  imagination,  where thought just 
reproduces r e a l i t y ,  t h e r e  i s  product ive  imagination,  where thought  
has the a b i l i t y  t o  produce something new- This way, i n  imagination,  
thought augments our p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  read r e a l i t y .  Correspondingly, 
f e e l i n g s ,  Ricoeur says,  "are ways of 'b2ing-there'  , of ' f ind ingf  
ou r se lve s  wi th in  t h e  world .-- Because of f e e l i n g s  w e  are ' a t t uned  to '  
a spec t s  of r e a l i t y  which cannot  be expressed i n  terms of t h e  o b j e c t s  
r e f  e r r e d  t o  i n  ordinary  language" (Ibid. , 156) 
To sum it a l 1  up, Ricoeur considers  t h a t  a rnetaphor includes, 
bes ides  i t s  cogni t ive  dimension, an imaginat ive  and an emotional 
eiernent as w e l l .  A l 1  of them a r e  i n t ima te ly  connected. T h e  f u l l  
c o g n i t i v e  i n t e n t  of a metaphor would be incomplete without the 
c o n t r i b u t i o n  of imagination and f ee l i ngs .  I n  Ricoeur's own words: 
" the re  i s  a structural analogy between t h e  cogni t ive ,  t he  
imaginat ive ,  and tire emotional  components of  t h e  complete 
metaphor ica l  act and t n a t  t h e  metaphorical  p rocess  draws i t s  
concre teness  and i t s  completeness from t h i s  s t r u c t u r a l  analogy and 
t h i s  complementary funct ioning"  (Ibid., 157 ) . 
Ricoeur 's  theory  o f  metaphor i s  o f t e n  r e f e r r e d  t o  a s  a t ens ion  
theory of metaphor. The reason f o r  employing t h e  term "tension" is 
obvious if w e  t ake  i n t o  account  t h e  fact t h a t  Ricoeur b r ings  forward 
two levels o f  re fe rence ,  a s  w e  s a w  when he analyzed t h e  d i f f e r ences  
between Frege and Benveniste's approaches concerning t h i s  i s s u e  t h a t  
make up the foundat ions  f o r  a s p l i t  reference i n  which the  
metaphorical  s ta tement  is  r o o t e a -  Then, t h e r e  are two d i f f e r e n t  ways 
of looking  a t  t h e  concept of an image: t h e r e  can  be t a l k  about the  
image as r e p l i c a  and t h e  image as f i c t i o n  and they Soth act t oge tbo r  
i n  a metaphor with one being surpassed by the  other. Finally,  
feelings corne onto t h e  scene a t t ached  t o  and conple t ing  the  
metaphorical  u t t e r ance .  Moreover, t h e  l i n g u i s t i c  elements t h a t  e n t e r  
i n t o  t h e  makeup of a metaphor are connecred by t h e  copula 'is". The 
copula i t s e l f  should only be t aken  together  wi th  F t s  c o r r e i a t e  "is 
not" because a metaphor points  o u t  not only the  s i m i l a r i t i e s  between 
remote i deas  b u t  a l s o  t h e i r  d i f fe rences ,  p reserv ing  t h e  tension 
between them- 
Through metaphor we d i scover  a new c r e a t i v e  aimension i n  
language- Metaphor, as Ricoeur p u t s  it, has an h e u r i s t i c  func t ion .  
Metaphor r e l a t e s  t o  r e a l i t y  by br inging forward new aspects of it. B y  
improving our language w e  a r e  likely t o  d i scove r  i n  t h e  world 
something t h a t  could no t  be prev ious ly  descr ibed .  Thus, metaphor does 
no t  m i r r o r  r e a l i t y  bu t  it re-descr ibes  it, it makes it more d i v e r s e  
and f u l l e r .  And through t h a t  it changes our  w a y  of r e l a t i n g  t o  it, it 
chânges "our way of dwelling i n  t h e  world". 
Lya l l  d i d  n o t  develop h i s  ideas on metaphor t o  t he  ex ten t  t h a t  
Ricoeur d i d .  However, as shown above, there are s i m i l a r i t i e s  between 
h i s  thought on the subject and Ricoeur's. Unlike Ricoeur, Lya l l  did 
not  have a t  hand t h e  f indings  of  phenornenology, such as the  
importance of s u b j e c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  attempt t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  way t h e  
world makes i tself  present  t o  awareness, o r  t h e  idea of the  
importance of r e tu rn ing  t o  t h e  t h i n ç s  i n  themselves. Thus L y a l l  did 
not  have an incen t ive  f o r  walking i n  uncharted t e r r i t o r y ,  p r e f e r r i n g  
t o  stay on t h e  path l i g h t e d  by t r a d i t i o n a l  European views on t h i s  
m a t t e r .  Nevertheless, he foresaw t h e  importance of language and 
s t r e s s e d  tne use  o f  metaphor ica l  language which, complemented by 
ernotions i n  t h e  imaginative s t a t e  has the  a b i l i t y  t o  open up new 
dimensions i n  Our i n t e r a c t i o n  wi th  t h e  world. 
The same s o r t  of connect ion is emphasized by David Abram i n  
h i s  book The Spell  o f  the S ~ R S U O U S  (1997)  where he  a s s e r t s  t h a t :  
A t  t he  h e a r t  o f  any language then,  is t he  poe t i c  
p roduc t iv i t  y of express ive  speech, A l i v i n g  
language is  c o n t i n u a l l y  being made and remade, 
woven out of the s i l e n c e  by those  who speak ... And 
t h i s  s i l e n c e  i s  t h a t  of  our wordless 
p a r t i c i p a t i o n s ,  of our  perceptual  immersion i n  
t h e  depths o f  an animate, express ive  world. 
(1997,  8 4 )  
By be ing  immersed i n  t h e  natural world w e  have the opportunity t o  
improve our language, and rnetaphor i s  the  best t o o l  t h a t  w e  can use  
i n  o r d e r  t o  achieve t h i s .  
The world, as  Abram s e e s  it, i s  animate and i ts  "wild, 
p a r t i c i p a t o r y  l o g i c  r a m i f i e s  and e labora tes  i t s e l f  i n  language" 
(Ibid- , 8 4  ) . W e  cannot p i c k  up  a s i n g l e  phenornenon, as John M u i r  once 
sa id ,  without "finding it h i t c h e d  t o  everything else" i n  the 
universe .  Abram cont inues  t h i s  same l i n e  of thought: 
It i s  t h i s  dynamic, in terconnected r e a l i t y  t h a t  
provokes and s u s t a i n s  a l1  our speaking,  lending 
something of i t s  s t r u c t u r e  t o  al1 our  various 
languages. T h e  enigmatic nature o f  language 
echoes and 'prolongs unto  t h e  i n v i s i b l e '  t h e  
w i l d ,  i n t e r p e n e t r a t i n g ,  interdependent nature of 
t h e  s ens ib l e  landscape i t s e l f .  (Ibid., 85) 
This means t h a t  everything i s  connected, everything is p a r t  of t h e  
immense un i ty  which cannot be grasped by t h e  r i g i d  use language. 
In  sum, metaphor is of tremendous importance i f  w e  are t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a re la t ionship  between human beings as language users  and 
r e a l i t y .  The purpose of metaphorical language i s  n e i t h e r  t o  "improve 
communication, nor t o  ensure univocity i n  argumentation, but t o  
s h a t t e r  and t o  increase our sense of r e a l i t y  by s h a t t e r i n g  and 
increasing our language [-..] With metaphor w e  experience the  
metamorphosis of both language and r e a l i t y "  (Ricoeur 1991, 8 5 ) .  W e  do 
not u s e  metaphors f o r  the sake o f  comunication,  nor do we use them 
a s  mere ornaments. Metaphors do not help u s  t o  reduce ambiguity or t o  
a t t a i n  univocity.  Instead, they break apart t h e  s t ruc tu res  of 
language by bringing together  remote ideas t h a t ,  a t  t h e  same t i n e ,  
exh ib i t  s imi la r  and d i f f e r e n t  t r a i t s ,  as i n  the metaphorical 
a s se r t ions  t h a t  "Time i s  a r iver"  and "Odysseus is a journey", etc. 
Such a s se r t ions  grasp kinship and bui ld  s i rn i l a r i t i e s  on 
d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s .  Moreover, metaphors change our way of being-in-the- 
world. They do not merely describe r e a l i t y  any longer. The r e a l i t y  
they bring f o r t h  i s  completely new and unexpected. Metaphors do not 
imi t a t e  r e a l i t y .  Rather, they redescribe it, they re-present i t  
through words. With t h e  metaphorical a s se r t ion  "Tirne i s  a r ive r "  we 
a r e  prepared t o  understand time i n  a new way, as sornething 
continuously flowing and forever  chmging. Thus, reality becomes 
novel because we chznged our way of r e l a t i n g  t o  it. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An a l d e r  l e a f ,  loosened by wind, is d r i f t i n g  o u t  
with the t i d e .  As it d r i f t s ,  it bumps i n t o  t h e  
s lender  leg of a grea t  b lue  heron s t a r i n g  
i n t e n t l y  through t h e  r i pp l ed  surface, then drifts  
on. The heron r a i s e s  one l e g  o u t  of t h e  water  and 
replaces  it, a s ing le  s t e p .  A s  1 watch 1, too,  am 
drawn i n t o  t h e  spread of s i l e n c e .  Slowly, a bank 
of clouds approaches, s l i p p i n g  i t s  bulged and 
bi l lowing texture over t h e  e a r t h ,  fo ld ing  t h e  
heron and t h e  a l d e r  t r e e s  and my gazing body into 
t he  depths o f  a vast brea th ing  being, enfo ld ing  
us a l 1  wi th in  a common f l e s h ,  a conunon s t o r y  now 
bur s t i ng  with r a i n .  
David Abram 
David Abram, i n  his much ce lebra ted  book The Spel l  of the 
Sensuous, seems t o  summarize t h e  l a t e n t  i deas  presen t  i n  ~ ~ a l i ~ s  book 
In te l lec t ,  the Emotions and the Moral N a t u r e .  For L y a l l  human beings 
a r e  part of t h e  world i n  a s  much as t h e y  t o o  like t h e  r e s t  of "what 
is" p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  Being. T h e  i n t e l l e c t ,  Seing t h e  e t e r n a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  
connects with God bu t  separated from Nature. The 
the o the r  hand, put us  i n  touch, through phenomenal r e a l i t y ,  w i t h  
Being which fs another  name f o r  God, a t  least i n  what concerns L y a l l -  
L y a l l  first and f oremost r e l i g i o u s  and 
n a t u r a l  t o  f i nd  hlin t a l k i n g  about God and p r a i s i n g  h i m ,  he re  and 
the re ,  throughout t h e  Intel lect ,  the Emotions and the Moral N a t u r e -  
However, bes ides  comec t ing  with  G o d  through grace w e  can see  God i r r  
H i s  works. Regarding t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  Lyall,  i n  t h e  inaugural  
l e c t u r e  a t  Free Church College, on t h e  philosophy of mind, reminds 
us:  
Perhaps, we a r e  t oo  apt t o  forge t  t h e  c l a b s  of 
God i n  Nature, because of t h e  super ior  
mani fes ta t ions  of him in Grace. There is  t o o  
g r e a t  a  tendency t o  d i sparage  the  one, because of 
t he  more overwhelming demonstrations of the  
o the r .  It w a s  not  t n u s  wi th  t h e  Psalmis t .  H e  
looked up t o  t h e  heavens which God made, t o  t h e  
moon and t h e  s t a r s  w h i c h  he had ordained, and he 
l ea rned  h i s  lesson of p i e t y  from these .  H e  
r e j o i n e d  i n  t h e  p o e t i c  beau t i e s  of c r ea t ion :  and 
made t h e m  express his f e e l i n g s  o f  devot ion and 
u t t e r  the  language of t h e  most s p i r i t u a l  
experiences . And we b e l i e v e  t h e  more s c i e n t i f i c  
Our acquaintance with G o d  works, we s h a l l  s e e  G o d  
more i n  them, we s h a l l  be brought more i n t o  
immediate contact  w i t h  t h e  Divine Being - not  
with a law, o r  a p r i n c i p l e ,  but with a pe r sona l  
God - w e  s h a l l  behold more t o  admire [...] God i s  
obviously  recognized b o t h  i n  na ture  and i n  grace .  
(1853, 13)  
Lya l l  recognized the  importance of see ing  God through His works,  in 
Nature. Here 1 have no t  been concerned with t h e  o t h e r  p o s s i b i l i t y  of 
comec t ing  with G o d  through grace  b u t  r a the r  with t r y i n g  t o  make t h e  
most out  of w h a t  i s  l e f t ,  namely Nature. This i s  w h y  1 th ink  t h a t  
David Abram's i d e a s  a r e  most u s e f u l ,  a s  he of fe r s  u s  an i n s i g h t  t h a t  
comes £rom the phenomenological t r a d i t i o n ,  imbued w i t h  cons idera t ions  
about language and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n -  a world where human beings a r e  
n e i t h e r  subordinated t o ,  nor above Nature. 
Thus, I will make use of t h e  conclusions reached i n  the  
previous chapte rs  i n  order t o  show t h a t  Lyall  i n t u i t e d  avant l a  da te  
the importance of being a human being i n  a more-than-human world. 
Looking back t o  Lya l l f s  considerations on t h e  imaginative 
s t a t e ,  w e  can see  t h a t  is the place w h e r e  he br ings together both the 
i n t e l l e c t  and t h e  emotions. In t h e  imaginative s t a t e  we are  ab le  t o  
commune with Nature because i n  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  s t a t e  w e  perceive 
analogies, w e  s ee  beyond what is out t h e r e  as an objec t ,  we 
"personify nature", we do not l i m i t  ourselves t o  j u s t  describirrg 
r e a l i t y  Dut w e  re-describe it through an extensive use of 
metaphorical language , 
Moreover, Lyal l  would Say t h a t  w e  empathize with Nature 
through emotions, grasping its concreteness and unity, 
t h e  same w a y  Abram does: 
From t h e  rnagician's, o r  phenomenologist's, 
perspective t h a t  which w e  c a l 1  imagination is 
from t h e  f i r s t  an a t t r i b u t e  of t h e  senses 
themselves; imagination is  no t  a separa te  mental 
f a c u l t y  (as we often assume) but  i s  r a t h e r  a way 
t h e  senses themselves have of throwing themselves 
beyond what is h e d i a t e l y  given, i n  order  t o  
make t e n t a t i v e  contact w i t h  t h e  other s i d e s  of 
th ings  t h a t  we do not sense d i r e c t l y ,  w i t h  t h e  
hidden o r  i n v i s i b l e  aspects of  t h e  sens ib le .  
(Abram 1997,  58) 
The idea that i n  imagination w e  "make contact  with o ther  sides of 
things" is s b i l a r  t o  what Lyall thinks when he says t h a t  emotions 
and  e spec ia l ly  t h e  emotion of love, "see" beyond p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s ,  
beyond what i s  acc identa l  and changeable, toward Being i t s e l f .  
Ultimately, f o r  Lyal l  as well as  f o r  Abram, "both t h e  
perceiving and t h e  perceived being are o f  the same stuff C..] the 
perceiver and t h e  perceived are  interdependent and i n  some sense even 
revers ib le  aspec ts  of a comon animate element, o r  Flesh, tha t  i s  a t  
once both sensible and sensitive" (Abram Ibid. ,  67) . Abram takes  
Flesh t o  mean w h a t  Merleau-Ponty meant w h e n  he used t h i s  term i n  his 
w o r k  The Visible and the Invisible- The Flesh  i s  " the  r e c i p r o c a i  
presence  of  t h e  s e n t i e n t  i n  t h e  s e n s i b l e  and of t h e  s e n s i b l e  i n  t h e  
s e n t i e n t " .  I t  i s  t h e  i n t e r c o ~ e c t e d n e s s  of the  p e r c e i v e r  and of t h e  
p e r c e i v a b l e  world, These two cannot exist independently of each o t h e r  
because w e  can only  s e n s e  our  surroundings f r o m  a p a r t i c u l a r  
p e r s p e c t i v e  which i m p l i e s  t h a t  we extend o u r  s e n t i e n c e  i n  t h e  
surroundings ,  Moreover, it would be imposs ib le  t o  imagine a s e n t i e n t  
s u b j e c t  completely s e p a r a t e d  from a " f ie ld  of sensed phenornena". 
For Lyal l ,  as w e  s a w  be fo re ,  when h e  t a l k e d  about  love ,  he 
cons ide red  t h a t  "every o b j e c t ,  every being,  shares  i n  i t s  e x e r c i s e :  
it has  s e l e c t e d  no o b j e c t  f o r  i t s  e x e r c i s e ;  but  eve ry  o b j e c t  r e c e i v e s  
a p a r t  of  i ts  r e g a r d  as it cornes w i t h i n  i t s  sphere.  I n  i t s  most 
a b s o l u t e  c h a r a c t e r ,  being i s  i t s  ob jec t "  ( L y a l l  1855, 4 0 8 )  . T h e  same 
in terconnectedness  between us a s  s e n t i e n t  be ings  and t h e  s e n s i b l e  
surroundings is p r e s e n t  he re .  W e  are capable of l o v e  and w e  l o v e  
Being, r e g a r d l e s s  of t h e  p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s  i n  which it i s  expressed  o r  
of t h e  changes which it might endure. Through love  w e  axe i n  touch  
with "what is", w e  o u r s e l v e s ,  be ing p a r t  o f  it. Thus, L y a l l r  s thought  
i s  n o t  e x c l u s i v e i y  c e n t e r e d  on God and man s i n c e  t h i s  c o m e c t i o n  is  
e s t a b l i s h e d  by t h e  i n t e l l e c t  a lone .  But w e  a r e  on ly  whole when t h e  
i n t e l l e c t  and t h e  emotions work t o g e t h e r .  Through emotions, however, 
we . t ake  a de tour  and see Cod expressed  i n  p e r s o n i f i e d  Nature.  Through 
imaginat ion  where t h e  i n t e l l e c t  and emotions m e e t ,  w e  have t h e  
oppor tun i ty  t o  d i s c o v e r  new ways of  r e l a t i n g  t o  Nature, by making it 
more complex and f u l l e r .  For S t .  Bernard o f  Clairvaux (1090-11531, 
f o r  example, Nature w a s  a lmost  void  o f  any s i g n i f i c a n c e  s i n c e  he  is 
s a i d  t o  have t r a v e l l e d  a c r o s s  t h e  most b e a u t i f u l  landscapes  wi thout  
even noticing them as he was concerned exclusively with thoughts 
about his sou1 and God- 
For Lyall, Nature cannot be avoided because we are part of it 
as it is part of us. Even though Lyallrs work exhibits idealist 
features, he detaches himself from the general understanding of 
idealisrn, as he does not follow, for example, either Berkeleyr s or 
Hegel's ideas. This however, did not compel him to embsace a 
materialist point of v i e w -  He knew that the idealist tries to 
dissolve the tension between the 1 and the world by explaining the 
world as a mere projection of the mind, whereas the materialist 
submerges the 1 into the vast sea of matter. 
So Lyall took a more balanced stance, asserting that both the 1 
and the world exist but that they are connected by our emotions 
through which we are a l e  to see nature as animate and as " f u l l  of 
1ife"- However, Lyall does not see the world as Sartre, for exampie, 
saw it, when we are under the spell of emotions- Sartre, even though 
he emphasized the difference between the 1 and the world, stressed 
the tension tnat exists between the two, the tension that springs 
when the 1 tries to appropriate the world which, in its turn, opposes 
resistance. Thus, the I tries to make its own something that still 
remains "strange" and distant. Lyall avoids this "deception" because 
for him ernotions grasp what is beyond the particular characteristics 
of the world: emotions grasp Being i t s e l f .  
Ernst Breisach in his Ifitroduction to Modern Existentialism 
writes about simiiar existentialist views on this matter: 
Neither a denial of the reality of the world 
(idealist position} nor the denial of the 
uniqueness of man (materialist position), nor a 
set of benevolent laws of nature nor Divine 
Providence can eliminate the fundamental fact of 
t h e  human condi t ion ,  t h a t  no miraculous harmony 
e x i s t s  in the world and t h a t  t o  reso lve  t h e  
enormous t e n s i o n  between man and h i s  world is 
beyond human power- What becomes audib le  i n  t h i s  
t ens ion  i s  the echo of man's questions r e f l e c t e d  
from \somewheref , and human l i f e  a t  i t s  best i s  
t h i s  sounding of  t h e  depths.  (1962, 203) 
W e  can s e e  now t h a t  Lya l l ' s  pos i t i on  d i f f e r s  from S a r t r e ' s  i n  t h a t  he 
does n o t  regard  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between human beings and the  world 
as Deing under the  s i g n  of  an unsurpassable t ens ion .  For him, both w e  
and t h e  world a r e  p a r t  o f  Being. Emotions make t h i s  s i m i l a r i t y  
v i s i b l e  t o  us 
Now, t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p  can and should be developed by 
augmenting and improving ou r  langilage as well which gives us t h e  
chance t o  discover  i n  t h e  world something that could n o t  be 
prev ious ly  described.  This is  where Ricoeur's theory  of  metaphor i s  
u s e f u l .  Ricoeur  does n o t  consider  metaphor t o  be  just an ornarnent a s  
it w a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  understood. Au contraire, he t a l k s  about a 
metaphorical  statement whicn implies t h a t  metaphors can be true, t n a t  
they  can r e f e r  t o  r e a l i t y ,  I n  order  t o  show t h a t  metaphors have the  
c a p a b i l i t y  t o  reach r e a l i t y ,  he had t o  reassess  t h e  i s s u e  of 
re fe rence .  There is a rnetaphorical reference,  bes ide  l i t e r a l  
re fe rence ,  Ricoeur cons iders ,  z s  t h e r e  i s  a metaphorical  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  beside  l i t e r a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  The r e a l i t y  t o  which 
metaphors refer i s  a r i c h e r  r e a l i t y .  Ricoeur a l s o  had t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
between two types of imagination and s t r e s s  t h e  importance of the 
product ive  imagination. Imagination, f o r  Ricoeur, produces an 
unexplored v i s ion  of r e a l i t y .  F ina l ly ,  he had t o  draw on d i f f e r e n t  
ways i n  which t h e  emotional efement complements t h e  metaphorical  
p rocess  . Imagination always accornpanied emotional element 
which r ep re sen t s  a way of "finding ourselves" i n  t h e  world, of "being 
there". 
These t h e m e s  from Ricoeur are common t o  Lya l l  even though 
adrnittedly L y a l l  does not develop a theory of metaphor- However, he  
makes ex t ens ive  use  of metaphorical construct ions  and discusses  t h e  
i n t r i c a t e  work of imagination al though he does no t  produce an 
explanation o r  a thorough a n a l y s i s  of imagination which involves bo th  
t h e  emotions and t h e  i n t e l l e c t .  
Where L y a l l  w a s  mistaken w a s  i n  consider ing t h e  i n t e l l e c t  to be 
separated from r e a l i t y ,  Ricoeur showed t h a t  t h i s  should not be t h e  
case  because metaphors, which are c rea t ions  of our  i n t e l l e c t ,  do n o t  
merely d e s c r i b e  r e a l i t y .  Instead,  metaphors re-describe F t -  They make 
it more d i v e r s e  and f u l l e r  and thus they improve our r e l a t i onsh ip  
with it, 
Something s i m i l a r  is expressed by Abram when he wri tes :  "Only 
by overlooking t h e  sensuous, evocat ive  dimension of human discourse ,  
and a t t end ing  s o l e l y  t o  the  deno ta t ive  and conventional  aspect  of 
verbal  communication, can we hold ourselves a p a r t  from, and ou t s ide  
o f ,  t h e  rest of animate nature" ( I b i d . ,  7 9 )  . 
Thus, w e  a r e  constant ly  under t h e  "spe l l  of t n e  sensuous" 
because we ourse lves  a r e  sensuous beings .  T h e  i n t e l l e c t  is not,  a s  
Lyal l  bel ieved,  divorced from r e a l i t y ,  from Nature. As  Abram puts it: 
Our senses  d i sc lose  t o  us a wild-flowering 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  e n t i t i e s  and elements, i n  which 
h m a n s  a r e  thoroughly immersed. While t h i s  
d i v e r s i t y  of sensuous forms c e r t a i n l y  d i sp l ays  
some s o r t  of reckless order, w e  f i n d  ourselves  i n  
t h e  midst of,  rather t han  on top  of, t h i s  
order ... Does the  human i n t e l l e c t ,  o r  Ireason' , 
r e a l l y  spr ing  u s  f r e e  from Our inherence i n  t h e  
depths  of t h i s  wild p r o l i f e r a t i o n  of f o m ?  O r  on 
the contrary ,  is t h e  human i n t e l l e c t  rooted in ,  
and s e c r e t l y  borne by, our forgo t ten  contac t  w i t h  
t h e  mul t ip l e  nonhuman shapes t h a t  surround us?.  
(Ibid.,  4 8 - 4 9 )  
The l i n k  of reason with r e a l i t y  goes deeper than L y a l l  considered- 
Even though h e  stressed t h e  f a c t  t h a t  our emotions have a cogn i t i ve  
value,  t h a t  t h e y  r ep re sen t  t h e  channel  through which t h e  i n t e l l e c t  
reaches t h e  world, they  a r e  s t i l l  n o t  t h e  only  l i n k .  
Abram f o r  one recognizes t h a t  through language, t h e  i n t e l l e c t  
f inds i tself  i n  t h e  midst  of t h ings  because: 
W e  [.--] l e a r n  Our na t ive  language not  mental ly  b u t  
bod i ly  . W e  appropr ia te  new words and phrases  
f i rs t  through t h e i r  express ive  t o n a l i t y  and 
t e x t u r e ,  through t h e  w a y  they  feel i n  the mouth 
o r  r o l l  o f f  t h e  tongue, and it i s  t h i s  d i r e c t ,  
felt s ign i f i cânce  - t h e  t a s t e  of a word o r  
phrase ,  t h e  w a y  it in f luences  o r  modulates t h e  
body - t h a t  provides the f e r t i l e ,  po lyva len t  
source  f o r  a l 1  t he  more re f ined  and r a r e f i e d  
meanings which t h a t  term m a y  come t o  have f o r  us  ... 
Language, then,  cannot be genuinely s t u d i e d  o r  
understood i n  i s o l a t i o n  from the  sensuous 
r eve rbe ra t ion  and resonance of a c t i v e  speech- 
(Ibid., 7 5 )  
But t h i s  r e c i p r o c i t y ,  t h i s  interdependence between language and the 
i n t e l l e c t ,  on t h e  one nand, and percept ion and "sensuousness", on t h e  
o the r  tiand, has a downside f o r  Lyall. If w e  a r e  t o  p l ace  ourselves  i n  
Lya l l ' s  shoes w e  can see that he took the  i n t e l l e c t  t o  mean what it 
means i n  the  P la ton ic  t r a d i t i o n ,  It represents  o rde r  and it is t h e  
e t e r n â l  p r i n c i p l e ,  and t h i s  forced him t o  def ine  t h e  sur romding  
world as  a determinate  set of objects t o  cu t  t h e  conscious s e l f  o f f  
irom t h e  spontaneous l i f e  of Nature- "To def ine  another  being a s  an 
i n e r t  o r  p a s s i v e  ob jec t  i s  t o  deny i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  a c t i v e l y  engage us 
and t o  provoke Our senses; w e  t h u s  block our perceptual reciprocity 
with t h a t  being" ( Ib id . ,  5 6 )  . Thus, by def ining another  being as a 
passive object, for the intellect the phenornenal world becomes j u s t  a 
worla of shadows. 
Trying to avoid interacting with an inert world, Lyall 
sprinkled metapnors on the dry, abstract language that he used to 
explain this and that concept or idea- For the same purpose he needed 
the input of emotions which represent the only accessible path to the 
animateness of the world. Abram explains that : 
If we wish to describe a particular phenomenon 
without repressing our direct experience, then we 
cannot avoid speaking of the phenomenon as an 
active, animate entity with which we find 
ourselves engaged ... Only by affirming tne 
animateness of perceived things do we allow our 
words t o  emerge directly from the depths o f  our 
ongoing reciprocity with the world". (,Abram, 
idem, p. 56) 
Lnasmuch as we a r e  part of the world, inasmuch as we and the world 
are "of the same stuff", we cannot simply disassociate from it, we 
cannot regard it from a purely objective perspective- 
Lyall intuited that we are emotionally involved in the world. 
Our emotions, Lyall considers, represent our extension in the world. 
Through them we discover ourselves as participants in the world. This 
idea is rightfully emphasized by Armour and Trott in their analysis 
of Lyallf s major work Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature. 
The way Lyall understood the balanced relation between reason and 
enotions compels Armour and Trott to consider him a representative of 
Canadian philosophy. However, for them, his work seems to be more a 
patchwork quilt of foreign ideas- 
It was my goal here to show that Lyallrs contribution is more 
significant than Armour and Trott estimated. Indeed, emotions connect 
us with reality. But so does our intellect tnrough its activity of 
creating metaphors w h i c h  L y a l l  uses throughoiit nis work even though 
he doeç n o t  o f f e r  a study of metapnor as such. However, metaphors 
themselves are no t  purely i n t e l l e c t u a l  const ruct ions .  There is an 
emotional element that enters i n t o  t h e i r  constitution as well- T h u s ,  
t h e  l i n k  between emotions and reason becomes more ev iden t .  T h e i r  
balance i n  Lyall's w o r k  i s  a s t rong  exdmple of the accommodationist 
use of  reason. 
Being Used by Metaphor: The Fallacy of T a k i n g  a Metaphor L i t e r a l l y  
Turbayne d i s t i ngu i shes  between two sides of t h e  metaphor which 
c a s t  a Janus p r o f i l e  on it: on t h e  one hand, it can b e  used t o  
express t h e  otherwise un-expressible; but ,  on the  other hand, it can 
abuse i ts  u s e r s .  Metaphor abuses i t s  use rs  when the "make believe" Fs 
taken s e r i o u s l y .  This i s  where one must be  v i g i l a n t -  Otherwise, t h e  
"make-believe" is transformed i n t o  "believe" and t h e  "as if" l o s e s  
i t s  meaning and becomes "is". Thus, frorn enjoying t h e  tens ion c r ea t ed  
by  t h e  metaphor one can e a s i l y  end up, i f  one i s  no t  ca r e fu l ,  
dwell ing i n  an un rea l  world. This i s  what happened t o  Descartes,  f o r  
example. 
Wnat Descartes intended Co do with h i s  M a t h e s i s  Universa l i s  w a s  
t o  " t r a n s f e r  t h e  c e r t a i n t y  of geometr ica l  demonstration t o  t h e  
procedure of s c i e n t i f i c  à iscovery,  t h a t  is, t h e  c e r t a i n t y  of 
syn thes i s  t o  ana lys i s"  (Turbayne 1 9 7 0 ,  3 8 ) .  What t h i s  means is t h a t  
Descartesr  quest f o r  c e r t a i n t y  had t o  t ake  i n  t h e  advantages of t h e  
mathematical method, "more geornetrico" . 
Now, i s  t h i s  conjunction of  s c i e n t i f i c  discovery and 
geometrical  demonstration a valid one? According t o  Turbayne, it i s  
n o t e  Descartes engaged himself t h i s  i n  a sor t - t respass ing  process.  
Unaware of the  outcome of h i s  ques t ,  Descartes ac ted  as if by saying 
t h a t  "man i s  a wolf", he a c t u a l l y  be l ieved  t h a t  man w a s  indeed a 
wolf. 
Turbayne s e l e c t s  t h r ee  ca se s  of so r t - t r e spas s ing  where 
Descartes does no t  seen t o  cornprehend t h e  f u l l  ix tpl ica t ions  o f  h i s  
arguments. 
1. The first case of so r t - t r e spas s ing  "is t h a t  of t h e  deductive 
r e l a t i o n  wi th  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between even t s ,  The former r e l a t i o n  
belongs t o  procedure [-,.] The l a t t e r  r e l a t i o n  Delongs t o  t h e  process 
going on i n  nature" (Ibid. ,  46). Making use  of deduction,  Descartes 
w a s  a b l e  t o  work w i t h  t h e  theorems which were deduced f r o m  
p r i n c i p l e s .  "Pr inciple  and theorem w e r e  neces sa r i l y  comected"  
( Ib id . ,  4 6 )  . Supposing t h e  principles were true, and because t h e  
mathematical method was employed, as i n  a chain of reasoning,  it 
would be expected for t h e  theorems t o  be t r u e  and t h e r e f o r e  t o  be p u t  
a t  work i n  t h e  process of explaining t h e  world, Which br ings  us t o  
t h e  next  i s sue .  "The  p r i n c i p l e  of procedure t h a t  s tarts  a 
demonstration i s  repea ted  i n  t h e  ' a c t i v e  p r inc ip l e*  t h a t  s t a r t s  t h e  
causa l  process" ( I b i d - ,  46). Thus, w h a t  Turbayne argues  i s  t h a t  when 
Descartes thought about t h e  f a c t  t h a t  "physical  causes  produce t h e  
ex is tence  of t h e i r  e f f e c t s ,  and t h a t  t h e  e f f e c t s  n e c e s s a r i l y  follow 
from t h e  causes" (Ibid., 4 7 )  he was applying t h e  procedural  a lgor i thm 
t o  t h e  phys ica l  world o r ,  as Turbayne metaphorical ly  pu t s  it "a 
prominent page of  t h e  r ec ipe  was mixed i n  w i t h  t h e  stew" ( Ib id . ,  4 7 ) .  
T h i s  a c t  of  s h i f t i n g  what w a s  found i n  one domain i n t o  the orner,  o r  
of a s s o c i a t i n g  them u n t i l  they became "necessar i ly  connected" gave 
enougn grounds f o r  Descartes t o  a f f i r m  t h a t  nature  can be subjected 
t o  t h e  deductive method. Wnich, Turbayne considers,  i s  a c l e a r  
example of t a k i n g  a metaphor l i t e r a l l y .  
2 .  T h e  second c a s e  of t he  so r t - t r e spas s ing  d e t e c t e d  by Turbayne 
i n  Descartesr  system of thought is "the inadver ten t  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of 
explanat ion with phys ica l  explanation and t h i s  with causa l  
explanation,  t h a t  i s ,  t h e  reciuction of one t o  t h e  o the r "  ( Ib id . ,  47) . 
This means sirnply t h a t  Descartes thought t h e  main preoccupation of 
physics t o  be t h a t  of discovering t h e  laws governing t h e  movement of 
t h e  bodies and then, us ing  these  laws t o  account f o r  t h e i r  motion. 
And t h i s  explanation was nothing o t h e r  than  a causa l  explanat ion 
which impl ies  t h a t  events  were a c t u a l l y  caused by the  "physical 
laws". One should n o t  fo rge t  Descartes w a s  determined t o  make use 
only of d i s t i n c t  and c l e a r  ideas a s  opposed t o  "obscure notions". I n  
t h i s  case ,  t h e  c l e a r  and d i s t i n c t  i d e a s  were o f f e red  by e n t i t i e s  such 
as: "bodies moving", "bodies a t  r e s t "  and 'external causes" o r  
"resistance",  where t h e  former ones a r e  no th ing  bu t  t h e  e f f e c t s  of 
t h e  causes expressed by the l a t t e r  ones, A l 1  along Descartesf  
explanat ion the word "pr inc ip le"  was used t o  designate both "the 
premise o r  statement of  t h e  law i n  t h e  procedure and t h e  a c t i v e  
p r i n c i p l e  , t h e  supposed cause  i n  t h e  process" ( Ib id . ,  4 8 ) -  Thus, 
Descartes f a i l e d  t o  s ee  the  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  physical  
explanat ion of  phenornena and t h e i r  t h e o r e t i c a l  explanation,  T h e  
concept of  f o r c e ,  used i n  t h e o r e t i c a l  explanat ions ,  is f a l l a c i o u s l y  
asc r ibed  t o  o b j e c t s .  "Something t h a t  belongs t o  perçons o r  l i v i n g  
th ings  i s  a sc r ibed  t o  matter", Turbayne cons iders .  
3- T h e  t h i r d  case of so r t - t r e spas s ing  involves  t h e  
unwarranted i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of deduction with 
computation o r  c a l c u l a t i o n  o r  any o the r  f o m  of 
m e t r i c a l  reckoning o r  counting [,.] Because 
mathematical computation is cons t an t ly  used i n  
sc ience ,  we must no t  regard i t  a s  a def in ing  
proper ty .  Because l i n e s  and ang les  a r e  used t o  
enormous advantage i n  o p t i c a l  demonstration [,.] 
w e  must no t  t h e r e f o r e  succumb t o  t h e  tendency t o  
t h i n k  t h a t  exp lana t ion  by means o f  l i n e s  and 
ang les  exhaust o p t i c a l  explanat ion,  We might j u s t  
as well Say t h a t  mechanical exp lana t ions  exhaust 
s c i ence  o r  t h a t  w e  cannot s e t  up a deductive 
system without u s i n g  d i f f e r e n t i a l  equat ions .  
( Ib id- ,  49-50) 
I n  Turbaynef s view, the M a t h e s i s  Universalis need not  be geometr ica l .  
What is t o  be taken and used £rom t h e  method i t se l f  i s  the 
dernonstration f e a t u r e  and n o t  " the  na ture  of  t h e  terms used i n  it". 
The "geometrical  method" i s  va luab le  inasmuch a s  it uses 
dernonstration, no t  inasmuch as i t  i s  geometrical .  It does not mat te r  
if t h e  terms p e r t a i n  t o  the area of geometry o r  no t ,  as long as t h e  
algori thm followed is t h e  one of demonstration. 
Turbayne concludes that: "If w e  a r e  v ic t imized,  then w e  confuse 
devices of  procedure with the a c t u a l  process of  nature ,  and t h u s ,  
unknowingly i n s i n u a t e  metaphysics" ( Ib id . ,  56) , 
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